11 EYLÜL SONRASI KİTLE İMHA SİLAHLARI TERÖRİZMİ TEHDİDİ VE ULUSLARARASI KARŞILIKLARA BİR ÖRNEK: NÜKLEER EMNİYET REJİMİ

11 Eylül 2001 terör saldırıları sonrasında endişe duyulan en önemli tehdit, kitle imha silahları (nükleer, kimyasal ve biyolojik silahlar) ya da bunların yapılmasında kullanılan kimyasal, biyolojik, radyolojik ve nükleer (KBRN) maddeler ile düzenlenebilecek terör eylemleriydi. Sınır- aşan terör gruplarının amaçları kendi öz kimliklerinin uygulamalarına engel olduklarını düşündükleri Batı değerleri üzerine kurulmuş uluslararası siyasî ve ekonomik düzeni güç kullanarak devirmektir. Bunu gerçekleştirmek için çok sayıda insanın ölümüne yol açacak, iktisadî ve siyasî sistemin işleyişini engelleyecek ya da bozacak, travmalara yol açacak, halkı paniğe sevk edecek, ya da halkta korku, endişe ve kaygı duygularına neden olacak büyük eylemler öngörmektedirler. Uluslararası toplum, KBRN terörizmini önlemek için birtakım siyasî ve hukukî karşılıklar geliştirmiştir. ABD Eski Başkanı Barack Obama’nın nükleer ve radyolojik maddelerle yapılabilecek terör saldırılarını en önemli tehdit olarak tanımlamasıyla beraber, bu maddelerin kullanım, depolama ve taşınma esnasında korunmaları, yani, nükleer emniyet kavramı öne çıkmıştır. Bu çalışma, nükleer ve radyolojik maddelerle yapılabilecek saldırıları önleyebilmek amacıyla oluşturulan nükleer emniyet rejimini ele alacaktır. Tehdit değerlendirmesini, askerî, teknolojik, siyasî ve teorik açılardan yaptıktan sonra, nükleer emniyet rejiminin gelişimini ve unsurlarını tanıtacaktır. Daha etkin bir uluslararası rejim haline gelmesi yönünde, uluslararası ve ulusal seviyede yapılması gerekenleri ortaya koyacak, bu kapsamda nükleer emniyet normu ve kültürünün geliştirilmesi gerektiğinin altını çizecektir. Çalışmanın dikkat çektiği en önemli husus, nükleer emniyetle ilgili uluslararası düzenlemelerin başarılı olmasının en önemli dayanağının, ulusal nükleer emniyet rejimlerinin kurulması ve sağlamlaştırılması olduğudur.

THE POST-9/11 WMD TERRORISM THREAT AND AN EXAMPLE TO INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES: THE NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME

The most significant threat following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were those that could be carried out with the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) material. The main aim of transnational terrorist groups is to change the prevailing system by use of force. They perceive the international system based on Western values as an obstacle to the applications of their identities and belief systems. To that end, they foresee sensational terrorist attacks that will result in mass casualties, disrupt the social, economic and political life, will traumatize publics, and lead them to live under constant fear, anxiety and worry. The international community have come up with some political and legal responses to this CBRN terrorism threat. After the former US President Barack Obama defined nuclear terrorism as the most important threat to international security, the security of nuclear material in use, storage and transport has come to the fore. This article will tackle nuclear security regime, which is formed to prevent the threat of terrorism with the use of nuclear and radiological material. After making threat assessment from military, political, technological and theoretical perspectives, it will provide the historical background to the nuclear security regime and its elements. It will put forward the requirements at the international and national level on how the regime will be strengthened and be more effective. It underlines that what is critical is the development of the norm and culture of nuclear security at the national level so that there will be effective national nuclear security regimes that will lead to a universalized nuclear security regime.

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