Teori ve Uygulamada Merkez Bankası Şeffaflığı

Özet: Merkez Bankası şeffaflığı, son yıllarda para politikasının temel özelliklerinden biri haline gelmiştir. Merkez Bankası şeffaflığının artması, özel sektör belirsizliğini azaltır, ekonomik karışıklıkları istikrarlı hale getirmek için Merkez Bankasına daha çok esneklik verir, üretimin volatilitesini düşürür ve Merkez Bankacılarının hareketlerini sosyal olarak optimal hale getirir. Çalışmada Merkez Bankasının İnterbank Faiz Oranları üzerine olan şeffaflık etkisi ampirik olarak ortaya konulmaktadır. Ekonomik şeffaflık arttığında faizin azalacağı ve enflasyon ile faiz oranı arasındaki pozitif ve anlamlı ilişki nedeniyle enflasyonun da azalacağı görülmektedir. Sonuç olarak ekonomik şeffaflık daha etkin bir para politikası için uygun ve öngörülebilir bir ortam oluşturmaktadır.

Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice

Abstract: Central Bank transparency has become the main characteristic of monetary policy in recent years. An increase in central bank transparency has some consequences. These are; decreasing uncertainty of private sector; increasing the elasticity of central bank in applying stabilization policies; decreasing the volatility of production and; helping central banks to act in conformity with social optimality. In this study, the transparency effect of central bank on interbank interest rates is empirically argued. The results show that an increase in transparency leads a decline in interest rates and because of the existence of positive and significant relation between inflation and interest rates, inflation will decline. Economic transparency comprises a more predictable and appropriate conditions for monetary policy applications.

Kaynakça

[1]Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O. (2001). Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals. International Economic Paper, 42(2), 369-397.

[2]Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O. (2002). The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 34(2), 520-539.

[3]Jensen, H. (2000). Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking. Working Paper, University of Copenhagen.

[4]Geraats, P.M. (2001). Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts. Working Paper No. 41, European Central Bank.

[5]Tarkka, J. & Mayer, D.G. (1999). The Value of Publishing Official Central Bank Forecasts. Discussion Paper 22/99, Bank of Finland.

[6]Cuikerman, A. (2000). Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent About Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does It Make? Working Paper, Tel-Aviv University.

[7]Kuttner, K.N. & Posen, A.S. (2000). Inflation, Monetary Transparency, and G3 Exchange Rate Volatility. Working Paper 00-06, Institute for International Economics.

[8]Cuikerman, A. (2000). Establishing a Reputation for Dependability by Means of Inflation Targets. (Eds.: Mahadeva, L. & Sterne, G.). Monetary Frameworks in a Global Context. London: Routledge.

[9]Chortareas, G.; Stasavage, D. & Sterne, G. (2002). Does It Pay To Be Transparent? International Evidence From Central Bank Forecasts. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 84(4), 99-118.

[10]DeHaan, J. & Eijffinger, S.C.W. (2000). The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-Tales. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(3), 393-407.

[11]Fry, M.J.; Julius, D.; Mahadeva, L.; Roger, S. & Sterne, G. (2000). Key Issues in the Choice of Monetary Policy Framework. (Eds.: Mahadeva, L. & Sterne, G.). Monetary Frameworks in a Global Context. London: Routledge.

[12]Geraats, P.M. (2002). Central Bank Transparency. The Economic Journal, (112), 532-565.

[13]Blinder, A.; Goodhart, C.; Hildebrand, P.; Lipton, D. & Wyplosz, C. (2001). "How Do Central Banks Talk? Geneva Report on the World Economy. Vol.3.

[14]Bini-Smaghi, L. & Gros, D. (2001). Is the ECB Sufficiently Accountable and Transparent? CEPS Working Document, No. 169.

[15]Fracasso, A.: Genberg, H. & Wyplosz, C. (2003). How Do Central Banks Write? An Evaluation of Inflation Targeting Central Banks. Vol. Special Report 2 of Geneva Reports on the World Economy, Centre for Economic Policy Research.

[16]Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P.M. (2006). How Transparent Are Central Banks? European Journal of Political Economy, 22(2), 1-21.

[17]Hallett, H.A.J. & Viegi, N. (2001). Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy. CEPR Discussion Paper 2671.

[18]Nolan, C. & Schaling, E. (1996). Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability. Working Paper, Bank of England, No. 54. 228

[19]Clare, A. & Courtenay, R. (2001). What can we learn about monetary policy transparency from financial market data? Discussion Paper No. 06/01.

[20]Blinder, A. (2000). Central Banking in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: MIT Press.

[21]Gersbach, H. (2003). On the Negative Social Value of Central Banks' Transparency. Economics of Governance 4(2), 91-102.

[22]Cuikerman, A. (2001). Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem. (Ed.: Wypolsz, C.). The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[23]Goodfriend, M. (1986). Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking. Journal of Monetary Economics, 17(1), 63-92.

[24]Gersbach, H. & Hahn, V. (2001a). Should Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers Be Published? Bundesbank Discussion Paper 02/01.

[25]Gersbach, H. & Hahn, V. (2001b). Voting Transparency and Conflicting Interests in Central Bank Councils. Bundesbank Discussion Paper 03/01.

[26]Tabellini, G. (1987). Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 19(4), 425-436.

[27]Cuikerman, A. & Meltzer, A.H. (1986). A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility and Inflation Under Discretion and Asymmetric Information. Econometrica, 54(5), 1099-128.

Kaynak Göster

ÖNERİ
  • ISSN: 1300-0845
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 2 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 1994
  • Yayıncı: Marmara Üniversitesi

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