PARA POLİTİKASI BAĞIMSIZLIĞININ TEST EDİLMESİ: ALMAN BASKINLIK HİPOTEZİ

1979 yılında yürürtlüğe giren Avrupa Para Sistemi (APS) Avrupa Topluluğu içerisinde oluşturulan bir parasal düzenlemedir ve birincil amacı Avrupa’da parasal istikrar bölgesi oluşturmaktır. Avrupa Para Sistemi£nin en önemli unsuru, katılımcı ülkelerin döviz kuru ilişkilerini yürütmek amacıyla oluşturulan Döviz Kuru Mekanizması’dır (DKM) . Sistem içindeki düzenleme, ikili kur oluşumunu tanımlanan dalgalanma bantları aralığında, yeniden ayarlama’nın mümkün olduğu sabit fakat ayarlanabilir kur sistemi olarak tanımlamaktadır.İlk başından beri, APS’nin temel hedefi, simetrik yapıda bir kur rejimi oluştuırmak olup, bu amacı gerçekleştirme yönünde sistem içi düzenlemelere gidilmiştir. Buna rağmen, Bir çok iktisatcı, APS’nin simetrik kur rejimi olarak planlanmasına rağmen asimetrik bir yapıya dönüştüğünü vurgulamaktadırlar. Bu durumda, Almanya para politikasının diğer üye ülke para politikaları üzerinde baskınlık oluşturup, söz konusu ülkeler için para politikası bağımsızlığının ortadan kalktığı vurgulanmaktadır.Alman Baskınlık Hipotezi, Almanya’nın kendi para politikasını bağımsız olarak belirlerken, diğer üyelerin bu politikayı takip etmek durumunda olduğunu ifade eder. Bu durumda, üye ülkelerin para politikası yürütme sürecinde faiz oranlarının belirlenmesinde, Almanya’nın kendisi için belirlediği faiz oranları etkili olmaktadır. Bu çalışma, APS’ne üye ülkelere ait faiz oranları verilerini kullanarak söz konusu Alman Baskınlığının mevcut olup olmadığını ve veya derecesini ölçmeyi hedeflemektedir. Sistemin kuruluş aşamasından, sonu olan Ekonomik ve Parasal Birliğe geçiş aşamasına kadar olan süreçte Alman Baskınlık Hipotezinin test edilmesi için Kointegrasyon metodu kullanılmıştır.Bu çalışmanın sonuçları, yukarıda zikredilen hipotezde öne çıkan AB ülkeleri para politikası oluşumunda mutlak bir Alman Para politikası baskınlığının mevcudiyetini desteklememektedir. Buna rağmen, sonuçlar aynı zamanda, Almanya para politikasının, AB ülkelerinin para politikası oluşumuna etkilerini destekleyen bazı ipuçları vermektedir. Bu çalışma, Almanya’nın, verili dönemler arasında diğer AB üyesi ülkelerin para politikalarını etkileme derecesini ortaya çıkarmaktadır.

Testing The Degree Of Monetary Autonomy: German Dominance Hypothesis Revisited

European Monetary System, (EMS) came into force in 1979, was an intra European Community monetary arrangement and its foremost aim was to create a zone of monetary stability in Europe. The most important pillar of the Europeran Monetary System was its Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) that is designed to administer the exchange rate regimes of the participant countries. Bilateral exchange rates were systemically defined to be of fixed but adjustable nature, with the given fluctuations margins where realignments were possible option for the participating currencies.From the very start, the main purpose of the EMS was to create a symetrical zone of exchange rate regime and for that end, some operational rules had been introduced to support stability. However; it is often argued and advocated by many scholars to the extent that that European Monetary System was initially designed to operate symetrically but turned out to be conspicously an asymetric regime. In that, it is argued that German Monetary policy largely dominated the monetary policies of the other EMS countries by ruling out molnetary independence for them. This argument explicitly defends the deterministic influence of German Mark on other participant countries in determination of bilateral exchange rates. German Bundesbank had played the most proeminent and active part in monetary interventions designed to smooth out bilateral exchange rates.German dominance Hypothesis suggests that Germany fixes monetary policy of its own while the other EMS countries would have to follow its footsteps. According to that; as a monetary policy measure, the process of interest rate determination for other EMS countries is manipulated by German interst rates. This work is an attempt to measure the presence and/or the degree of German dominance by using interst rates data for the EMS countries. A cointegration method has been employed to carry out testing the validity of the German Dominance Hypothesis from the onset of the system until the end, when Economic and Monetary Union in EU had become operational.The findings of this work does not support an absolute presence of German Dominance in EU monetary policy as the aforementioned hypothesis suggests. However, it is also notable to infer the supportive elements of the German influence in monetary policy in EU. This work try to highlight the degree of German monetary impact on other participants over the sample period.

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