Türkiye’de “Bağımsız Yönetim Kurulu Üyeleri”nin Yükselişi
Dünyada gerçekleşen gelişmelere paralel olarak, Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu’nun, kurumsal yönetim ile ilgili yürürlüğe koyduğu yönetmeliklerle birlikte, yönetim kurulunda bağımsız üyelerin bulunması zorunluluğu getirilmiştir. Bu yönetmelik, şirketlerin kurumsal yönetimlerini iyileştirdiği gibi, doğrudan yabancı yatırımları da pozitif bir şekilde etkileyerek ülkelerin bütününün ekonomisine de olumlu bir şekilde katkı sağlamaktadır. Bir şirketin kilit noktaları olan stratejisinin oluşturulması, performans değerlendirilmesi, risk alınması ve personel ile ilgili işlerde bağımsız yönetim kurulu üyelerinin önemli bir rol alması beklendiğinden, etkili bir bağımsız yönetim kurulu üyesinin hep teknik hem de kişiler arası yeteneklerinin olması gerekmektedir. Bu makalenin amacı Türkiye gibi gelişmekte olan ülkelerde kurumsal yönetim kurallarının uygulama sürecinde önemli bir görev alan “bağımsız yönetim kurulu üyelerinin” önemini analiz etmektir.
The Rise of “Independent Board Members” in TURKEY
With regulations on corporate governance set forth by the Capital Markets Board, in line with the developments taking place worldwide, an obligation to have independent board members on the board of directors is born. While improving the corporate governance standards of a company, this regulation also positively contributes to the economy of the country as a whole through positively affecting its foreign direct investments. Since independent board members are expected to take influential roles in the key areas of a company such as strategy setting, performance evaluation, risk taking and human related issues; an effective independent board member should possess technical as well as interpersonal skills. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the significance of “independent board members” that has a substantial role in the implementation process of corporate governance rules in Emerging Markets like Turkey.
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