___

• ACEMOĞLU, D., and ROBINSON, J. A. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown (2012).
• ADAMS, G. P. Jr. Competitive Economic Systems. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell (1955).
• ALLISON, J. A. The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure. New York: McGraw-Hill (2013).
• ARROW, K. J., and DEBREU, G., “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy.” . (1954) Econometrica 27 (3): 265–90.
• BARTELS, L. M. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press (2008).
• BATOR, F. M. “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization.” (1957) American Economic Review 47 (1): 22–59.
• BATOR, F. M. “The Anatomy of Market Failure.” (1958) Quarterly Journal of Economics 72 (3): 351–79.
• BAUMOL, W. J. “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive.” (1990) Journal of Political Economy 98 (5) Part 1: 893–921.
• BAUMOL, W. J. Entrepreneurship, Management, and the Structure of Payoffs. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press (1993).
• BEARD, C. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York: Macmillan (1913).
• BECKER, G. S. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” (1983) Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August): 371–400.
• BENTLEY, A. F. The Process of Government; A Study of Social Pressures. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1908).
• BLACK, D. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (1958).
• BRADLEY, R. L. Jr. Capitalism at Work: Business, Government, and Energy. Salem, Mass.: M&M Scrivener Press (2009).
• BUCHANAN, J. M. “Public Finance and Public Choice.” (1975a) National Tax Journal 28 (December): 383–94.
• BUCHANAN, J. M. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1975b).
• BUCHANAN, J. M. “The Domain of Constitutional Economics.” (1990) Constitutional Political Economy 1 (1): 1–18.
• BUCHANAN, J. M., and TULLOCK, G. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1962).
• COASE, R. H. “The Problem of Social Cost.” (1960) Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44.
• DOWNS, A. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row (1957).
• EDELMAN, M. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press (1964).
• FUKUYAMA, F. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press (1992).
• GILENS, M. Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press (2012).
• GILENS, M., and Page, B. I. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” (2014) Perspectives on Politics 12 (3): 564–81.
• HACKER, J. S., and PIERSON, P. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon and Schuster (2010).
• HAYEK, F. A. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1944).
• HIGGS, R. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government. New York: Oxford University Press (1987).
• HOLCOMBE, R. G. From Liberty to Democracy: The Transformation of American Government. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (2002a).
• HOLCOMBE, R. G. “Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources.” (2002b) Review of Austrian Economics 15 (2–3): 143–59.
• HOLCOMBE, R. G. “Make Economics Policy-Relevant: Depose the Omniscient Benevolent Dictator.” (2012) The Independent Review 17 (2): 165–76.
• HOLCOMBE, R. G. “Crony Capitalism: By-Product of Big Government.” (2013) The Independent Review 17 (4): 541–59.
• HOLCOMBE, R. G. “What Stiglitz and Stockman Have in Common.” (2014) Cato Journal 34 (3): 569–79.
• HOLCOMBE, R. G., and Castillo, A. M. Liberalism and Cronyism: Two Rival Political and Economic Systems. Arlington, Va.: Mercatus Center (2013).
• KOLKO, G. The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900–1916. New York: The Free Press (1963).
• KOLKO, G. Railroads and Regulation: 1877–1916. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press (1965).
• KRUEGER, A. O. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” (1974) American Economic Review 64 (June): 291–303.
• LOUCKS, W. N., and WHITNEY, W. G. Comparative Economic Systems. New York: Harper and Row (1973).
• LOVE, J. R. Antiquity and Capitalism: Max Weber and the Sociological Foundations of Roman Civilization. London: Routledge (1991).
• MARX, K., and ENGELS, F. The Communist Manifesto. New York: International Publishers (1948).
• MCCHESNEY, F. S. “Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation.” (1987) Journal of Legal Studies 16 (1): 101–18.
• MCCHESNEY, F. S. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1997).
• MILLS, C. W. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press (1956).
• NADER, R. Unstoppable: The Emerging Left-Right Alliance to Dismantle the Corporate State. New York: Nation Books (2014).
• OLSON, M. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1965).
• OLSON, M. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press (1982).
• OLSON, M. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2000).
• PIKETTY, T. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (2014).
• RAWLS, J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press/Belknap (1971).
• SCHUMPETER, J. A. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1934).
• SCHUMPETER, J. A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 2nd ed. London: (1947).
• GEORGE, Allen and Unwin. Schweizer, P. Extortion. How Politicians Extract Your Money, Buy Votes, and Line Their Own Pockets. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (2013).
• STIGLER, George J. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” (1971) Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1): 3–21.
• STIGLITZ, J. E. The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers the Future. New York: W.W. Norton (2012).
• STOCKMAN, D. A. The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America. New York: Public Affairs Press (2013)
• TRUMAN, D. B. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A . Knopf (1951).
• TULLOCK, G. “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” (1967) Western Economic Journal 5 (June): 224–32.
• TULLOCK, G. “The Transitional Gains Trap.” (1975) Bell Journal of Economics 6 (Autumn): 671–78.
• WEBER, M. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press ([1922] 1978).
• WHITE, R. Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America. New York: W.W. Norton (2011).
• WITTMAN, D. A. “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results.” (1989) Journal of Political Economy 97 (6): 1395–1424.
• WITTMAN, D. A. The Myth of Democratic Failure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1995).