Demokrasinin Liberteryen Eleştirisinin Eleştirisi: Caplan ve Brennan Örneği

Locke, Tocqueville ve Mill gibi klasik liberaller anayasal demokrasiye meşruluk sağlayıcı argümanlar geliştirmişler ve oy hakkının genişlemesini savunmuşlardır. Demokrasinin yoğun eleştiri aldığı dönemlerde klasik liberaller demokrasiyi eleştirmenlerine karşı savunmuşlardır. Ancak kamu tercihi teorisi ile birlikte demokrasinin temel kabulleri liberal gelenek içinde sert bir şekilde eleştirilmeye başlanmıştır. Özellikle demokratik rejimlerin halkın rızasını alamadığı ve seçmenlerin siyasal konularda cahil olduğu gibi eleştiriler kamu tercihi teorisyenlerinin sıklıkla dile getirdiği problemler arasında yer alır. Caplan ve Brennan gibi kamu tercihci liberteryenler ise demokratik yönetime çok daha ciddi sınırlamalar getirmeyi önererek, bilgili bir azınlığın yönetmesi gerektiğini iddia etmektedirler. Bu durum liberal gelenekte siyasal haklar ile sivil haklar arasındaki bağı kopartmakta ve liberalizm içinde radikal bir öneriye dönüşmektedir. Bu makalede, liberal gelenekteki bu farklılaşmanın nedenleri belirtilerek, Caplan ve Brennan’ın iddiaları eleştirilecektir

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Demokrasi, Kamu Tercihi, Bryan Caplan, Jason Brennan, Anayasal Gelişme

The Critique of Libertarian Criticism of Democracy: Caplan and Brennan Cases

Classical liberals, such as Locke, Tocqueville and Mill, have developed arguments to justify constitutional democracy and defended the spreading out of the suffrage. Classical liberals have defended the democratic developments against its critics in difficult times. However, with the development of public choice theory, some philosophers started to criticize the basic assumptions of democracy very harshly in the liberal tradition. The problems such as the gap between the democratic policies and the popular consent and the widespread political ignorance of the voters are frequently given as examples of the democratic failure by public choice theorists. Caplan and Brennan, public choice libertarians, want to restrict political rights of the incompetent voters through establishing a kind of aristocratic political regime where the informed voters only have the right for political rights. Therefore, they want to break the link between political rights and the civil rights in the liberal tradition, and thus, offer a radical proposal. In this article, the reasons of this radical proposal in liberal tradition are examined, and the assumptions of Caplan and Brennan are criticized

Keywords:

Democracy, Public Choice, Bryan Caplan, Jason Brennan, Constitutional Development,

PDF

___

ACEMOGLU, Doren, ROBİNSON, James A., “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democ- racy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 115, 2000, s. 1167 –99.
ARROW, Kenneth J., Social Choice and Individual Values, Martino Fine Books, New York.
BRENNAN, Jason (2016), Against Democracy, Princeton University Press, New York 2012[1963].
BUCHANAN, James, “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets”, Journal of Political Eco- nomy, No. 62, 1954, s. 114–123.
BUCHANAN, James M., TULLOCK, Gordon, Calculus of Consent: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Liberty Foundation, Indianapolis 1999a [1962].
BUCHANAN, James M. “Individual Choice in Voting and the Market”, in The Logical Foundati- ons of Constitutional Liberty, Liberty Foundation, Indianapolis, 1999b., s. 75-89.
BRYAN, Caplan, The Myth of Rational Voter, Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press, New York 2006.
CHRISTIANO, Thomas, “The Authority of Democracy”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2004, s. 266–90.
CONACHER , J. B. (Ed.), The Emergence of British Parliamentary Democracy in the Nineteenth Century, John Wiley and Sons, New York 1971.
CONGLETON, Roger D., Perfecting Parliament, Constitutional Reform, Liberalism, and the Rise of Western Democracy, Cambridge University Press, New York 2011.
CONSTANT, B., Princibles of Politics Applicable to All Governments, (Ed. Etienne Hofmann- Dennis), (Trans. O’Keeffe), Liberty Fund, New York 2003 [1815].
ESTLUND, David, Democratic Authority, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2008.
FABİENNE, Peter, “Political Legitimacy”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato. stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/2016.
GROFMAN, Bernard, “Anthony Downs, (1930-)”, Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, (Eds. Charles K. Rowley, Friedrich Schneider), Springer, New York, 2008, s. 91-96.
HAYEK, Friedrich A., Constitution of Liberty, (Ed. Ronald Hamowy), University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2011 [1960].
KAHAN, Alan S., Alexis de Tocqueville, Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers, (Ed . John Meadowcroft), Continiuum, New York 2013.
LOCKE, John, Second Treatise on Government, Hackett Classics, New York 1980 [1689].
MILL, J.S., Representative Government, Batoche Books, Ontario 2001 [1861].
NATHAN Rosenberg and Birdzell L. E., How The West Grew Rich, Basic Books, New York 1987.
NORTH, Douglass C., Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press, New York 2005.
ROUSSEAU, J. J., Social Contract, Penguin Classics, New York 1968 [1762].
SHEPSLE, Kenneth. A., Analysing Politics, Rationality, Behaivor, and Institutions, W. W. Norton, New York 2010.
SOMIN, Ilya, “Voter Ignorance and Democratic Ideals”, Critical Review, No. 12, 1998, s. 413- 458.
SOMIN, Ilya, Democracy and Political Ignorance, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA 2013.
TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis de, Democracy in America, (Ed. Eduardo Nolla), (Trans. James T. Schli- fer), Liberty Fund, New York 2009 [1835].
TULLOCK, Gordon, Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar, Brookfield 1993.