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DOĞRULUK KOŞULU BİLGİNİN SARSILABİLİRLİK KURAMLARI İÇİN GEREKSİZ MİDİR?

Sarsılabilirlik kuramları makul bir bilgi tanımına ulaşabilmek için hatalı gerekçelendirmelere dayalı doğru inançları eleme stratejisini güder. Farklı felsefeciler kendilerine özgü sarsılabilirlik anlayışları geliştirmiştir. Sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmeler hiçbir zaman yanlış inançların dayanağı olmadığından Zagzebski (1994) katı sarsılabilirlik şartının inancın doğruluğu ile gerekçelendirilmesi arasındaki bağımsızlığı ortadan kaldırdığını ifade eder. Bunu takiben, Zagzebski ve yine benzer görüşleri savunan bazı felsefeciler (örneğin, Merricks, 1995) sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmenin zorunlu olarak doğruluğu beraberinde getirdiği sonucuna varır. Bu makalede, sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmelerin her zaman doğru inanca ulaşmaması durumuna örnek göstererek, doğruluk koşulunun lüzumsuz olmadığını iddia ediyorum. İddiama göre metafizik sorulara (örneğin: Tanrı var mıdır?) ilişkin inançlar sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmelere sahip olabilirler. Buna rağmen söz konusu gerekçelendirmeler destekledikleri inançlara doğruluk atfedemez.

IS THE TRUTH CONDITION SUPERFLUOUS FOR DEFEASIBILITY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE?

Defeasibility theories aim to reach a plausible definition of knowledge by finding strategies to exclude true beliefs based on faulty justifications. Different philosophers have advanced with their own understandings of undefeated justification. Zagzebski (1994) indicates that the strong defeasibility condition violates independence between truth and justification because undefeated justification never leads to false beliefs. Following this, Zagzebski and some other philosophers who pursue a similar line of reasoning (e.g., Merricks, 1995) conclude that undefeated justification entails truth. In this paper, I argue that the truth condition is not superfluous by presenting an example of undefeated justification that does not entail truth. My claim is that beliefs about metaphysical questions (e.g., Does God exist?) can have undefeated justifications. Nonetheless, such undefeated justifications are not capable of assigning truth to the beliefs that they support.

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Yayın Aralığı: 2
Başlangıç: 2014
Yayıncı: Eray Yağanak

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