Serbest Nakit Akışlarının Şirket Değerine Etkisi: Serbest Nakit Akış Teorisi Bağlamında BIST 100 Endeksi Üzerine Dinamik Panel Veri Analizi

Her geçen gün daha fazla sayıda şirket; yeni finansman kaynaklarına ulaşmak, kredibilitesini artırmak, kurumsallaşmak ve tanınmak gibi amaçlarla halka açılmakta ve çok ortaklı hale gelmektedir. Şirket hisselerinin çok sayıda yatırımcının eline geçmesiyle birlikte sahiplik ve yönetim ayrımı ortaya çıkmakta ve bu ayrım beraberinde birtakım sorunlar getirmektedir. Serbest Nakit Akış Teorisine göre vekâlet maliyetlerinin başlıca kaynağı serbest nakit akışlarıdır ve özellikle düşük büyüme fırsatlarına sahip şirketlerde serbest nakit akışları şirket değerini azaltmaktadır. Çalışmada BIST 100 endeksinde yer alan 49 şirketin 2002-2016 verileri kullanılarak dinamik panel veri analizi yapılmıştır. Şirket değerini temsilen Tobin's q'nun bağımlı değişken olarak seçildiği ve Arellano-Bond fark ve Arellano-Bover sistem genelleştirilmiş momentler tahmincilerinin (GMM) kullanıldığı analiz sonuçları, düşük büyüme fırsatlarına sahip şirketlerde serbest nakit akışları ve şirket değeri arasında negatif bir ilişkinin olduğunu göstermektedir. Sonuçlar, Türkiye özelinde Serbest Nakit Akış Teorisini desteklemektedir

The Effect of Free Cash Flows on Company Value: Dynamic Panel Data Analysis on BIST 100 Index in The Context of Free Cash Flow Theory

Each passing day more companies go public to reach new financial sources, to increase credibility, to institutionalize, to gain recognition and thus transform into a structure with many shareholders. Along with increasing number of shareholders, separation between ownership and management arise, which comes with several problems. According to Free Cash Flow Theory the main source of agency costs is free cash flow and free cash flows decrease the value especially in companies having low growth opportunities. In this article dynamic panel data analysis has been performed by using 2002-2016 data of 49 companies in BIST 100 Index. Results of analysis in which Tobin’s q as proxy for company value has been selected as dependent variable and Arellano-Bond difference and Arellano-Bover system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators have been used show that there is a negative relationship between free cash flows and company value. The results support Free Cash Flow Theory in Turkey

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