The government of the United States performs on the basis of a separation of powers that ensures a constitutionally framed system of checks and balances practiced by legislative, executive, and judicial branches in relation to the others. The executive power is the main concern in this article and is derived from either the constitutional grant of power to the President or congressional delegated authority to the President. While using constitutional or even the congressional executive powers, American presidents have been issuing executive orders since the origin of the Republic. However neither the Constitution nor the Congress defines executive orders or any specific provision within the Constitution authorizes the President to issue such orders. The ambiguity behind executive orders has frequently caused the illegal and improper uses that have been construed as a governmental treat to the constitutional separation of powers, the rule of law, individual liberties, and democracy. This article contains the analysis of the development of the American model of executive orders in order to contribute the ongoing discussion related to both the legal and political dynamics of executive orders and how such orders have shaped the development of presidential executive power.
BirleĢik Devletler hükümeti yasama, yürütme, ve yargı organlarının birbirleri ile olan iliĢkilerinde Anayasal çerçeveye sahip kontrol-denge sistemini esas alan bir kuvvetler ayrılığı ilkesi temelinde hareket eder. Bu makalede öncelikli olarak ele alınan yürütme yetkisi kaynağını, Anayasa‟da BaĢkan‟a ithaf edilmiĢ olan ve Meclis‟in BaĢkan‟a vermiĢ olduğu yetkiler bütününden alır; ve Amerikan baĢkanları bu yetkilerini icra ederken, Cumhuriyet‟in baĢlangıcından itibaren baĢkanlık kararnamelerine baĢvurmuĢtur. Fakat ne Anayasa ne de Meclis baĢkanlık kararnamelerini tanımlamadığı gibi Anayasa da BaĢkan‟a bu tarz bir kararname çıkarma yetkisi vermemiĢtir. BaĢkanlık kararnamelerinin ardındaki bu muğlaklık neticesinde ortaya çıkan kararnamelerin yoğun hukuk dıĢı ve uygunsuz kullanımı anayasal kuvvetler ayrılığı ilkesine, hukukun üstünlüğüne, bireysel özgürlüklere, ve demokrasiye karĢı bir devlet müdahalesi olarak değerlendirilmiĢtir. Bu makale, baĢkanlık kararnamelerinin yasal ve siyasi dinamiklerine ve bu kararnamelerin baĢkanlık yürütme yetkisinin geliĢimini nasıl Ģekillendirdiğine iliĢkin tartıĢmalara katkıda bulunmak amacı ile, Amerikan modeli baĢkanlık kararnamelerinin kullanımının ve geliĢiminin incelenmesini içerir.
BRANUM Tara L., President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern- Day America, J. Legis., Vol. 28, 2002, P.1-86.
CALABRESI Steven G., The Virtues of Presidential Why Professor Ackerman is Wrong to Prefer the German the U.S. Constitution, Const. Comment, Vol.18, 2017, P.51-104.
CASH Robert B., Presidential Power: Use and Enforcement of Executive Orders, Notre Dame L. Rev., Vol.39, 1963, P.44-55.
CONTRUBIS John, Executive Orders and Proclamations, CRS Report for Congress, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-772.pdf, 1999, P.1-26.
COOPER Phillip J., By Order of the President: The Use & Abuse of Executive Direct Action, University Press of Kansas, 2002.
DRIESEN David M., President Trump‟s Executive Orders and the Rule of Law, UMKC Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 3, 2019, P.489-524.
FLEISHMAN Joel L. & AUFSES Arthur H., Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.40, No.3, 1976, P.1-45.
FREEMAN Mark, Constitutional Framework and Fragile Choosing between Parliamentarianism, Presidentialism Semipresidentialism, Pace Int’l L. Rev., Vol. 12, 2017, P.253-282.
GAZIANO Todd F., The Use and Abuse of Executive Order and Other Presidential Directives, Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum Executive Summary, No.2, 2001, P.1-86.
GUSTAFSON Tyler, The Modern American Presidency: How the Executive Branch Has Changed, Grove City College Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 10, 2019, P.49-70.
HEBE William, Executive Orders and the Development of Presidential Power, Vill. L. Rev., Vol.17, 1972, P. 688-712.
IVEY Lisa M., Ready, Aim, Fire? The President‟s Executive Order Authorizing Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War on Terrorism is a Powerful Weapon, But Should it be Upheld?, Cumb. L. Rev., Vol.33, 2002, P.107-134.
Aziz v. Trump, 234F. Supp. 3d 724, 736 (E.D. Va. 2017), https://www. leagle.com/ decision/infdco20170214d23.
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep‟t v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001), https: // casetext.com/case/building-const-trades-dept-v-allbaugh.
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1996), https://casetext. com/case/chamber-of-commerce-of-us-v-reich-2.
City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1240-43 (9th Cir. 2018), https:// www.leagle .com/decision/infco20180801123.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981), https:// www.law.cornell.edu/ supreme court/text/453/654.
Farkas v. Texas Instrument 5 Inc., 372 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967), https://law. justia.com/ cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/375/629/130852/.
Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2012), https://casetext.com/case/ sherley-v-sebelius-4.
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/ text/67/635.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018), https://casetext.com/case/trump-vhawaii-4.
Utah Ass‟n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1183 (D. Utah 2004), https://www. courtlistener.com/opinion/2578208/utah-assn-of-counties-v-bush/.
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017), https://caselaw. findlaw. com/us-9th-circuit/1863628.html.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952), https://www.law. cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/343/579.
Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed.Reg. 3139 (1952).
Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017).
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).