DUYULAR, DOKUNMA VE VÜCUT BİLİNCİ

Eldeki yazı felsefe ve psikoloji tarihinde yüksek duyular diye adlandırılan görme ve işitme duyuları ile alçak duyular diye adlandırılan koklama, tatma, dokunma duyularını konu etmektedir. Yüksek duyulara özgü algısal herhangi bir işlevden yoksun görsel ve işitsel duyumları kabul etmemize izin veren istisnai durumların da varlığına işaret ederek duyum ile algı arasındaki ayrımı yüksek duyulara uygulayacağız. Böyle istisnai durumlarda görme ve işitme duyusuna tıpkı alçak duyumlardaki gibi bedende yer-tutan bir bilinç içeriğinin karşılık geldiğini ileri süreceğiz. Duyuların ayrıştırılması üzerinde kısaca duran bölümden sonra dokunma duyusuna yoğunlaşmak suretiyle pasif dokunmayı aktif dokunmadan ayırt edeceğiz. Görme duyusunun tahakkümünden kurtulduğunda dokunma duyusu özerkleşmeye ve ayrıcalık kazanmaya başlayacağından, “ortak duyumsanırlar” hipotezi ciddi eleştirilere açık hale gelir. Vücut bilincini oluşturan, pasif dokunmaya ait dokunsal hassasiyettir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

duyular, dokunma, vücut bilinci, fenomenoloji

The present paper discusses the senses such as vision and audition which are called in the history of philosophy and psychology superior senses as well as the senses such as smell, taste and touch, viz. the so-called inferior senses. By pointing to the exceptional cases of vision and audition that permit us to accept the visual and auditory sensations deprived of any perceptual function proper to the superior senses, we apply the distinction between perception and sensation to the superior senses. We claim that, just like the inferior senses, these exceptional cases have a bodily localized conscious content corresponding to vision and audition. After the section on the differentiation of the senses, we focus on the sense of touch and clarify the distinction between active touch and passive touch. The fact that the sense of touch, when emancipated from the domination of vision, becomes more autonomous and gains a privilege makes the hypothesis of “common sensibles” open to serious criticism. Bodily consciousness is made up of tactile sensibility pertaining to passive touch.

Keywords:

senses, touch, bodily consciousness, phenomenology,

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