İnanma İradesi: William James'in İmanın Pragmatik Savunusu Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme

Bu çalışmada, James’in inanma iradesi argümanı ve ona yöneltilen bazı itirazlarüzerinde durulmaktadır. James’in argümanı, kişinin, epistemik açıdan meseleye kararveremediği ancak karşı karşıya kaldığı inanç seçeneğinin hakiki bir tercih ifade ettiğidurumlarda, tutkusal doğasına dayanarak inanabilmesine olanak sağlar. İlk itirazolarak, tutkusal doğanın doğruluk konusunda güçlü bir rehber olmadığı ve bu açıdanargümana dayanarak birbiriyle çelişen birçok dini inancın haklı çıkartılabileceği ilerisürülmektedir. İkinci olarak, James’in, bizi bazı doğruları onaylamaktan alıkoyduğuiçin Clifford’ın delilciliğini suçlarken, aslında kendi argümanında da aynı şeyi yaptığıiddia edilmektedir. 

The Will to Believe: An Evaluation of William James’s Pragmatic Defence of Faith

Although it has been generally considered that evidential arguments are the onlyappropriate way to believe that God exists, it has been argued that there are also nonevidentialarguments/reasons for belief in God. William James’s “The Will to Believe”is one of the most signifi cant non-evidential reasons in favour of religious belief.James criticises Clifford’s views and asserts that we have the right to believe even ifthe evidence is inconclusive. According to Clifford, it is wrong to believe any propositionon insuffi cient evidence. James’s primary goal is to show that Cliffordian evidentialism is irrational because it prevents us from acknowledging certain kinds of truth.And James argues that our passional/non-epistemic nature can determine what webelieve when an option is a genuine option which means live, forced, and momentousoptions and cannot be decided on intellectual/epistemic grounds. The argument briefl yenables us to say that “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide anoption between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its naturebe decided on intellectual grounds”. In this essay, I will discuss James’s “The Will toBelieve” and some objections which have been directed to it. First, I will argue thatour passional nature is not a reliable guide to truth and that many confl icting religiousbeliefs can be justifi ed on this ground. And second, I will argue that although Jamesaccuses Clifford’s evidentialism of preventing us from acknowledging certain kinds oftruth, his argument is equally vulnerable to a similar objection.