Zamansal Tutarsızlık altında bir Dinamik Yatırım Modeli

Bu makalede zamansal tutarsızlık içeren tercihlere sahip bir vekil ile temasta olan bir asilin bulunduğu üç periyotluk bir dinamik yatırım modelini inceliyoruz. Zamansal tutarsızlığı ??-tercihleri ile temsil ediyoruz. Her periyot, vekil bir miktar yatırım yapıyor, bunu gözlemleyen asil, vekile bir teklifte bulunuyor ya da bulunmuyor, ardından da vekil, eğer teklif varsa, kabul ediyor ya da etmiyor. Hem sofistike vekil (zamansal tutarsızlığının farkında olan) için hem de naif vekil (zamansal tutarsızlığının farkında olmayan) için optimal yatırım miktarlarını buluyoruz. Farklı vekiller, kendi tutarsızlıkları hakkında sahip oldukları bilgilerin farklı olmasından dolayı farklı periyotlarda oyunu bitirmeyi ve farklı miktarlarda yatırım yapmayı seçiyorlar. Naif vekilin sofistike vekile göre daha yüksek (ya da aynı) miktarda toplam yatırım yaptığını, dolayısıyla asilin, naif vekille karşılaşmayı tercih edeceğini gösteriyoruz.

Zamansal Tutarsızlık altında bir Dinamik Yatırım Modeli

In this paper we analyze a three-period dynamic investment model where a principal interacts with an agent who is time-inconsistent. We use ??-preferences to capture time-inconsistency. In every period, the agent invests an amount and then the principal, observing the investment amount, makes an offer or not; finally the agent accepts the offer or not. For both the sophisticated agent (who is aware of his inconsistency) and the naive agent (who is not aware of his inconsistency), we find the optimal investment streams. The difference in their information set is causing them to finalize the game at different periods or to attain different levels of investments. We found that the naive agent ends up investing a higher (or equal) overall amount than the sophisticated agent, and thus the principal is (weakly) better off with a naive agent.

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