Dummett ve Davidson: Düşüncenin Dile Bağlılığı Üzerine
Dummett da Davidson da dilin düşünceyi oluşturduğunu düşünür, ancak tam olarak aynı şeyi kastetmezler. Dummett dilin düşünceyi öncelediğine inanır, halbuki Davidson için dil ya da düşünce birbirini öncelemez. Yine de, bu iki düşünürün ortak paydası olan fikir şöyle ifade edilebilir: Dil düşünce için zorunludur. Bu savı anlamak için hem Dummett’ın hem de Davidson’ın argümanlarını ele alıp, ikisi için de bu savı temellendiren ana argümanın nesnellik argümanı olduğunu göstereceğim. Her iki düşünür için de düşüncenin nesnelliğinin kaynağında yatan şeyin doğal dil olduğunu savunacağım.
Dummett and Davidson on the Dependence of Thought on Language
Both Dummett and Davidson believe that language is constitutive of thought. However, they do not believe exactly the same thing. Dummett believes that language is prior to thought, whereas Davidson believes that neither is prior to the other. Still, they share a common core that can be put as follows: language is necessary for thought. In order to understand this claim that I look at their arguments and show that for both philosophers the argument from objectivity is the main argument to secure their conclusion. I argue that for both of them natural language is the source of the objectivity of thoughts
___
- Davidson, D. (1975). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Davidson, D. (1985). Rational Animals. Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. (Eds. E. Lepore & B. McLaughlin). New York: Blackwell, 473-80.
- Davidson, D. (1999a). Intellectual Autobiography. Philosophy of Donald Davidson. (Ed. L. Hahn). Illinois: The Library of Living Philosophers, 1-68.
- Davidson, D. (199b). Reply to Thomas Nagel. Philosophy of Donald Davidson. (Ed. L. Hahn). Illinois: The Library of Living Philosophers, 207-10.
- Davies, M. (1986). Tacit Knowledge, and the Structure of Thought and Language. Meaning and Interpretation. (Ed. C. S. Travis). Oxford: Blackwell, 127-58.
- Davies, M. (1992). Aunty’s Own Argument for the Language of Thought. Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. (Ed. J. Ezquerro). Norwell: Kluwer, 235-71.
- Dummett, M. (1981). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Dummett, M. (1991). Frege and the Other Philosophers. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dummett, M. (1993). The Seas of Language. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dummett, M. (1998). Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- George, A. (1997). Has Dummett Oversalted His Frege? Remarks on Conveyability of Thought. Language, Thought and Logic. (Ed. R. Heck). New York: Oxford University Press, 35-70.
- Jeffrey, R. (1985). Animal Interpretation. Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. (Ed. E. Lepore & B. McLaughlin). New York: Blackwell, 481-7.
- Malcolm, N. (1972-3). Thoughtless Brutes. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 16, 5-20.
- Peacocke, C. (1997). Concepts without Words. Language, Thought and Logic. (Ed. R. Heck). New York: Oxford University Press, 1-34.
- Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Philosophical Investigations. (Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe). Malden: Blackwell.