Vekalet Sorunu Çerçevesinde Bütçe Katılımı ve Yolsuzluk İlişkisi

Günümüzde, vatandaşların demokratik süreçlere katılması, demokrasilerin bir gereği haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışma, bütçe katılımı ile yolsuzluk arasındaki ilişkiyi araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, International Budget Partnership tarafından yayımlanan, Açık Bütçe Endeksi katılım puanları ile Uluslararası Şeffaflık Örgütü’nce yayımlanan Yolsuzluk Algı Endeksi puanları arasında regresyon analizi gerçekleştirilmiştir. Sonuçlar, bu iki değişken arasında orta düzeyde (R = 0.335), pozitif ve anlamlı bir ilişki olduğunu göstermiştir. Analiz sonucunda elde edilen modele göre, bütçe katılımındaki artış, yolsuzlukların azalmasına katkı sağlamaktadır. Yolsuzluk birçok sosyo-ekonomik faktörle ilişkili olmasına rağmen, bütçe katılımı, dünyada tüm ülkeler için büyük ekonomik kayıplara sebep olan yolsuzlukların azaltılmasına katkı sağlayabilmektedir. Araştırmanın bulguları ayrıca vekâlet sorunları çerçevesinde tartışılmıştır. Bulgular, vekâlet ilişkilerinde, asimetrik bilgiden kaynaklanan sorunları azaltacak potansiyele sahiptir.

The Relationship of Budget Participation and Corruption within the Framework of Agency Problem

Today, participation of citizens in democratic processes has become a requirement of democracies. This paper aims to explore the relationship between budget participation and corruption. To this end, regression analysis method has been used between the Open Budget Index participation scores published by the International Budget Partnership and the Corruption Perception Index scores published by Transparency International. The results have indicated that there is a moderate (R = 0.335), positive and significant relationship between these two variables. According to the model found, it is determined that the increase in budget participation contributes to reduction of corruption. Although corruption is associated with many socio-economic factors, budget participation is effective in reducing corruption which is huge economic loss for all countries in the world. The findings of the research also have been discussed within the framework of agency problems. The findings have the potential to reduce the problems arising from asymmetric information in agency relationships.

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