Sosyal ve Politik Etkileşim, Bireysel Değerler ve Vergi Ahlâkı Arasındaki İlişkilerin Yapısal Eşitlik Modeli ile Test Edilmesi

Özet: Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, vergi mükelleflerinin politik kurumlara duyduğu gü- ven (kamu yönetişiminin kalitesi), vergi mükelleflerinin sosyal sermaye algısı, vergi ida- resine karşı tutumu, mali adalet algısı ve otorite ile işbirliği eğiliminin vergi ahlakı üze- rindeki etkisini irdelemektir. Bu çalışmada beyan esasına tabi vergi mükellefleri araş- tırmanın ana kütlesini oluşturmaktadır. Ancak ana kütlenin tamamına ulaşmak gerek zaman gerekse maliyet açısından zor olduğundan araştırmanın kapsamı Aksaray ve İz- mir şehirleri ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Vergi ahlakının belirleyicilerini tespit etmeye yöne- lik olarak yapılan bu araştırmada, önerilen araştırma modelini ve araştırma hipotezle- rini test etmek için yapısal eşitlik modeli kullanılmıştır. Sözcükler: ahlakı, vergi uyumu, yapısal eşitlik modeli.

Testing the Relationships between Tax Morale, Socio-Political Interactions and Individual Values through the Structural Equation Model

Abstract: The main aim of the study is to examine the influences of taxpayers’ trust in political institutions (the quality of public governance), of their perception on social capital, of their attitudes toward the tax administration, of their understanding of fiscal fairness and of their tendency to obedience to authority on the tax morale. The popula- tion of the research is taxpayers who are liable to fill the tax return accordance with Turkish income and corporate tax laws. Take into consideration the costs to reach all population, the scope of the research was restricted to Aksaray and Izmir. In the re- search that focused on examining the determinants of tax morale, we use the structural equation model to test the proposed research model and the research hypotheses . Key Words: Tax morale, tax compliance, structure equation modeling.

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