Engin YILDIRIM, SERDAR GÜLENER, AZİZ KUTLAR

7477

1962 - 1982 Dönemi Anayasa Mahkemesi Üyelerinin Yargısal İdeal Noktalarının Belirlenmesi

Bu çalışma, Anayasa Mahkemesi (AYM) üyelerinin 1961 Anayasası döneminde yargısal politik tutumlarını gösteren ideal noktalarının Bayesyen Markov Zinciri Monte Carlo (MCMC) algoritmalar kullanarak gerçekleştirilen Dinamik Madde Tepki Kuramı aracılığıyla tahmin etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu dönemde Mahkemenin esastan incelediği iptal, itiraz, siyasi parti kapatma konularında verdiği kararlar özgürlükçü, devletçi ve kategori dışı olarak tasnif edilmiş ve oylamaya katılan yargıçların kullandıkları oylar bu sınıflandırmalara göre kodlanarak orijinal bir veri tabanı oluşturulmuştur. Yargıçların ideal nokta tahminleri sonucunda bu dönemde görev yapan AYM üyelerinin büyük bir kısmının yargısal politik tutumlarında ne özgürlükçü ne de devletçi tutumun baskın çıkmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Genel olarak Mahkeme üyelerinin yaygın kanaatin aksine bu dönemde katı devletçi bir tutum içinde olmadıkları sonucuna varılmıştır

Estimating Judicial Ideal Points of the Justices of the Turkish Constitutional Court between 1962 and 1982

This paper aims to analyze judicial political attitudes of justices of the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) between 1962 and 1982 by means of Item Response Theory using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMM) algorithms. We have created an original database in which the Court’s decisions on merit concerning abstract and concrete norms reviews and dissolution of political parties are classified into categories of libertarian, statist and unclassified and votes of the justices are coded under one of these categories. As a result of ideal point estimations, we have found that neither a libertarian nor a statist attitude was dominant for a great majority of the Court’s justices. We conclude that contrary to the widely-held belief, the justices of the TCC did not adopt a strict statist attitude in the examined period

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Amme İdaresi Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1300-1795
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 4 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 1968
  • Yayıncı: -
Arşiv
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Engin YILDIRIM, SERDAR GÜLENER, AZİZ KUTLAR