Bu araştırma, devletlerin uluslararası hukuka neden uydukları konusunu Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri açısından ele almaktadır. Devletleri uluslararası hukuka uymaya iten asıl etmenin, diğer devletler tarafından güvenilmez olarak tanınma korkusu olduğunu iddia eden İtibar Teorisi’nin; Realizm, Liberalizm ve İnşacılık olmak üzere Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinine ait üç farklı teoriyi birleştiren bir yaklaşım olduğu savunulmaktadır. Literatür taramasına dayanan araştırmada, ilk olarak, Uluslararası Hukuk ve Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinlerinin uyum konusuna bakış açılarındaki farklar üzerinde durulmuştur. Daha sonra; Realizm, Liberalizm ve İnşacılık teorilerinin devletlerin davranışlarında uluslararası hukukun yeri ve uyum konusundaki görüşlerine yer verilmiş, İtibar teorisinin hangi açılardan bu yaklaşımlarla benzer olduğu açıklanmış ve İtibar teorisinin birleştirici bir teori olarak görülmesi gerektiği iddia edilmiştir.
This research deals with the question of why states comply with international law in terms of International Relations theories. It is argued that the “Reputation Theory”, which holds the main factor urging states to comply with international law to be the concern over recognition by other states as unreliable, is an approach that combines three different theories of the International Relations discipline, namely Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. The literature review-based study first emphasizes the differences between the perspectives of International Law and International Relations disciplines on the subject of compliance; subsequently it discusses the views of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism on the role of international law in the conduct of states and on compliance; finally, it explains the aspects in which the reputation theory is similar to the approaches of the former theories and maintains that the reputation theory should be regarded as a unifying theory.
Akehurst, Michael (1993), A Modern Introduction to International Law (New York: Routledge).
Beck, Peter J. (1981), “The Winter War in the International Context: Britain and the League of Nations’ Role in the Russo-Finnish Dispute, 1939–1940”, Journal of Baltic Studies, 12 (1): 58-73.
Bodansky, Daniel (2010), The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).
Boyle, Alan (2010), “Soft Law in International Law Making”, Evans, Malcolm D. (Der.), International Law (New York: Oxford University Press): 122-140.
Breitmeier, Helmut, Oran R. Young ve Michael Zürn (2006), Analyzing International Environmental Regimes: from Case Study to Database (Massachusetts: MIT Press).
Bull, Hedley (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press).
Chayes, Abram ve Anatonia Handler Chayes (1995), The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
Chayes, Abram, Anatonia Handler Chayes ve R. B. Mitchell (1998), “Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective”, Weiss, Edith Brown ve Harold K. Jacobson (Der.), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Cambridge: MIT Press): 39-62.
DiMento, Joseph F.C. (2003), The Global Environment and International Law (Austin: University of Texas Press).
Downs, George W. ve Michael A. Jones (2002), “Reputation, Compliance, and International Law”, The Journal of Legal Studies, 31 (1): 95-114.
Doyle, Michael W. (1998), Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (London: Norton).
Fisher, Roger (1981), Improving Compliance with International Law (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia).
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, (2010), “The Practical Working of the Law of the Treaties”, Evans, Malcolm D. (Der.), International Law (New York: Oxford University Press): 172-200.
Franck, Thomas M. (1990), The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press).
Glennon, Michael J. (2005), “How International Rules Die”, Georgetown Law Journal, 93 (3): 939-991.
Guzman, Andrew T. (2002), “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law”, California Law Review, 90: 1823-1887.
Haas, Peter M. (1997), “Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst”, Weiss, Edith Brown (Der.), International Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (Washington DC: The American Society of International Law): 21-48.
Hathaway, Oona (2002), “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”, The Yale Law Journal, 111 (8): 1935-2042.
Hathaway, Oona (2005), “Between Power And Principle: An Integrated Theory Of İnternational Law”, The University of Chicago Law Review, 72: 469-536.
Henkin, Louis (1979), How Nations Behave, 2. Baskı (New York: Columbia University Press).
Jacobson, Harold K. ve Edith Brown Weiss (1995), “Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project”, Global Governance, 1: 119-148.
Keohane, Robert O. (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Keohane, Robert O. (1989), International Institutions and State Power Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press).
Keohane, Robert O. (1992), “Compliance with International Commitments: Politics within a Framework of Law”, Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 86, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Keohane, Robert O. (1997), “International Relations and International Law: Two Optics”, Harvard International Law Journal, 38 (2): 487-502.
Keohane, Robert O. ve Nye Jr, Joseph S. (1998), “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age”, Foreign Affairs, 77 (5): 81-94.
Kingsbury, Benedict (1997), “The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law”, Weiss, Edith Brown (Der.), International Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (Washington DC: The American Society of International Law): 345-372.
Kingsbury, Benedict (1998), “The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 19 (2): 345-372.
Krasner, Stephen D. (1983), “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Krasner, Stephen D. (Der.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press): 185-205.
Krasner, Stephen D. (2002), “Realist Views of International Law”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of American Society of International Law, 96: 265-268.
Kratochwil, Friedrich V. (1989), Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Kratochwil, Friedrich V. ve John Gerard Ruggie (1986), “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State”, International Organization, 40 (4): 753-775.
Kreps, Sarah Elizabeth ve Anthony Clark Arend (2006), “Why States Follow the Rules: Toward a Positional Theory of Adherence to International Legal Regimes”, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 16: 331-414.
Levitsky, Steven ve Lucan A. Way (2002), “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy, 13 (2): 51-65.
Machievelli, Niccolò (1988), The Prince, Skinner, Quentin ve Russell Price (Ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Mitchell, Ronald B. (1994), “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance”, International Organization, 48 (3): 425-458.
Mitchell, Ronald B. (2001), “Institutional Aspects of Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness”, Luterbacher, Urs ve Detlef F. Spinz (Der.), International Relations and Global Climate Change (Massachusetts: MIT Press): 221-244.
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1973), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Gözden Geçirilmiş 5. baskı (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).
Pazarcı, Hüseyin (2001), Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, I. Kitap (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi).
Posner, Eric (2003), “Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?”, Stanford Law Review, 55: 1901-1919.
Raustiala, Kal (2000), “Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 32 (3): 387-440.
Raymond, Aron (2003), Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Transaction Publishers).
Schädel, Andreas (2016), Signaling Weakness or Building Capacity: A Reassessment of the Reputation Argument in Separatist Conflicts, Yayımlanmamış Doktora Tezi, (Zürih: ETH Zurich).
Setear, John K. (1996), “An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law”, Harvard International Law Journal, 37 (1): 139-229.
Shannon, Vaughn P. (2000), “Norms are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation”, International Studies Quarterly, 44 (2): 293-316.
Shihata, Ibrahim F. I. (1997), “Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance With International Environmental Agreements - Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank’s Experience”, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 9: 37-51.
Simmons, Beth A. (1998), “Compliance with International Agreements”, Annual Review of Political Science, 1 (1): 75-93.
Simmons, Beth A. (2000), “Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?”, Yale Journal of International Law, 2: 323-362.
Smith, Edwin M. (1990), “Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements”, California Law Review, 64: 1549-1606.
Sohn, Louis B. (1964), “Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization”, Harvard Law Review, 77 (8): 1381-1425.
Tang, Shiping (2005), “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict”, Security Studies, 14 (1): 34-62,
Thirlway, Hugh (2010), “The Sources of International Law”, Evans, Malcolm D. (Der.), International Law (New York: Oxford University Press): 95-121.
Underdal, Arild (2002), “Conclusion: Patterns of Regime Effectiveness”, Miles, Edward L., Steinar Andresen, Elaine M. Carlin, Jon Birger Skjærseth, Arild Underdal ve Jørgen Wettestad (Der.), Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence (Massachusetts: MIT Press): 433-465.
Vogel, David ve Timothy Kessler (1998), “How Compliance Happens and Doesn’t Happen Domestically”, Weiss, Edith Brown ve Harold K. Jacobson (Der.), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Cambridge: MIT Press): 19-37.
Waltz, Kenneth (2010), Theory of International Politics (Illinois: Waveland Press).
Young, Margaret A. (2012), “Introduction: The Productive Friction Between Regimes”, Young, Margaret A. (Der.), Regime Interaction in International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press): 1-19.
Young, Oran R. (1992), “The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables”, Rosenau, James N. ve Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Der.), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 160-194.
Young, Oran R. (1994), International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
Zakaria, Fareed (1997), “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, 76 (6): 22-43.