PANDORA’NIN KUTUSU: LİBYA ÇATIŞMA HARİTASININ GÜNCELLENMESİ

Bu çalışma, Paul Wehr tarafından ileri sürülen çatışma haritalama tekniğini kullanarak ikinci Libya çatışmasını incelemektedir. Bu noktada çalışma, Libya çatışmasını, bağlamı, konusu, aktörü ve dinamiği çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Çalışmada, Libya sahasının analiz edilmesinin nedeni, Libya'nın son dönemin en karmaşık çatışmalarından biri olması ve dolayısıyla bölgesel dinamiklerini derinden etkilemesinden ileri gelmektedir. Çalışmanın önemi, Libya'daki çatışma sahasına alternatif bir analiz haritası sunarak literatüre katkı sunmasından ileri gelmektedir. İkincil veri kaynakları üzerinde yapılan çalışma, nitel araştırma tasarımına dayanmaktadır. Çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre, çatışmayı sona erdirmenin yolu, çatışmanın temel nedenlerine ve her iki tarafın da kabul edebileceği siyasi bir çözüme ulaşmaktan geçmektedir. Ayrıca Libya'daki çatışmaya barışçıl, adil ve kalıcı bir çözüm için gerekli ön koşul, demokratik bir sürecin desteklenmesidir. Buna göre, Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) öncülüğündeki uzlaşmanın başarısı, Libya'daki istikrar için oldukça önemlidir.
Anahtar Kelimeler:

Çatışma, , Çatışma haritalama, , Libya

PANDORA’S BOX: UPDATING THE LIBYAN CONFLICT MAP

This study examines the second Libyan conflict by using the conflict mapping technique that was introduced by Paul Wehr. At this point, the study analyses the Libyan conflict within the framework of context, issue, actor, and dynamic of the conflict. The reason for analyzing Libya in the research is that it is one of the complex conflicts of the last period, and thus deeply affects the regional dynamics. The significance of the research arises from its contribution to the literature by presenting an alternative road map of the conflict in Libya. The study conducted using secondary data sources is based on the qualitative research design. The results of the study reveals that the way to end the conflict is through reaching the root causes of the conflict and a solution acceptable to both sides. Besides, the necessary pre-condition for a peaceful, fair, and lasting solution to the conflict in Libya supports a democratic process. Accordingly, the success of United Nations (U.N)-led reconciliation is quite significant to stability in Libya.

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