MERKEZ BANKASI BAĞIMSIZLIĞININ BÜTÇE AÇIKLARINA ETKİSİ: GELİŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKELER AÇISINDAN BİR İNCELEME

Merkez bankalarının bağımsızlığı konusu, özellikle son otuz yılda yoğun olarak tartışılır hale gelmiştir. Birincil hedefi fiyat istikrarını sağlamak olan merkez bankalarının bağımsızlığı fikri teorik açıdan zaman tutarsızlığı, kamu tercihi teorisi ve hoş olmayan monetarist aritmetik ekseninde şekillenmiştir. Hem gelişmiş hem de gelişmekte olan ülkeleri yakından ilgilendiren bu kurumsal gelişme, enflasyonla mücadele açısından para politikasının bağımsızlığını vurgulamaktadır. Bağımsız merkez bankaları hükümetleri mali disiplini sağlamaya yönlendirirken, bağımsız olmayan merkez bankaları ise hükümetlerin gevşek maliye politikası uygulamasına izin verebilmektedir. Literatüre bakıldığında, merkez bankası bağımsızlığının bütçe açıkları üzerindeki etkisini ele alan güncel çalışma sayısının yetersiz olduğu görülmektedir. Merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ile bütçe açıkları arasındaki ilişkiyi inceleyen makalede, 1980-2014 dönemi 66 gelişmekte olan ülke açısından panel veri analizi kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Ele alınan dönem için merkez bankası bağımsızlığı göstergeleri olan merkez bankası başkanı değişim hızı (MBDH) ve yasal bağımsızlık (YB) için zaman değişimleri sıfırdır. Dolayısıyla, merkez bankası bağımsızlığı değişkeni ve kukla değişkenler birimler arası değişimleri ortadan kaldırdığından sabit etkiler modeli (fixed effect) kullanılamamaktadır. Değişkenler arasında bir ilişkinin olup olmadığını test etmek için Genelleştirilmiş En Küçük Kareler (GLS) ve Hausman-Taylor (HT) yöntemleri uygulanmıştır. Merkez bankalarının hem yasal hem de fiili bağımsızlığının ele alındığı çalışmada, merkez bankasının fiili bağımsızlığı ile bütçe açıkları arasında negatif bir ilişki olduğu görülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı, Bütçe Açığı, Yasal Bağımsızlık ve Fiili Bağımsızlık

THE EFFECT OF THE CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE ON BUDGET DEFICITS: AN INVESTIGATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The issue of the independence of central banks has been intensely debated, especially in the last three decades. The idea of the independence of central banks, whose primary objective is to ensure price stability, is shaped on the axis theoretically by time inconsistency, public choice theory, and unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. The institutional development, which closely concerns both developed and developing countries, emphasizes the independence of monetary policy in terms of combatting inflation. Independent central banks are driving governments to ensure fiscal discipline, while non-independent central banks can allow governments to implement loose fiscal policy. In the literature, the number of recent studies addressing the impact of central bank independence on budget deficits seems to be insufficient. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and Hausman-Taylor (HT) methods were applied to test the relationship between variables. In this article, which examines the relationship between central bank independence and budget deficits, a panel data analysis was conducted for 66 developing countries in the period 1980-2014. For the period covered, central bank independence indicators, such as the head of the central bank turnover rate (MBDH) and legal independence (YB) are time-invariant variables. Therefore, since the central bank independence variable and dummy variables eliminate individual specific effects, the fixed effect model could not be used. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and Hausman-Taylor (HT) methods were applied to test whether there was a relationship between the variables. In the study, which discussed both legal and actual independence of central banks, a negative relationship was found between central bank actual independence and budget deficits.

Keywords:

Central Bank Independence, Budget Deficit, Legal and Actual Independence,

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