Mali Kurumlar: Mali Disiplin ve Bütçe Hakkı İle İlişkisi

Bu çalışmada mali kurumların mali disiplin ve bütçe hakkı üzerindeki etkisi incelenmiştir. Mali kurumlar, mali kurallar, bağımsız mali kuruluşlar ve mali konseyler olarak sınıflandırılmıştır. Normatif bir perspektife göre optimal şekilde tasarlandığında tüm mali kurumların mali disiplini sağlama ve bütçe hakkını güçlendirme potansiyeli bulunmaktadır. Mali kurumlar, kısa vadede ekonomik istikrarı, uzun vadede mali disiplini sağlayacak şekilde maliye politikalarının oluşturulmasına katkı sağlayabilir. Belirli bir grup lehine, çoğunluk aleyhine mali kararların alınmasını engelleyerek bütçe hakkını sağlamlaştırabilir. Ancak bu kurumların inşa edilmesinin ve etkin şekilde faaliyet göstermesinin önünde engeller bulunmaktadır. Kurumların mali disiplini etkileme kanalları geliştirmesi ve kalıcı olması için toplumsal talep ve uzlaşı gerekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Mali Disiplin, Bütçe Hakkı, Mali Kurallar, Bağımsız Mali Kuruluşlar, Mali Konseyler

Fiscal Institutions: Their Relation with Fiscal Discipline and Power of the Purse

This study examines the impact of fiscal institutions on the fiscal discipline and the power of the purse. Fiscal institutions are classified as fiscal rules, independent fiscal institutions and fiscal councils. According to normative perspective, all fiscal institutions have potential to strengthen fiscal discipline and the power of the purse when they are optimally designed. Fiscal institutions can contribute to the implementation of fiscal policies in a way that will provide economic stability in the short term and fiscal discipline in the long run. Fiscal institutions can consolidate the power of the purse by preventing fiscal decisions against the majority in favor of a particular group. However, there are obstacles to the construction of these institutions and their effective functioning. Social demand and consensus is needed for institutions to develop channels that affect fiscal discipline and to be permanent.

Keywords:

Fiscal Discipline, The Power of the Purse, Fiscal Rules, ndependent Fiscal Institutions, Fiscal Councils,

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