TEORİ VE UYGULAMADA MERKEZ BANKASI ŞEFFAFLIĞI

Merkez Bankası şeffaflığı, son yıllarda para politikasının temel özelliklerinden biri haline gelmiştir. Merkez Bankası şeffaflığının artması, özel sektör belirsizliğini azaltır, ekonomik karışıklıkları istikrarlı hale getirmek için Merkez Bankasına daha çok esneklik verir, üretimin volatilitesini düşürür ve Merkez Bankacılarının hareketlerini sosyal olarak optimal hale getirir. Çalışmada Merkez Bankasının İnterbank Faiz Oranları üzerine olan şeffaflık etkisi ampirik olarak ortaya konulmaktadır. Ekonomik şeffaflık arttığında faizin azalacağı ve enflasyon ile faiz oranı arasındaki pozitif ve anlamlı ilişki nedeniyle enflasyonun da azalacağı görülmektedir. Sonuç olarak ekonomik şeffaflık daha etkin bir para politikası için uygun ve öngörülebilir bir ortam oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Merkez Bankası Şeffaflığı, Ekonomik Şeffaflık, Para Politikası, Enflasyon Oranı, Faiz Oranı

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