

International relations theory and the post-cold war period*

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Prof. Atila Eralp: Good morning, we are sorry to start a little late. When I introduced Prof Halliday yesterday I tried to make the point that his research and publications focus on three major areas of international relations: international relations of the Middle East, international political theory and international dimensions of revolutions. During the presentation yesterday, he focused on international relations of the Middle East. Today he will focus on international political theory and the practise of international relations (IR) at the end of the Cold War.

Prof. Fred Halliday: Thank you very much Prof. Eralp. I am going to give a very general talk today about the subject of IR, reflecting inevitably the way we teach it at LSE but also engaging with the broader development of the subject.

1. IR: Three forms of explanation

1.1. The expansion of IR

You all know that IR, as an academic subject, is a relatively recent part of the university curriculum. The first chairs and departments were founded after the First World War in Britain and the United States. The question which was then addressed was a very obvious and important one: "How does one prevent the outbreak of war between major states?". So, the initial question, the focusing question of the discipline or the field was understanding the causes of war and working out ways to prevent war. This points to something that has run throughout the history of the discipline, and indeed is, and should be relevant to any social science, which is that while in the university one is studying these things with a necessary intellectual and moral distance, the outside world is still prompting and is the ultimate point of reference for the subject. If you look at the history of any subject, sociology, economics, management etc.,

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it has developed in the university in response to a need from society, in response to something that requires solving. That goes as well for more recent topics that have developed: information technology, environment, women studies, development studies, which have become established parts of the university curriculum in the last ten years.

The growth in the study of IR really dates from the Second World War and particularly from two developments. One, the Cold War and the impact that gave to the study of IR are very much in the classical vein of addressing this question on the causes of war and the means to prevent it. But at the same time there developed a whole range of other issues such as area studies, IR of the Third World, and the study of international organisation. The latter is itself part of the prevention of war most obviously through the League of Nations and the UN. And at the same time, there has been an enormous growth in the study of international organisation, whether directly related to the issue of war or to the question of integration in the European sphere. Just to diverge for a moment, the map of European integration is now extremely complex; by last count we have several different layers or elements of European integration from the European Union to the Western European Union, the OSCE, NATO and so forth which encompass some of the European states. Of course, 'Europe' now stretches to Alma Ati and Vladivostok as well as to Vancouver and Los Angeles.

Now, in broad terms, you can quantify the expansion of studying international relations also in the number of students and professors in the departments. For example, my department has doubled in size in the last 10 years from about 12 to 24 members of staff. This is obviously very welcome, but at the same time it has its risks as any expansion does. There are questions that should be posed of the study of IR from within it and from without it. So, what one has to do is carry out a brief survey of some aspects of the discipline, identify one or two problems, as I see it, and then suggest some ways in which in the 1990s, in the period since the end of the Cold War and not necessarily as a result of the end of the Cold War, the subject has in fact developed.

1.2. Relations between states, non-state actors

Let me begin by saying what IR is about. I have always been struck by how few people outside IR departments know what it is about or have any conception of it. They believe it is basically reading newspapers and watching television, saying what is going to happen in the EU expansion talks tomorrow or in the UN's policy in Kosovo. However, the study of IR, as I see it, addresses really three more long-standing questions. These are questions which have been central to the study of societies and states,

and of the international system not for the last five or fifty years but for at least the last five hundred years. So, the historical context for the study of IR is not the immediate. It is basically the world since the creation of the modern international system in the 16th century.

The three questions are these. First of all, how can we analyze relations between states? It is the central, old-fashioned but still relevant issue. Ironically, the word “international” we use in English, and which I think others have copied including Turkish, with *uluslar arası* does not actually mean what it says. *International* is a euphemism for inter-state relations. When the word was invented by Jeremy Bentham in 1780 he applied it to law. He meant to apply it to law between nations in the classical Latin sense of peoples. But it has come to mean relations between states with the result that the world body in which all states are gathered has got the completely incorrect name of the United Nations. It should be called the United States but unfortunately somebody got the brand name first. But relations between states is the historic core of the discipline and I would argue, despite globalisation and everything else that we are hearing, it is still absolutely the central concern. So, the simplest argument is that relations between states are determined by the maximisation of power and that power is largely to be understood in military terms. That of course was the central thesis of what is called ‘realism’ and it remains an important theme despite the advent of other approaches.

However, to say that relations between states are central leaves open numerous questions. It leaves open as I have already suggested: What is the power of states? Is it primarily military? Is it primarily economic? Is it primarily what has been termed ideological or power over opinion? And, what is the relationship between these?

Clearly, the Soviet Union in its last years had immense military power – over 45,000 nuclear weapons and an army of 6 million. But it did not have commensurate political power and it did not have enduring ideological power. It crumbled very rapidly. So, the question of the balance between different forms of power and of the shifting balance at different times in history alone is very central. For example, now in America there is a big literature on what is called “soft power”, meaning precisely not nuclear weapons, not battleships but the power of the English language, the world appeal of McDonald’s, the power of consumerism, the power of information technology and leadership in that sphere, life-style attractions and so on and so forth. The argument is that this is another form of power which may be as important as military power.

Another question which is raised is the issue of definition. If we are talking about states, what is understood by a state? Here I think, the sociologists have much to offer. I will come back to this in redefining what in IR is understood by the state. But if inter-state relations is one major theme of the subject, the second is the relations which are not comprised by the states- in other words, the relations between non-state actors. Most obviously, multinational cooperations whose movement of finance, whose determination of technology and employment patterns is decreasingly affected by the states, and many of their turnovers are greater than that of many of the states in UN. Multinationals employ people, they have in some cases private armies and they can move money around the world without the control of the states. They also do much to influence the press and the public opinion in many countries including Britain.

The multinationals are not the only non-state actors. We have nationalist movements, we have opposition movements, we have religious movements whose ideas, whose books, sometimes whose guns cross frontiers. Then we have the whole world of what is called global civil society, meaning by that the world of Amnesty International, NGOs, women's groups, the groups concerned with the environment and all the others of whom there are a several thousand in the world. They are not controlled by the states, they do not get their finance from states, and they seek to influence the public opinion and world politics in ways that are not primarily tied to state interests. If you ask almost a sociology of knowledge question, "How is it that over the last 15 years the issue of the environment has come onto the agenda?" It is largely due to the work of NGOs. People are writing articles and papers, lobbying governments, writing books, getting on committees and so forth. Of course they cannot ignore states but the initiative is not coming from them. If you ask, "How was it that in 1995, 4000 NGOs related to women's issues as well as the state bodies who met in the context of the UN decade on women met in Beijing?" Again this did not come from states: one thing we can say for sure is no state in the world is controlled predominantly by women. They are controlled by men. So, the initiative, the values, the issues have come from below, from NGOs. Even as, as always happens, states have said: "Oh, that looks like an interesting issue. We'd better get involved in it". Or, alternatively they have said "That looks like a dangerous issue. We'd also better get involved in it", as states have always done.

At Beijing, they said, there were NGOs in the classic liberal sense of good-hearted people trying to do good for the world, but there were also what they called: "the RINGOs" which are religious NGOs, saying women should be veiled or whatever it might be, or the Catholic ones attacking abortion and contraception. But there were also what they called "GINGOs" which are government-controlled NGOs of whom there are

many in the world. And of course there are also what were called MANGOs which are male-controlled NGOs. I am sure there are Mafia controlled NGOs as well. So, not all that call themselves an NGO are right. Nevertheless, the main point is that relations between societies and even relations between states and governments are increasingly affected by economic pressure groups, nationalist, political forces which are not controlled by states. Of course, one can overstate this argument. Because, clearly, at the end of the day, it is states which have armed force. One can overstate the degree to which NGOs seek to circumvent the state rather than actually seek to influence the state. After all, most NGOs are lobbying governments to do something or other governments to do something. They are not anti-state, just separate from the state. The PLO was an obvious example. What do they aim to do in life? They aim to have their own state.

The second broad question is therefore what is the role, what is the influence of these non-state actors? How important are these? The old style statist, the realists would say, and I remember my predecessors, professors of my department, would always say when you talk about these things: "That is all very well Mr. Halliday, but what has it got to do with IR? They do not count for anything when it comes to relations between states and do not fool yourself that they do". There is a more serious argument with regard to MNCs and the world economy which is, at the end of the day, a system of global finance. This is that a system of MNCs presupposes the strength of states. It presupposes law, order, regulation, taxation and a system of inter-state relations which of anything has to be stronger and more intrusive than one in which economics and finance would be largely confined within states. To take the most obvious example, if there is piracy on the high seas and in the air, then you cannot have international trade. If banking is not regulated, then you have gangster banks. The more people want to have banks and the more countries want to have banks, the more the state has to regulate. Just as we have seen an explosion in international banking and international finance, we have also seen the intrusion of states to regulate, to control ever more so what is going on in the world economy.

Moreover, if people would say that we live in a world of rapid mobility and states are no longer important as far as the market is concerned, then one has to be very careful. It is true if you are talking about the movement of finance and it is to some extent true if you are talking about technology; but we still know which countries in the world are keeping the control of that technology and trying to be in the lead at the expense of others. It certainly is not true that the state is disappearing as far as the movement of the people is concerned. In fact, in no time in history, has it been more difficult for the average person in the world to

cross frontiers. I do not mean the educated elite with a few dollars in their pocket, the CNN-watching, the *Economist* reading elites, but for the other 99.9% of the humanity. It has never been as difficult as it is in the late 1990s for ordinary people to move, let alone to go to work in another country. States are stopping the movement with citizenship laws, policemen, barriers and everything else. I think, this second dimension, the non-state dimension is often overstated and yet raises many interesting theoretical and practical questions.

1. 3. International structures: Three theories

What is the third area? The third area is the area of structure. In other words, the argument that it is not states as individual actors and it is not non-state actors (MNCs, NGOs, nationalist groups etc.) that are determinant. It is argued that all of these actors, individual actors, like individuals in a society are located within a broader structure of which they may or may not be aware, and which, as all structures do, limit what they can in fact do. You may think you are free, you may think you have created yourself as a free person, but actually, to name a figure, 95% of who you are and what you can do is determined by the structures over which you have no control whatsoever - be it family, religion, nationality, state, economy, education and so forth, not to mention the character and processes of your body. In international relations the idea of structure has itself a long history. There are different arguments. But, let me mention three of them. The most old-fashioned one of all is the realist argument. It is that states are located within a structure of military power, a hierarchy of military power which determines their role and freedom. Only a minority of great powers (in the late 20th century, that means nuclear powers) have a significant margin of freedom as far as IR is concerned. You cannot go and simply occupy the territory of another country. You are technically, like an individual, able to lock yourself into a room and have no contacts with the outside world. The state could decide not to have trade or diplomatic relations or student exchanges or media exchanges with the other countries: but the cost of such absolute autarky would be very high.

The classic realist concept of structure, the one that they have held and still hold to, rests of course on the concept of balance of power. 'Balance of power' does not mean that there exists a parity of power. In other words, it does not mean that there is a rough equality. First of all, balance of power is said to be a self-correcting mechanism in the international system. The realist argument, the traditional IR argument, is that this is the central structure of IR. What happens is that if one state seeks to impose its will on others, if one state seeks to become dominant or hegemonic, then a coalition of other states will form to counteract it. In

other words, there is a self-correcting mechanism against world-empire, against world domination, within the international system. The examples are obvious. Napoleon sought to dominate Europe and coalitions formed against him. Hitler tried to dominate the Europe coalitions formed against him: the result was, it is argued, a very unlikely coalition of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. In the post-war world the Soviet Union sought to dominate the world and saw again a coalition formed against it including countries which might not otherwise have been in the same alliance. The argument is not only that military power is central, but that the apparent autonomy of states and the isolation of states is delusory and in fact that a self-correcting and controlling mechanism operates.

Now, there are many problems of balance of power and it is often regarded as highly immoral. It is also regarded as inaccurate. An essay question that I have set to my students was, 'Where is the balance of power in the post-Cold War world?' The United States is the dominant power militarily, economically and ideologically. It does not look as if everybody wants to form an alliance against it. Everybody wants to be a part of the US-led economic system and therefore the balance of power system does not seem to operate. I had the pleasure, a couple of years ago of doing a series of interviews for the BBC with American Cold War policy-makers, and one of the people I interviewed was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. And at the end, I said to Dr. Kissinger "I set you the exam question that I set our undergraduates last year. What is the role of balance of power in the post-Cold War world?" He thought for a minute, he frowned, "It is a very difficult question," he said. But, he had an answer, and the answer you should know because it may be the end of the story. He said "there are always interludes after great wars or great conflicts and the period since the end of Cold War is after great conflict. Give it 20 years and there will be another military strategic conflict looming in the world and the balance of power will reassert itself." Who are we to say that he is wrong or who are we to say that human agency and good will and all the NGOs can do anything about it? Certainly, again, going back to my pessimistic LSE predecessor he would certainly say: "Oh, you know, all of you are dreaming about creating a new world and order and peace. Give it 20 years and it will be back to business as usual". Maybe they are wrong. Maybe the reason is why history does not repeat itself. But it is not a discreditable argument.

Balance of power is a very traditional concept of structure but of course there are other concepts of structure. The Marxist theories of IR which developed in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Wallerstein's world systems theory, identified a structure as well. It was not a structure of military power. It was a structure of economic power. I simplify it but this is basically the argument. There were imperialist powers and there were

dependent powers. Of course what they took was dependency theory in its Latin American form and generalised it to the world. And a very good example of this work would be the work of Wallerstein, looking at the way in which a world system of economic inequality was created. But, again, the message is the same as it is in realism, which is if you are a medium or small power there is virtually nothing you can do. You are stuck and the ability to develop economically or to assert yourself politically or militarily is affected by the fact that you are part of a broader international structure.

The third kind of structural or systemic argument is to be found in the work of the international political economists: I am using the word structure and system interchangeably. I am thinking in particular of my colleague Prof. Susan Strange, who I think has done some of the most original work in this field. Susan argued that the traditional interlocking or interrelationship of economics and politics, which has to be found in classical thought in Adam Smith or Karl Marx or even more recently in Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi in the 1940s, has been broken in the post-war period. The source lies in a dangerous and in many ways, mind-restricting professionalism by the economists on the one hand and the political scientists on the other. What most economists ignore is political and military power as a factor guaranteeing the functioning of the economic system and indeed the functioning of the individual societies, just as they ignore ideology and values. If the world did approximate to a perfect market, it would look very different from what it does. We certainly have not got a perfect market in labour and are not going to have one: every inhabitant of an Anatolian town who wants to go and work in Western Europe would be quick to tell you this. So, one argument for *political* economy rests on a critique of the economists. The other one is that politicians and the IR/political experts have ignored the power of the economy. So, Susan's "structures" are ones which seek to reassert the interaction, if not the unity, of economic and political factors. In contrast to the realists, with their balance of power which is predominantly a military concept and in contrast to the Marxists who had a predominantly productive concept of the market and of the structure, Susan argued that, in fact, we were located within four structures, in which the economic and the political combined. But, the relation between four structures was itself contingent. In other words they were not necessarily dominant at any one particular time. Those of you familiar with the work of Michael Mann on states, will know that he identifies three forms of state power: here too that which is dominant at any one time is open. So, Susan argued that the security structure is very important and remains important. The dollar would not be the dominant currency in the world if the Americans did not have nuclear weapons and the US navy: the relation between the two is too

easily forgotten. But there is also a production structure, there is also a finance structure - production and finance are different in her theory - and finally there is our business, METU's and LSE's business, which is the knowledge structure. This last includes technology, education and so forth.

If we are moving into something called the 'knowledge era' - a phrase I do not like, insofar we are always in the knowledge era, as Plato, al-Ghazzali and every thinker in history has been in a knowledge era - then, this fourth structure, the structure of knowledge and technology is very important. The issue and impact of information technology are obvious examples and, again, an example of how structural power works. First of all, information technology is not egalitarian. It looks as if it is egalitarian in terms of personal access but the development of technology is restricted to one or two countries, not including mine. It is carried out predominantly in *one* of the world's 10,000 languages. It embodies a discrimination against all others. It is also increasingly dividing the world up into those who have access to it and those who do not. So, it is hierarchical. It is driven by market pressures as every university department, which has endlessly had to change its information technology and its equipment when the earlier system was perfectly adequate for our intellectual needs, knows. It is not driven by the needs of users but by the needs of those who make more money out of it or who live by installing and servicing it. If you are running a department, you cannot say, "Look, we have got a 10-year old WordPerfect program or whatever. Let us forget about all the other stuff. Why do we need it?" You are driven by the structure. You will not get the students, you will not get the contacts, you will not get the e-mail. The world has to conform to the technology of Mr Gates. So, the structure forces you to change.

2. Challenges to realism

Against this background we can assess the development of IR. What has happened over the last 20 or 30 years is, in one sense, what Thomas Kuhn described in his famous *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962); there was a dominant paradigm in IR, a dominant approach, that is increasingly being criticised because of its anomalies, and because of the things that it cannot explain. Alternative approaches have now come along. But unlike Kuhn's model, what has not happened is that the old paradigm has been replaced by a new one. We have not returned to 'normal science'. What we have instead is a multiplicity of paradigms and multiplicity of approaches. Realism continues, and I would say that the majority of those working in IR, in either the United States or Britain, still operate with some kind of realist framework. In other words, the state is

central, military power is central. The international system for all the organisations, values and global civil society (whatever you want to include in it) is still a competitive, anarchical system. That is the essence of the underlying realist framework, or its 'neo-realist' variant.

However, other paradigms have emerged. I have mentioned Marxism and political economy. I would now mention an area which I think of as being a very creative area and one that is a cautiously phrased, but a very effective counter theory to realism, that is what is called foreign policy analysis (FPA). FPA is against assuming that states are unitary actors which act in the international system against other states. You challenge the assumption of the unitary actor, and ask, "How *is* foreign policy made?" What about the conflicts between different elements in the government which may well produce an irrational, suboptimal outcome? What about the conflict between civilian parties and the military or between different factions within the different parties or between different ministries or even between different security organisations? All countries have this. What is the role of the press, increasingly a part of the formation of public opinion? What about public opinion? What about ethnic groups? What about minorities? For example, you have in Turkey people from Bosnian origin, Trans-Caucasian origin, Azeri origin. Are they affecting foreign policy? How are they doing it? What about the Chechens? Are they pulling it one direction or the other? What about business interests, and so on and so forth?

Even within the governmental apparatus foreign policy is no longer the product of a rational decision-making process. Look in Turkey at the relation between civilian and military bodies, and divergences within each. If you put in everything else, the whole domestic context is itself changing. It is becoming broader. A Marxist would say there is no problem. It is big business which dictates foreign policy. Of course, there are some instances we can say that is the case: but clearly it is not enough. And then which big business? Some businesses might like to go one way and some might like to go the other. It is ironic now that some big businesses are in favour of the embargo on Cuba and some want to lift it. Some want to lift the embargo on Iran and some want to impose it and so forth.

In the external environment a much more complex picture prevails. What are other states doing or what do you think other states are doing? How much of, to give an obvious example, Greco-Turkish relations are about what Greece and Turkey are doing? How much is what politicians, newspapers, commentators *think* they are doing or *pretend* they think they are doing? I am not a specialist but I think there is a high element of both in the whole story. This would be true for British relations with the EU.

Much of the British public is simply not prepared to have an adult, grown-up discussion about the most important issue on the foreign policy agenda, European Monetary Union, to the extent that nobody mentions it: it is extraordinary. It is going to have implications on everybody's livelihood including how much they pay for their mortgages and what their wages are, and what their taxation is. Nobody now discusses this because it is too sensitive. This is a case where the external environment produces misperception. We do not discuss it. So the whole development of Foreign Policy Analysis is one that challenges realism. I think it has been a very effective counter to the unitary approach to international relations.

2.1. Challenges to the discipline: Parochialism, methodological anxiety

I mentioned at the beginning that IR, like any social science, is immediately and indirectly responsive to what is happening in the real world. There are three dimensions to this relation, three circles or three factors. The first is what is going on in the discipline itself, the internal history. X had a theory, Y refuted it, Z set up a research department and only hired people who had a particular approach, and so on. We all know that. I think that internal history is important. Because it is how people in the discipline see it. Disciplines are like nations, they pretend that everything comes from their own nations. So, actually if they get a theory from somewhere else, like structure or postmodernity or feminism or Marxism etc., they say: "No, no, we invented it". It is self-deception, but it is part of the good feeling, it is part of the self-image, it is part of the feel good factor. Interdependence, to give an example, is the buzzword of much IR theory at the moment. The concept of interdependence does not come from international relations. It comes from trade theory in the late 1960s. But somebody used it in IR. So, now it is ours you know. It is the same with food and everything else. We say, "It is our food not others". It is OK.

So, the internal development is important but yet I think there are two things very wrong with IR at the moment. One, which I suspect you have become aware of here - because you have people trained in different countries - is that our discipline claims to be about international relations but is limited in perspective. You would have thought it was about something to do with what people in other countries were thinking, yet it has actually become very parochial. It is becoming parochial in the sense that virtually nobody in orthodox British or American IR reads or sees fit to read anything in the language other than English. It is an elementary point, but I think it is an absolute scandal. If there is anything which a

discipline should train people - it could be anything, archaeology, IR or whatever it is - it should place in their mind an important thing - to read in other languages. If you read the Greek press, Turkish press or even the German press about Cyprus or about the Aegean islands you are going to get different and necessary perspectives. If British people read the Spanish, Italian or French press about EMU they are going to get different perspectives. They need not agree but they should have different perspectives. Actually, IR is in large measure a monolithic, single language discipline. Equally, it has become fragmented between British and American approaches.

There was a book written over a decade ago by Kal Holsti, called *The Dividing Discipline* (1985). It showed, for example, that in methodology, and particularly the relation with history on the one hand and quantification on another, that British and American approaches were diverging. I reviewed the book and said Holsti was wrong. I said a lot of people in Britain are doing American style work and also the people in America are doing what the Americans call "soft", historical, unquantified stuff. In retrospect Holsti was right and I was wrong. Take a very simple example: just look at the major IR journals in America and look at the level of quantification and compare it to the British one. There is no algebra in British IR journals but there are masses of it in some American ones, notably *International Studies Quarterly*. The concerns that they are addressing are in large measure different. A very classic difference is that in the 'English school' of realism, that of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, the central concept is that of "international society". What they mean by international society is that while international relations is comprised of a system of states, these states have shared international values. Like a society, they have certain shared norms. You can, as in a society, defy them: but you do it at a price, and very few people or in this case, states, do so for much of the time. If you do, if you invade another country, as Saddam did or Hitler did, or transgress in other ways, you get punished, which is what happens in a society. So, the 'English school' approach is that there are the norms of diplomacy, the norms of law, even the norms of war: these constitute something more than just a system of states clashing against each other.

What is the American approach? Kissinger, Waltz, all these people. Morgenthau writes about maximisation of power. International society is for him just a silly liberal idea. There is no debate between these two approaches. They constitute two different traditions and increasingly in methodology, in language, in for example the American application of rational choice theory to international relations. They are two different schools, and they do not interact, and this is just not intellectually bad. It is very bad for younger people in the IR profession because, if you do a

Ph.D. in one country, you may not get hired in another. And if you write an article in one country, let alone a language other than English, you do not get quoted. So, you have, both at the level of language and also at a level of approach, growing fragmentation in a discipline that should be more unified. I am sure you must see this here in Turkey because you read different magazines: actually, you have an independent vantage point.

The other danger in the subject is one which is common to many social sciences at the moment. It is what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz called 'epistemological hypochondria', that is, obsession with method and with questioning philosophical issues at the expense of getting on with a job of actually looking at the world or looking at societies. I know that this is a sensitive issue, but I am willing to hold my ground on these questions and since I have little time I am putting it in slightly broad terms. I am very much in favour of teaching theory and the philosophy of social science in IR. I am very much in favour of abstraction. I am very much in favour of our students having a broad culture in the philosophy of the social sciences, so they can argue about what a cause is, what a fact is, what an explanation is, or what the difference between fact and value is. This is part of basic literacy of any social science student. But to spend the majority of your time and majority of your journal space, discussing meta-theory, epistemology, the critique of ethnocentric assumptions and all the rest of it is a misuse of time.

I very much hold to the view of our late colleague Ernest Gellner who said these are questions for the philosophy department and people should go to philosophy departments and do it and do it properly. Most of the people in our discipline frankly do it very badly. They waste time and they waste journal space and – the most serious crime – they mislead the young. This is a very serious crime indeed, for which they executed Socrates and many others. They mislead the young by letting them waste time on these issues for which they are not properly trained. I would put it in a more challenging form: I am very willing to be opposed on this. I do not think there is *any* meta-theoretical or methodological issue of relevance to social sciences which is specific to IR. I do not think there is one which IR should take as its own in such a way that it does not look at what other social sciences are saying on the matter, and which can be worked out solely or mainly through international relations. When you get endless maundering articles about the conflict and erosion of the fact-value distinction. Well, yes that is a very important issue: but it has been discussed for 300 years at least. It is not specific to IR. Similarly for the concept of cause or the concept of rights or whatever it may be, or the relation between theory and practice or between perception and reality. One can go on. There are a lot of people like Mr. David Hume and Mr.

Kant – these gentlemen have written on these questions. We should not be spending our time pretending that IR has a particular take on such issues.

So I argue there are two generic problems in the discipline: one is parochialism and fragmentation and the other is this epistemological hypochondria. When we come to the two other circles of determination of IR, the second I have already hinted at, is a broader intellectual and academic climate of the times: what is going on in other disciplines, what is going on in intellectual journals. I think IR has pretended to be creating concepts where actually it has borrowed them, but there is nothing wrong with this any more than as anything wrong in trade or eating food from other cultures. I think it should be recognised more. But at the same time, if the issue of fact and value or cause or structure, or post-modernity has been flogged to death in another discipline, do we have to go through the same procedures ourselves? I doubt it. On the question of post-modernism, which is very widespread in IR, I would say about a third of our research students are, in some way or another, interested in Foucault and IR, Derrida and the arms race and so on. One needs to read what others have already written in literary theory in history, in sociology about the problems with this approach before you start reinventing the debate as one in IR.

3. IR since 1989

3.1. *The end of the cold war*

If the first area is the history of the discipline itself and the second is the broader intellectual academic milieu, the third is what is happening in the outside world. Here we come directly to the end of the Cold War.

One of the philosophical arguments of English realism which I mentioned as the traditional school, of which I am not part, but respect, is a hostility to what is called ‘presentism’. Presentism is the argument that since something, since the end of the Cold War, since the Iranian revolution, since Tony Blair came to power, since Mr. Erbakan left the government, the world has completely changed and we are living in a totally different situation: we have, it is claimed, to get rid of all concepts which we once had. One of the founders of this school, Martin Wight, said that the main function of the academic discipline, the main function of a university education, is to correct against presentism. In other words, it is to get people to realise how yesterday’s headlines or today’s headlines or CNN are not actually that new. This is a very healthy point to make,

although it must not be taken too far, because our job is partly to say that actually *this* is not that new but *that* is.

To take an example: the crossing of frontiers by religious ideas has been going on for thousands of years, migration has been going on for thousands of years, there have been multinationals and banks operating across frontiers for hundreds of years. There have been criminals crossing frontiers for hundreds of years. If you take the central, very precise point of globalisation, that money and information related to money can be moved in zero time around the world, it has been possible to do this age since 1867 when the transatlantic cables related Europe to America. Do not, therefore, exaggerate the novelty of many things now going on. People are saying, "Look, nationalism is rising", yet we have had this problem, these ethnic phenomena, for quite some time. So, I think the suspicion of presentism is a healthy response. But, equally we have to say "yes, there may be something new". The trick is to say, "*that* is not so new, but *this* is new". If you take the example of the environment, the argument of the anti-ecological lobby, of the motor-car industry and of the oil industry, is: there has always been change in the world climate; so, what is new? "There was the ice age and most change in the world climate has not been to do with humans. It has been to do with changes in nature. Nature has an unstable, but ultimately, over thousands of years, self-correcting mechanism. We may be in for another ice age or we may be in for the opposite of another ice age. We cannot do anything about it. It has happened before, so relax." I think that would have been one of the good examples of the abuse of this anti-presentist approach, by saying that since something is not particularly new, let's not worry about it. I think there *is* something new to worry about global warming and many other things. There is something that human beings have to do with it. We are causing it and therefore perhaps, as a social scientist, we can do something against it. One has to be careful to balance the argument that *everything* is new against the argument that nothing has changed. I am equally critical of those colleagues in the IR field who have said everything has changed since 1989, and those who say in an English idiom, "Don't worry chaps, pull up the blankets. It is all in Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger": it is business as usual. I do not think that either of these are true. I think also both of them are very boring responses.

3.2. *World since 1989*

When we come to IR in the post-1989 period, we encounter several analytic challenges. First, how do we explain the end of the cold war. Certainly you can explain it in terms of inter-state relations. Equally you can do so in terms of the third dimension of IR, the structural. Realists

and structuralists can tell their own story. But, there is another story which I think is the most interesting one. It is about what happened to the Soviet elite in the 1980s that led them to embark on these changes and over which ultimately they lost control. To my mind, this brings the focus very much to what I referred at the beginning as the *second* layer of IR. In other words, it was not primarily relations between states. There *were* negotiations on arms control, and about Afghanistan. That was not trivial. But that was not the main thing because that could be managed without the system collapsing. Nor I think was it the structure: people say globalisation brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. No, they could have done without McDonalds and Chase Manhattan Bank for another thirty years. It was not globalisation. It was something at the second level. It was the crossing of frontiers by ideas. It was a transitional process, the crossing of frontiers by the images of western consumerism more than those of western democracy. It was the demoralisation of the communists who until the early 1980s thought they could save and continue that system. So, one has to look for the answer within the context where communism had been very successful, which created a large educated class of people who were curious about the outside world in the way that their predecessors were not.

Stalin was not reading the *International Herald Tribune*, but his successors were. They were listening to the BBC and the Voice of America. How did this come about? Most accounts of the collapse of communism are entirely internal. They were about economic reform and this party boss replacing that party boss, and so on. This goes as much for recent work based on archives and on interviews as for previous books written from outside with less knowledge, with less facts. But there is an international relations story to be told and if we are talking about the challenges to discipline from the real world, this extraordinary event is a real challenge. There is something new: the end of the Cold war.

I am particularly interested in the way in which the impact of the West, not so much of the arms race or of politics but of Western society had this demonstration effect that demoralised communism. For me, the image that is most striking and most potent in this regard is of Gorbachev, going in the early 1980s to Canada and just going to a supermarket. He did not go to the most expensive supermarket, he just went to an average supermarket in an average Canadian town. What would he see? He would see something that was infinitely superior to the most important Central Committee shop in Moscow. He would see yoghurts and breakfast cereals and neatly packaged meats and fishes, fresh ones, fresh cheeses too, and a range of things which was simply not just beyond what the average Russian had ever seen but beyond what Russian society could ever produce: that was the defeat. The defeat was in the area that they had

chosen to compete in since Khrushchev in the early 1960s, which is in the area of consumer goods. Of course, communism constantly thought of itself as the ultimate form of modernity, as catching up with and overtaking the West. But the definition of their modernity was always 20 years behind that of the West. It was pig iron and steel mills when the West was already beginning to get into microchip computers, trainers and all the other things. It is the joke of Eric Honeker, the Secretary General of the East German Communist Party in 1988, coming to the party centre and saying, “Comrades, I have a wonderful news for you. In East Germany we produced the largest computer in the world”. The point is that he got it wrong, he was associating technology and industrial development with something that was from the previous epoch. He also failed, as communism as a whole failed, to identify the key element in modernity, its constantly changing, self-transcending character.

I shall just conclude on this point. For any of us teaching in any branch of the social sciences, the collapse of Soviet communism and its consequences provide enough of a research agenda and enough challenges to our previous knowledge on it to occupy us for life. For IR there is a central issue too: it says something about power in the international system. The way in which economics is mediated through lifestyles is very important. I summed it up in something I wrote: I said what destroyed communism was not the gun-boat but it was the T-shirt. OK, I put it demagogically. Yet, there are many replies to this. The realists would say, “Come on, it was weapons, it was Reagan’s arms build-up”. The area specialists would say, “This is a very Euro-centric view because it did not happen in China, they are staying in power, and they look likely to stay in power”. So, where does that leave your theory? I just leave that in the air for more discussion.

3.3. Gender and IR

Let me now mention second level influences, two broader ideas in the social sciences which have affected IR. One is feminism. Feminism and women’s studies developed in the 1970s and 1980s in a range of disciplines: in history, in sociology, in economics and in literature. The last one it got to was IR: but it did finally get there in the late 1980s. If you take the central feminist thesis, which is that men and women are allocated different roles in societies and in all social activity, that would include international relations. Secondly, this difference of role is hierarchical. In other words, men get more than women of whatever it is. It is power, it is money, it is status. I think there is a lot that can be said about the gendered character of IR but the central claim is very straightforward: and would go for all areas, like economics, society, the family, religion – and the

internet. What presents itself as a set of natural roles or set of roles that are not particularly gendered turns out to be highly gendered. The claim of feminists about international relations is not that all IR is about gender relations, but is rather that all international processes are gendered and much of IR theory is gendered.

To take two examples. If you just think of war, men and women have different roles in war; even when women are involved in combat they have different roles. War is also symbolically very often about the protection of women, the 'motherland in an abstract sense' - "*anavatan*" I believe is the Turkish word - or about the protection of women from attack, from rape, from violence whatever it may be. Those who have followed the events in Bosnia will know that this is not a trivial point. But the gendered character of war is also about subordination: men have power because they have access to weapons, and women do not. One of the curious features of the Yugoslav wars is the very high participation of women in combat roles; up to 20% on all sides. But why is that? It is because the technology of the weapons used is early 19th century technology. You do not need to have gone through military training school. It is basically rifles, mortars and mines and cutting people's throats. It is because the soldiers in that war were de-skilled that women were able to play a combat role. But in modern war, of course, men are trying to use women to a larger extent. In regard to a second example, the world economy, feminist studies of employment show that changes in the world economy have enormous gendered effects. Industrialisation at this stage has been done largely with women doing these assembly jobs, because of two reasons. One is they have allegedly got 'nimble fingers', they are able to look into microcomputers and do the work better than men. Secondly, very important also as a social reason, women go on strike less than men, because they have to care for children. This replication of social roles is evident in the gendered character of the employment following from the industrialisation of the Far East, and in the gendered character of debt repayment: in Latin America they are basically cutting state welfare provision and that has put the burden of transport, education and health on to women. These two examples show how international processes have a gendered character.

To look at one further area, nationalism and fundamentalism – all have their ideological images of women. Every nationalism says, "this is the role for our women: she should do this and she should not do that" and usually some combination of "she should be at home" and a bit of doing something else, but not too much. This is a constant feature of nationalism as it is of fundamentalism. One of the extraordinary features of Hindu fundamentalism is that it is just trying to mimic the Semitic religions - Christianity, Judaism and Islam. It is trying to do so partly by coming up

with one God when actually they have got thousands. It is trying to do so also by sorting out the gender of their gods. Their gods, if you have ever seen their pictures, have a somewhat male and female character. But now we see they are going to be male. They are also trying to formalise the subordination of women. Their argument is “this is what the other great fundamentalisms do. We have got to do it too”. There was an interview with a Hindu fundamentalist on British TV, and he said, “there are four kinds of women, there is the pure woman as the Goddess; there is the ordinary woman as the good mother; there is the fallen, immoral woman”. The interviewer asked “What can be worse than that?”. The fundamentalist said, “Worse than the fallen woman is the educated woman.” The point about this idea is it is universal: in a world of nationalism, fundamentalism, post-modernism, cultural relativism, everybody in the world, from China to Peru, who saw that interview, knew exactly what the man was saying. This is a universal, modern, gendered message produced by transnational processes.

There are two other areas to look at briefly. If you are looking in the field of international organisation at policies of international organisations toward women and gender there is a vast amount of material there, whether it is the UN Decade for Women, or issues on women’s rights. So far it is a huge debate in the UN rights organisation. There is the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. The EU has legislation to do with this, largely rising from inequality of work – Article 119. But the UN has gone on to discuss domestic violence. Again, if you take the issue of domestic violence, this is an issue which NGOs pushed on to the agenda. Domestic violence means men beating up women – a universal phenomenon. This is sometimes accentuated by migration and modernity, and by what people see on TV. That phenomenon is one which the NGOs have put on the agenda and, again, is one which international organisations have taken up. The UN has even passed a resolution on violence against women. So, international organisation is one further area of the gendering of IR.

The other area is the role of gendered assumptions within theory itself. What we have here is the coming together of feminist critiques of orthodox political theory, showing how power, sovereignty, authority and political theory are highly gendered with the critique of IR concepts like sovereignty, a highly gendered concept. Security is also a gendered concept. For most women, the most important form of security is to walk down the street and not get attacked, not international security. Not just gender-neutral processes like organisation and economic integration but apparently the theoretical concepts of IR itself have a gendered character. Of course, if you get into the world which the post-modernists have appropriated – the world of symbolism and images – then the whole idea

of countries as women to be protected and all the gendered character of international symbolism is itself very frightening. I just gave that as one example of where the second circle, the circle of intellectual climate and academic challenge, has affected IR.

The other second circle area is sociology. Although IR talks about society and socialisation, it has been less influenced by sociological thinking than it has by economics or by law or by politics or history. But there is a lot happening in sociology. Some of it I do not regard as welcome such as the abandonment of teaching people the classics in favour of the teaching of moderns. People also ought to be reading Marx, Weber, Comte or Durkheim. But there are two developments in sociology and I think it had very interesting effects on IR. One is what is called historical sociology, the work of people like Otto Hintze, Michael Mann and Charles Tilly. Historical sociology has taken the core concept of IR, which is the concept of state, and has subjected it to very interesting investigations. It has shown that the state can be seen not as hypostatised states, as Turkey, America, China – that kind of general concept that people in IR used – but in the Weberian sense of a coercive, administrative entity. It is the international relations of states in that sociological sense that is as interesting as the international relations of countries, states, seen in this broad juridical sense. Their interest is in how international factors affect the development of states in that sociological sense. In other words, you are not writing the history of taxation, ministries or security organisations within any country: you are largely writing the history of how these apparatuses dealt not only with their own country, but also with the outside world. If you just take the history of Turkey from the *tanzimat* onwards or even from the execution of Selim III, down through the *tanzimat* and Abdulhamit – let alone the First World War and afterwards – it was external factors that were the driving force. The reason why the Committee of Union and Progress in 1908, took Auguste Comte's slogan of progress and order (the same as taken by radical reformers in Brazil in the same period), and tried to do something in Turkey is because of outside pressure, interstate and transnational. Why did Ataturk launch his national struggle in 1920? The history of all countries is the history of outside pressure. It continues to be so.

Why are countries trying to modernise their education, information technology, and their tax collection? It is because of external pressure. So the history of states is a history of external pressure and the response of states to these pressures. The state is not something, as old-fashioned IR presented it, like in a pre-sociological concept of the individual, "I am, here and now, going to have relations with other countries. Send an ambassador or trade or delimit a frontier". No, the state is in its very *raison d'être* constituted by interaction with other states and that is what

affects society. So, you have the *tanzimat* or you introduce VAT or get your primary school children to take the study of mathematics more because you feel the pressure of the outside world. It is historically significant but it also is very important for understanding the way globalisation is working today and the way countries are reacting to it. That historical sociological perception has a lot going for it.

The other sociological concept that has influenced IR is the concept of modernity. Ten years ago modernity was like republicanism in political theory. Nobody ever talked about it. But now everything is modernity. It is strange that the reason why modernity has come to be a concept in the second circle (being the intellectual, political milieu) is actually because of post-modernity. People have reacted against it. It is a bit like the way everybody has become concerned about secularism because of anti-secularism. So, modernity has become a key concept. In our department we had the post-modernists first but now we have the modernists, and we have a most successful postgraduate course run by Justin Rosenberg, "Modernity and IR".

What is the claim? The concept of modernity, as used in the social sciences today, at least in Britain, is a creative if tense mix of Marx and Weber. It basically says two things. One, that something happened to European society and more broadly to the world in the early 19th century associated with the industrial and political revolutions, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. This fundamentally transformed society in such a way that one cannot talk sensibly about the world since the early parts of the 19th century and the world before that without noticing this fundamental difference, this shift of the combination of political and industrial revolutions. Sometimes it is referenced to Polanyi. His great book calls it *The Great Transformation*. Ernest Gellner just called it "the big ditch", he said "I am a paid up member of 'the big ditch' support society". What does it mean? It means that the nature of the society, state, family, market have changed, but also international relations has changed. You cannot talk about war in 1914 in the way you talk about war in 1760. Of course, in a Marxist term, that would be directly tied to capitalism and its development. But, Weber, more broadly, saw modernity as a fundamental transformation of society at that historical moment. Both Marx and Weber linked it to a second thesis, that of the structures of modernity. In other words, people are more affected, societies are more constrained by structures and by the constantly changing character of modernity than in previous societies. The most obvious example is time. People in pre-modern societies do not have a particular concept of time. Modern society has to have time. You have to have simultaneity, as you have to have order, taxation and so forth. You also have a concept of an open future, of progress. More generally, you have a stronger state, the

state intervenes in people's lives. The percentage of the national output that the state levied in 1800 in any country in the world was 2% or something like that. Now except in Afghanistan, it is a minimum of 30%. You can not be a modern state if the state does not levy 30% of the output as taxation in one form or another.

Modernity constitutes this framework. Weber referred to it as an "iron cage". Gellner yielded a bit more to human agency and he called it a "rubber cage". But whether it is an iron or rubber cage, it is there and IR is constrained by it. IR is constrained both by "the big ditch" or "the great transformation" which has produced the fundamentally different world of which European colonialism and now globalisation are the obvious signs. It has also produced new forms of structure and determination: these greatly affect what people do, so that the price which you pay for food in the cafeteria or the price of petrol is determined by global forces in the way it never was in the past – the most important book published in the field of IR in my time is *The Empire of Civil Society* written by one of my colleagues, Justin Rosenberg. It is an application of modernity directly to IR. *The Empire of Civil Society* makes the case very well. It does, moreover, set in context one of the great buzzwords of the 1990s in the end of the Cold War which is globalisation.

3.4. Globalisation

Globalisation means many things to many people. But the first thing modernity theory would suggest is that globalisation is not specific to the 1990s. Here too an element of historical perspective, an element of anti-presentism, is in order. If, you take as globalisation the percentage of a country's national output that is traded internationally, which is a good index, you see even the developed countries of the world have only now, in the last five years or so, reached the levels of before 1914. If you take another index of globalisation which is the percentage of total investment as invested abroad, the British are no way near where they were before the First World War. It is now about 10 or 12% or something. In 1913, it was a third. It is not to say something dramatic is not happening, and clearly the speed of communications and satellites are different. But we are really looking at globalisation of the 1990s not in the context of technological change, nor in the context of the collapse of communism but in the context of a much broader process which is what modernity has done over two centuries to create a unified world through colonialism, through trade, through subjugation and so forth. On globalisation: there is something new, but you have to be clear about what criteria you are using and never, ever, forget the point about labour not being mobile. The work of David Held and his colleagues in their work *Global Transformations* is precisely

such an attempt to locate, on the basis of clear criteria, where change has, and has not, taken place. You have to look at globalisation in a historical perspective but you also have to come back to, whatever your perspective is, the quite properly central concern of IR which is the state.

Globalisation has not abolished states. There are a 190 of them; probably there are not going to be many more. I hope the Palestinians will make it but I do not think that the Tibetans are going to make it. I do not think any other candidates in the Middle East and anywhere else I can see are going to make it. This is a good example of presentism. You could say after the collapse of communism that all states in the world are going to fragment. My good friend Graham Fuller, a lot of whose work, of course, has been concerned with Turkey, has developed a theory of the 'amoebisation' of states. He even says, stable states may break up. If in 25 years time California secedes, nobody is going to stop it. I myself do not see that: states as territorial entities, states as centers of authority, as centers of appropriation, as centers of military power, are going to remain. One can argue that they should because the alternative to states is violent fragmentation – Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Colombia, parts of Washington D.C. I do not think that it is exactly the liberal paradise which people would like to see. In a strange way, after all the stress on order and authority as the most important political value, or at least the precondition for anything else, has come back into fashion. So, globalisation has its dangers but it is also the case empirically that states are as important, even more important in some respects. If you just take this criterion of the percentage of GNP which states appropriate, it is about 40% or more for America and Britain, and neither Mrs Thatcher nor Ronald Reagan made 1% difference to it. No way. If you take the regulation of international trade, there are tens of thousands of bureaucrats and experts meeting in Geneva, Vienna, Istanbul and New York, drawing up regulations for everything: world accountancy, radio frequencies, you name it. States control the World Trade Organisation. The states are not abandoned, even as they try to adjust to it. One has to be both definitionally and historically precise, and get the perspective right, but also keep the state firmly in view even while you can accept that there are lots of things states do not control.

3.5. The Kantian perspective

Let me end with the issue which concerns many people across the world, the question of where globalisation on the one hand and the collapse of communism on the other leave the great vision of Professor Kant who wrote 200 years ago about the world becoming a zone of peace and about the end of military conflicts between states. If IR began as the

study of war, are we actually going to be unemployed? There may be an inbuilt bias to promote the continued interest in war or to come up with something else, fundamentalism maybe. You are all familiar with the arguments. The arguments are, on the one hand logical and deductive and on the other hand empirical. The empirical arguments are simple. No two states, which one can define as being fully democratic, have ever gone to war. It is a fact. (No states are 100% democratic any more than any other state is 100% secular. I mean 'democratic enough', like Britain, France or Japan.) That alone is a very striking point. The deductive logical argument is that democratic states have no interest in war, they have an interest in peace and in trade. On the one hand, economic interdependence promotes peace and secondly, democratic states are able by their political culture to find compromise, to conciliate with others whereas dictatorial states are not. They may be falsified, there may be other considerations. We all know that democratic countries once aroused can be extremely aggressive and militant, as America was after Pearl Harbour. The third argument is that they subscribe to law and so to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Those three deductive arguments are not trivial.

My view is cautiously optimistic but not anything like as optimistic as many proponents of the zone of peace argument, such as Francis Fukuyama or Michael Doyle. First of all, if by democracy you mean a relatively tough definition of democracy, this means four things – the effective control of the state by the electorate, proper access to information, a real "one person one vote", and that it has lasted for a generation. This last is essential: In other words, it is not just a ballot like in Lebanon in the 1950s. There were lots of other 'democratic' countries in the 1950s like Lebanon, Uruguay and Sri Lanka. They all failed - because they did not endure, they failed the fourth test. If you apply those tests, then you are really only talking about three dozen countries in the world which are democratic at the moment. So, at least 150 others are not. This 150 could, therefore, go to war with each other. This leads to the point that democracies are precarious. The idea that democracy lasts forever is a bit like the idea that middle age lasts forever. I would like to think that it is true but evidence suggests it is not so. The precariousness even of all countries, even of the United States, as democracies, has to be recognised. I do not mean in the next five years but over the next 25 years: the destructive trends include declining electoral participation, rising crime and growing paranoia. On the last point, the United States is the only country in the world where people actually think that they are about to be invaded by the UN. There is no assumption that in 50 years time any of these established democracies will still be liberal democracies. Like anything else in society, it has to be fought for, maintained and reproduced. So I would argue, the claim for

democracies as peaceful is much more precarious than any optimistic, progressivist, account would allow.

Secondly, we come to what, in my opinion, is the number one issue on the IR agenda in the world today. It is the one that calls for most urgent attention: it *will* lead to wars and conflicts if not addressed. And, it is not being addressed. That is the inequality in the world today. Globalisation is producing a world that is more unequal than any world you have ever seen. Not only is it doing so, it is doing so faster and more visibly than any other process. To give you a rough calculation, made by Eric Hobsbawm: in 1900 if you had asked the question, "What percentage of the world's population live at what is, by the standards of that time, a relatively comfortable level?" It does not mean central heating and colour TV. But a relatively comfortable level. You would have had to have said roughly a third. Now, it is less than 10%. In other words, the margin or the band of those who are living well-off by what is now defined as comfortable has got less and less. The majority of the world's population have become relatively worse-off and they know it. What they want is more wealth, they want changes in trade, they want to migrate, they want to send their children to METU and they want to find good jobs as well. The fact is that colonialism or communism did not solve this problem. But nor is globalisation solving this problem. Also, many people are getting absolutely poorer. The perceived gap is getting wider: everybody knows that these perceived gaps produce conflicts within and between countries. Given that fact, I am not particularly optimistic about the future. There are also idiots out there willing to take advantage of it. Mr. Milosevic is a prime example, as are some others. The zone of peace argument is a bit narcissistic. So, in this sense, if you ask, "what are the challenges facing IR in the post-Cold War world?", my response is this list: 1. explaining the collapse of communism at the end of the Cold War. That is a research agenda for anyone's life. 2. Feminism. 3. The two contributions of sociology; historical sociology and modernity. 4. Unpacking- I did not say deconstructing - the issue of globalisation, getting a handle on it. 5. The zone of peace.

IR is not a social science on its own. It is a field, a discipline combining elements of politics, economics, history and sociology. It should have some degree of theoretical rigour comparable to other areas of academic investigation. It should have concepts and it should define them. At the same time it should avoid, and I repeat this, the kind of epistemological hypochondria and endless rambling meta-theory of the kind that it is currently corrupting the young. It should have a historical perspective on the world, as all disciplines should. A historical awareness means to know where things have come from but also to identify as modernity theory does, that which is new and that which is not new. It

should also be substantive: our primary job is not getting involved in philosophical issues. We get involved in explaining why there is war or why there is globalisation and what we mean by it, or fundamentalism or European integration or Turkish-Arab or Turkish-Greek relations. We have to have a handle on something.

Nor is our job is to predict. People come and say, "Ah, you did not predict the Iranian revolution. He did not predict the Lebanese civil war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Halliday is useless". We are not gamblers. Our job is not to prophecy. We hold to the view that human behaviour is unpredictable because of so many variables and because there is such a thing, much as the structuralists do not want to admit, as human agency. Individuals matter, so do collective social actors. Gorbachev made a difference, Ataturk made a difference, Khomeini made a difference, I regret to say Margaret Thatcher made a difference. I could not care less that I did not predict the collapse of communism: our job is to explain.

The final methodological requirement of IR is that there has to be an ethical dimension, in the sense that IR raises many moral issues: self-determination, the justice of war, the role of international law, the relation of state to individual - all these are ethical questions. Here I do think the criticism of the positivist Northern American approach is right. Many people teach IR in America with no ethical dimension at all. For anybody who lives in Turkey or Britain, who follows international relations from the press, it is all full of ethical issues. People are saying, "This *ought* to be done. This *ought not* to be done". We have got to train people to think about the arguments: ethics is inscribed in IR.

To conclude on the most old-fashioned point of all, and a very British point, but one I will make because I think it is true: as in all social sciences, so in this one, intuition and gut-feeling play a role in deciding what you think is more important. So, intuition and gut-feeling without education is nothing but prejudice. But based on reading, based on knowledge and listening to the people, it plays a role. If you take the big issues, and I am not talking about prediction here, but I am talking about how we orientate the subject, we have to ask what we think are going to be the big world issues confronting people now, and the next generation. We all have our lists. Many people in Turkey are asking me "Is fundamentalism going up or down?" The Internet, the history books and all the knowledge in the world are not going to give you the answer. You have got a look to the evidence and then come up with some intuitive gut-feeling answer. Is China going to blow up or not? Again, no amount of data, no web-site, is going to answer that question. What is going to happen in Russia? Will the EMU work or will it collapse? Who is going

to win the next American presidential election? Our job is not to predict these things but to prepare ourselves to follow them. Here the things I have mentioned: history, substantive and explanatory analysis, ethical issues, are all important. But, at the end of the day, there is an element of gut-feeling as well. It does no harm to read some poetry and novels. Here it comes back to the oldest issue of all in IR, of whether you are an optimist or pessimist or sceptic. I leave it to you.

Prof. Atilla Eralp: Thank you very much Prof. Halliday. You have touched on all crucial aspects of theory and practice of international relations in a short span of time. Thank you very much again.