

Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicization of NATO's 'Critical Security Discourse'

Güvenliği ve Barışı Koruma: NATO'nun 'Kritik Güvenlik
Söylemi'ni Stratejikleştirmenin Ardında Yatan Nedenler

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“La verita' e' nel fondo del pozzo:
lei guarda in un pozzo e vede il sole o la luna;
ma se si butta giu' non c'e' piu' ne sole ne' luna,
c'e' la verita'”

Il Giorno della civetta
Leonardo Sciascia (1921-1989)¹

Abstract

After the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO entered an era where it wants to re-establish the legitimacy of its existence. Throughout its two NATO New Strategic Concepts (1999 and 2010), NATO has been constructing its Post-Cold War legitimacy in producing its own identity-discourse and meaning of security which will determines its global policy based on a “Future Security Risks” narrative. Analyzing the construction process of the legitimacy of NATO's existence by using Discourse Analysis Method, this study attempts to shed light on the “building blocks” of NATO's contemporary purpose, and accordingly, the factors that determine the purpose of its existence in a globalized world.

Key Words: NATO, NATO's discourse, Critical Security Discourse, Geopolitical-Narrative-Framework, Securitization, Post-Cold War security-insecurity global environment.

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¹ “The truth is at the bottom of a well. You look in a well, and you see the sun or the moon, but if you jump in, there's no longer the sun or moon; there's the truth.”

Öz

Sovyetler Birliği'nin 1991'de sona ermesiyle NATO kendi varlığının meşruiyetini yeniden temellendirme sürecine girmiştir. NATO bu meşruiyet zeminini öncelikle söylemsel olarak oluşturmakta ve bunun inşasını yaparken "Gelecek Güvenliği Riski" söylemi üzerinden politikasını belirlemektedir. Bu makale, NATO'nun varlığının meşruiyetinin inşa sürecini, söylem analizi yöntemiyle inceleyerek, NATO'nun günümüzdeki amacının yapı taşlarına ışık tutmayı ve bu bağlamda da bu "yeni" NATO'nun varlık sebebini belirleyen ve etkileyen faktörleri ortaya çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, Sovyetler Birliği, Güvenlikleştirme, Kritik Güvenlik Söylemi, NATO Söylemi

“Τὰ Πάντα ῥεῖ” (“*Ta Panta rhei*”), meaning “everything flows”, is the famous phrase, apparently coined by Simplicius of Cilicia, which summarises Heraclitus’ philosophy and his concepts of “change” and “becoming”. According to Heraclitus, “becoming” is the substance of being since everything is subject to time and transformation. Even what seems to be static to sensory perception is actually dynamic and constantly changing. Therefore, one can assume that “becoming” and “changing”, together with “space” and “time”, can represent the framework in which life is lived. However, within this universal dimension in which everything is dynamic, I would like to restrict this framework to our planet Earth and to its dominant living human beings (*Homines sapientes*) who have at their own disposal varying quantity of times. Our personal presence on this planet will come to an end, and it is exactly around this “time disposal” idea that I would like to construct this paper.

With this purpose, my research has the aim to demonstrate how NATO, as a military organization in charge of the defence of its members, despite its multiple attempts to change in order to adapt itself to the new post-Cold War times and geographical spaces in which it pretends to operate, and in which it could be called to intervene, has remained anchored to a static and a-historical own time. NATO can personify the classical “problem-solving theory” which “accepts the world (or situation) it inherits, seeks to make it work, and in so doing contributes to replicating what exists” (Booth, 2005, p. 4-10). With a “critical theory” eye, the paper explores the way in which NATO has moved, through the construction of official discourses in which the etymological definition of security has been re-adapted to the necessity of NATO countries, from a defence position to a securitizing one.

Confronted with the “out there” realities, which are outside the geopolitical space of NATO perimeter, the discourse produced by the Alliance can be only interpreted as a “tribal doctrine” which tries to reproduce hierarchical power-formula in fashion during the already gone Cold-War time.

At the beginning of the American movie "The Curious Case of Benjamin Button"², Theodore Roosevelt, the aging former president of the United States, is shown at a dedication ceremony of a clock in New Orleans' Union Station that take place in November 1918. As the clock starts functioning, we realize that it runs backwards and not forwards as all the normal clocks do and as does our human concept of time. The main explication is linked to the fact that the constructor of the enormous clock is a blind clockmaker who, embittered by the death of his son in World War I, creates a massive clock which runs backwards. His skewed and twisted reasoning is that this might somehow reverse time and allow dead soldiers to return to life and come home. The reversed footage of soldiers walking backwards away from a train illustrates his dream.

Indeed, the main character of the movie, Benjamin Button, starts his life when he is old. He is really born old, with a body so deformed by age (so he knows his time disposal: 85 years) that his mother thinks of him as being a monster. Benjamin Button's entire existence runs backwards (while he learns as other normal human beings do) until he dies like a baby just born.

I would like to use the two opposing images of a clock moving backwards and the one of a clock moving forwards as a metaphor which can explain how time, our existence, our past, and our future, and our struggle with time itself are all interconnected and are rooted in the concept of security.

We cannot imagine time and security as going their own separate ways. They are bonded.

As the forward clock is ticking, the backward clock has already stopped to tick for past empires, for past emperors, for past alliances, for past people, and for past world orders. But can we in all seriousness talk about a world order at all, as a compass which will always point to the same magnetic north, when even the magnetic north moves?

The two clocks help us visualize what has immediately become past and then history; and even what we live now and consider present at this exact moment in time is already past. While the future looks so far into the distance, it will become past, too. Moreover, we too have not to forget that, even as simple observers, we have our internal backward clocks that are ticking away our time left in this human existence.

This internal backward clock is represented by our life expectancies.

Of course, it is not the very exact quantity of time which we will have at our disposal in our life, but it is calculated on a mathematical media, and it is different for every human being living in different part of this planet Earth.

² "The Curious Case of Benjamin Button" is a 2008 American fantasy-drama film directed by David Fincher.

For instance a human being defined as Japanese and living in Japan will have a life expectancy of 82 years, a Moldovan 68, and a Mozambican 42 (Data based on http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights_rev.pdf). This means that their own backward clocks started ticking at 82, 68, and 42 respectively.

I am aware that this is just a general example but its main aim is only to provide an idea which I will use in this paper.

Life expectancy and our quantity of time disposal are indisputably based on our quality of life and on what we consume, not to mention the fact that we belong to a particular human group and live in a specific part of the Earth. Furthermore, another element which plays an important role in adjusting our backward clock arms and which we cannot omit from this picture is represented by our consumption factor.

As is the case in life expectancy data, the consumption factor also reflects huge discrepancies among human beings belonging to certain human groups and living in different parts of the globe.

Specifically, this consumption factor has been calculated and it is the number "32".

"The estimated one billion people who live in developed countries have a relative per capita consumption rate of 32. Most of the world's other 5.5 billion people that constitute the developing world, with relative per capita consumption rates below 32, are mostly down toward 1" (Diamond, 2008). A third element which plays an important role in this framework (becoming, change, time, and space), and in which the lives of human beings are regulated by the two clocks, is represented by the population growth rate.

"Population growth rate (PGR) is the increase in a country's population during a period of time, usually one year, expressed as a percentage of the population at the start of that period. It reflects the number of births and deaths during the period and the number of people migrating to and from a country. Between 1980 and 2000 the total world population grew from 4.4 billion to 6 billion. By 2015, at least another billion people will be added for a total of more than 7 billion. (...) most of this growth has been, and will continue to be, in the developing world. In 1998, 85 percent of the world's people (more than 4 out of 5) lived in low- and middle-income countries; by 2015, it will be 6 out of 7" (The World Bank Group).

This is because our Earth, being a living element in itself, has a backward clock, too. As more people will have more needs, will the Earth be able to provide for them all? How will human beings belonging to different groups and living in diverse regions of this planet organize themselves in order to set both clocks which symbolize and quantify our presence on this our planet? It is in answering to these ques-

tions that we have not to forget the vital link between the human being-society and the Earth, in which the Earth must not be perceived any more as a territory but as our unique dimension which we need, all of us, to survive and live.


It is between the learned³ and the then future (symbolized by the two opposing clocks which mark the times, and encapsulated inside the “becoming, change, time, and space” notions) that human existence has always been organized, and has moved and struggled to survive and to secure itself.

It is a struggle that, during the existence of we human beings, has moved between times of security, peace and war and, in this respect, we have organized ourselves as a family, a group, a tribe, a nation and a state, and forged, when necessary, alliances among us with the primary purpose of acquiring and maintaining peace and then of securing our survival.

This is the case now for a particular military alliance which was formed among states during a distinct historical moment and that had a very specific purpose in defending its members from a well-defined enemy.

The problem is that the defined enemy has disappeared due to “natural causes” and not as a consequence of war. Very briefly, his backward clock has stopped ticking, but the alliance has survived him.

In theory, the evaporation of the enemy which had supplied the main founding and original reason for the establishment of the alliance should have provoked the dissolution of the military bloc. In practice this did not happen and in order to survive to its historical end the alliance has substituted its main “raison d'être”, specifically its defence (military and ideologically) from a unique enemy, with the “ability to confront the existing and emerging 21st century security threats” (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008).



³ The etymology of history is “istor”, the old Greek for knowing, learned.

“Securing our future 1949-2009” (NATO’s 60th anniversary official web site) was the motto selected to condense the activities of NATO at its 60th anniversary, and my purpose in this paper is to focus on the Alliance’s recent narrative which has permitted the Organisation to reinvent itself, to define a new geopolitical context of interests and military operations, and then to proclaim an own production and interpretation of the concept of security.

Both the NATO 1999 and 2010 Strategic Concepts (NATO 1999 New Strategic Concept, 2010) have contributed to the construction of a “geopolitical-narrative framework” which represents the “liquid”⁴ field of existence of the NATO concept of security.

For my purpose, I will construct and deal with what I consider my picture of the NATO “geopolitical-narrative framework”, which will enclose the main elements of narrative: the author, the imaginary, the reality and the “model reader”. Then I will explain the function of my “NATO geopolitical-narrative framework” and at the end I will challenge this picture and its *raison d’être* assuming a position outside the “geopolitical-narrative framework”. Using various ontological questions, I will try to demonstrate the “cultural relativism” of the NATO approach and how security can be considered an idiosyncratic concept.

Now I would like to start with my methodology.

1. Methodology: Discourse Analysis, Emotional Words And the “Geopolitical-Narrative-Framework”.

I have based my methodological approach on the assumption that “Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frame the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure)” (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p.23-24).

Then it is extremely clear how the process of securitization becomes a political process in which the narrative has its primary importance.

⁴ Zygmunt Bauman has developed in a number of books the concept of liquidity applied to social science and social analysis. According to him, the passage from the “solid” into a “liquid” phase of modernity is a condition in which social forms can no longer keep their shape for long because they decompose and melt faster than the time it takes to cast them, and once they are cast for them to set.


“The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)” (Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, 1998, p. 26).

But whereas “by saying the words, something is done”, in this specific case of “securitization”, when we use the very word “security”, something more is done: an emotional element has been added to the narrative.

Here I will use a discourse analysis lens because discourse analysis represents a general term for a number of approaches to analysing written, spoken, signed language use or any significant semiotic event.

Indeed, I could say that like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza (the two fictional figures of the famous book of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra) our condition is to be completely surrounded and immersed into stories. Stories which are told to us through the use of a language, images, media, etc... However, the story can be a language because “language itself conditions, limits, and predetermines what we see. Thus, all reality is constructed through language, so that nothing is simply ‘there’ in an unproblematic way – everything is a linguistic/textual construct. Language does not record reality; it shapes and creates it, so that the whole of our universe is textual” (Barry, 2002). Moreover, when we look at our capacity to memorize, neuroscience has proved that “the brain has two memory systems, one for ordinary facts and one for emotionally charged ones” (Goleman, 1996), and indeed our brain is formed by two opposite hemispheres, the right and the left one.

Both brain hemispheres perform distinctive actions (which are inseparable and complementary in our cognitive and affective aspects of behaviour), and for the evidence that they memorise facts and/or emotions, I would like to say that in our brain there live both Don Quixote (emotions) and Sancho Panza (facts), who are inseparable and complementary too.



I can then say that we can be at the same time both Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. Furthermore, on the result of how external events are perceived and memorized, we build up our personal map (brain map) of our perceptions, which create a state and drive our behaviour.

According to Ernest Cassirer, humankind, in order to adjust itself to the immediate environment mentally, and through its capacity to imagine, is capable of creating a new dimension of reality, defined as a symbolic system.

“He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusion, in his fantasies and dreams” (Cassirer, 1974).

The securitization performance represents a very particular case: “The difference between normal challenges and threats to national security necessarily occurs on a spectrum of threats that ranges from trivial and routine, through serious but routine, to drastic and unprecedented. (...) The labelling of an issue as a security problem by the government automatically legitimises the use of exceptional means.” (Buzan, 1991, p. 113-115).

Why do we arrive at this result? The explanation is in the fact that we are using an emotional word which has emotional consequences.

The English word emotion⁵ is derived from the French word “émouvoir”. This is based on the Latin “emovere”, where e- (variant of ex-) means “out” and ‘movere’ means “move.” The related term “motivation” is also derived from the word ‘movere’.

Also in the title of this paper, I use three specific words: keeping, peace, and security, and, etymologically speaking, the three refer to emotional states.

The verb to keep (Penguin English Dictionary, 2004) means to retain possession or control of something; or to cause somebody or something to remain in a specified place or condition. At the same time, as a noun, ‘keep’ means a castle, fortress, or fortified tower.

Peace (Penguin English Dictionary, 2004) too carries emotional characteristics. Peace means a state of tranquillity or quiet and among its meaning connotes public order and security maintained by law or custom.

But the word which is central to our study is security (Penguin English Dictionary, 2004) (freedom from danger, fear, anxiety, destitution, etc.), which in its

5 “Emotion (...) noun (...) 1a a strong feeling, e.g. anger, fear, or joy, often involving physiological changes, e.g. a rise in the pulse rate. B such feelings considered collectively. 2 instinctive feelings or reactions, esp as opposed to reason (...) (Penguin English Dictionary, 2004).

etymological meaning bears strong emotions: it is derived from the Latin "securitas" then from 'sine' (= without) + 'cura' (= anxiety, worry)⁶.

However, there is a difference between anxiety and fear. While anxiety is a generalized mood condition that occurs without an identifiable triggering stimulus and is the result of threats that are perceived to be uncontrollable or unavoidable, on the contrary, fear occurs in the presence of an observed threat and is related to the specific behaviour of escape and avoidance.

Then in the case of anxiety, this can be provoked by a stimulus without the presence of a real material threat. Anxiety is more stressful than fear therefore human beings tend to transform anxieties to fear in order to avoid this stress.

Therefore, there is a strong relationship between who triggers the stimulus, the receiver of the stimulus, and the space in which the stimulus is broadcast.

What I have been constructing so far is a representation of a space which operates both at a geographical and emotional level, and which frames our perception of reality making the emotional aspects prevail.

This space is what Cassirer (Cassirer, 1974) calls the "symbolic space": because of his capacity to create signs and symbols which help him to interact with reality, the human being then, no longer a positivist rational animal, becomes an "animal symbolicum", and, as such, lives in a symbolic space, and this is a space which frames even his capacity of imagination.

And it is the peculiarity of the construction of this symbolic space through the use of the media of mass communication that the nature of the "animal symbolicum", as producer and consumer of myths, evolve in the image of the "homo videns".

With the publication of "Homos Videns – Television and post-thinking", the author Giovanni Sartori, who teaches Political Science at the New York's Columbia University, shed light on the fact that with the advent of the television we were entering in a new political era characterized by what he calls the post-thinking: the inability to think. It is the primacy of the image and the manipulation of public opinion through TV which leads us to see and watch, but without being able to understand, that represent the new challenges democracy faces nowadays under the influence of the television and more in general of the media.

6 "First of all we note that the term 'securitas', like all feminine nouns in 'tas', belongs to the category of abstract nouns, such as 'libertas', 'humanitas', 'civitas', and so on. It is, therefore, a purely theoretical concept, which did not correspond to any real objectivity in the eyes of most ordinary citizens or Roman soldiers. Even if we stop to consider the etymological root of the noun or adjective, we see that it is derived from 'sine' (= without) + 'cura' (= anxiety, worry). The 'secura' person was thus at the origin of the "sine cure" individual, that is without anxieties, without worries, and then free from thoughts or anxieties. The safety condition, therefore, is conceived as the absence of something: it is a condition that could be called 'of default'." (Campacci, 2009, p. 1).

In a world where the image has completely replaced the word, the human capacity of abstraction has been reduced.

The words that articulate human language are symbols which call in representations that recall to the mind depictions and images of visible things that we have seen. This is the case with the use of “concrete words”, as the case for house, bed, table, wife, etc., in short our practical vocabulary.

However this is not the case with “abstract words” which do not have any equivalent in visible things, and their meaning is far from being depicted by an image.

We can visualise “city”, but what about nation, sovereign people, bureaucracy, and an “abstract word” as security?

All of them are both abstract concepts elaborated and entity constructed by our mind.

As Sartori points out, the whole of our physical and chemical control on nature, as our capacity to create and manage the political-economical habitat is based on our capacity to think in terms of concepts that are invisible and non-existent to the human eye.


In this primacy of the image over the word (represented by abstract concepts, and myths), where, through the TV, the image deletes concepts, our capacity of abstraction becomes atrophied and with it our ability to understand.

The image that we see or perceive in reality doesn't produce ideas, but inserts itself in a space of ideas which provide it with framework and meaning.

“The image itself does not give any intelligibility. The image must be explained and the explanation that comes from the video is insufficient. (...) The seeing is atrophying the understanding.” (Sartori, 1997, p. 25).

It is in this process, that is, in atrophying the capacity of abstraction of the “homo sapiens”, that the human being becomes “homo videns”.

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To sum up, "homo videns" is an evolution/devolution of the "animal symbolicum" of Cassirer, and Sartori is conscious of that. In it we should go back to the division between signal and symbol operated by Cassirer on the Pavlov's dog experiment.⁷ A division now difficult to sustain due to the very fact that the symbol can be interiorized as a signal, and has every signal produces conditioned reflex and a reflex behaviour.

It is in dealing with security issues and the importance that this topic has for the "polis", that the above process is linked to the political discourse and more than ever in our times where democracy has been defined as a government of public opinion (Dicey, 1914).

Public opinion is "doxa", and not episteme, knowledge and science. "For the common man knowledge is not a priority," notes Sartori (Sartori, 1997, p. 27).

Opinion is simply a point of view; a subjective opinion for which no proof is asked. It is in the construction of public opinion that the invention, use, and manipulation of an image (far from the original literal meaning that it represents) for politicians becomes a game in which their own power is at stake.

A structured game where the public's conditioned reflex and reflex behaviour are compressed between a positive image (myth which can be security, order, etc.) and what I would like to call the contra-myth (which can be the idea of enemy, disorder, anarchy, etc), a fearful image, with both capable in producing stimulus and psychological and physical responses.

And in this game, the political discourse could even become, at its extreme, an empty script that appears as a myth that in its turn provides a temporal meaning and purpose to the original political discourse.

A political discourse where the myth acts, continuously referring to the contra-myth, both as signal and symbol to produce conditioned reflexes, and reflex behaviours on the voters which can sustain political decisions.

"The man who loses the capacity of abstraction is "eo ipso", incapable of rationality, and therefore a symbolic animal that is no longer in the position to sup-

7 "The classic experience of Pavlov is that of the dog, the bell and the salivation to the view of a piece of meat. Whenever we present to the dog a piece of meat, seeing and sniffing it and makes the animal salivate. If we ring a bell, what is the effect on the animal? An orienting reaction. It simply looks around and turns its head to look for where that sound stimulus comes from. If we repeatedly ring the bell, and immediately after show the meat and give it to the dog, after a certain number of times, simply ringing the bell provokes salivation in the animal, preparing its digestive system to receive the meat. The bell becomes a sign of the meat that will come later. The whole body of the animal reacts as if the meat was already present, with salivation, digestive secretions, digestive motricity, etc. A stimulus that has nothing to do with feeding, a mere sound, becomes then capable to induce digestive modifications." (Cassirer, 1974 (1944) p. 31-32)

porting, let alone of feeding, the constructed world of the homo sapiens.” (Sartori, 1997, p. 109-110).

Thus, security and the securitization process develop into an emotional space in which organisms are becoming anxious (not to mention about the possibility to construct a canine devotion as the Pavlov’s dog case).

I call this “symbolic space” a “geopolitical-narrative framework”, the space where the process of Securitization becomes a “more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p. 23-24).

This means that a “geopolitical-narrative-framework” is a physical and intellectual-symbolic space (as a hermeneutical circle), in which emotions and perceptions are elaborated through a narrative (narrative is a re-presentation of real or invented events), in order to produce a particular image and meaning to be attached to the word “security”. It is a space in which the reader, “volente o nolente”, willy-nilly, is part of it and where he is called to play an active emotional/interpretative role. As a result, the emotional state of the reader depends on the opinion-narrative of others.

2. The Geopolitical-Narrative Framework as an Interpretative Dimension

I consider the whole of NATO’s slogan “Securing our Future” as a narrative in which not only the written texts and the official speeches are its component body, but where even summits, pictures, and exhibitions are considered as vital elements in the construction and performance of a security ritual-liturgy.

“Narrative”, according to Paul Cobby is “a movement from a start point to an end point, with digressions, which involves the showing or the telling of story events. Narrative is a representation of events and, chiefly, represents space and time” (Cobby, 2006, p. 236-237).

My “Geopolitical-Narrative Framework” (GPNF) is essentially this representation of space, time, and emotions as they are produced and spread by NATO to its readers (the model reader, and the non-model reader). In brief, this GPNF is, in my opinion, the result of the narrating actions in which time, space, perceptions, anxieties, and threats have been produced and re-produced so far by the narrative itself, with the aim of assembling a cultural artefact “a cultural practice traceable to a particular historical context concerned with shaping the politics of security” (Williams, 2007, p.4).

Even if a narrative can be seen as a “story” or a “plot”, in reality this is not the case: “‘Story’ consists of all the events which are to be depicted. ‘Plot’ is the chain of causation which dictates that these events are somehow linked and that they are therefore to be depicted in relation to each other. ‘Narrative’ is the showing or the telling of these events and the mode selected for that to take place” (Cobby, 2006, p. 5-6).

Thus, in this GPNF, where a secure-insecure narrative is produced, what is important is first knowing who the teller is, then the showing, and the process of selecting certain events, and, of course, the reader himself who has to interpret the narrative text.

In the way the GPNF is working in persuading the reader, we find the same Aristotelian rhetorical elements of Ethos, Logos, and Pathos.

Thus, the main constituents of this GPNF NATO narrating space are: the author-ethos (NATO), the imaginary-pathos, the reality-logos, and the "model reader".



2a. The Author-Ethos: NATO

According to what we read on the Alliance official page, NATO is:

- Solidarity: it is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4th, 1949; (Art. 5)
- Freedom: the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means;
- Security: NATO safeguards the Allies' common values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes, and promotes these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area;
- Transatlantic link: The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied together. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests (NATO's official web site).

And when we read about "What does NATO do?" What does it in actual fact do?

Its main *raison d'être* is "military defence": "NATO is committed to defending its member states against aggression or the threat of aggression and to the principle that an attack against one or several members would be considered as an attack against all." This in brief is the main essence of Art.5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington D.C., 4 April 1949).⁸

Indeed, asserting NATO as an internationally recognised authority that has "moral competence", specifically the Aristotle's *ethos* ⁹, is required of any speaker to establish from the beginning of his "speech" with his audience. NATO then becomes an *ethos* because it is the only "winning" defence military organization and military structure which has survived the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Empire.

Its *ethos* is in the historical fact that the ideals that characterize the NATO community, nations, or ideology, have won over time.

Since the implosion of the Soviet Union - which personified the "enemy" against which NATO defence was constructed - the Organization, as an author, has assembled various reasons to postpone the backward clock and reinforce its *ethos*.

At the NATO Rome Summit in 1991, the defence terminology was even substituted with "future and risks".

"The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain"(The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, NATO's official web site).

8 "Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security" (North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's official web site).

9 *Ethos* is a Greek word meaning "character" that is used to describe the guiding beliefs or ideals that characterize a community, nation, or ideology. In rhetoric, *ethos* is one of the three artistic proofs or modes of persuasion (other principles being *logos* and *pathos*) discussed by Aristotle in 'Rhetoric' as a component of argument. Speakers must establish *ethos* from the start. This can involve "moral competence" only; Aristotle, however, broadens the concept to include expertise and knowledge. *Ethos* is limited, in his view, by what the speaker says.

After the adoption of the NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, the Alliance has re-asserted its "indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change" (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO's official web site).

NATO's journey into the realm of future and its supposed or pretended "management of the future" as a "reflexive security" (Vedby Rasmussen, 2001) sounds to me as an hermeneutical circle in which the management of security becomes the management of risk, then the management of the future, and as a result the management of anxiety.

Apparently NATO is not the only authority in this declarative-performative activity which has become the process of securitization of the future. Another actor has been involved successfully for centuries, even before the establishment of NATO, in the management of risk. And this actor very recently has been engaged in the NATO narrative. Because, if we talk about the management of the risk, we talk about the calculus of probability, and then, "elementary, my dear Watson", we can't forget to mention Lloyd's of London.

Lloyd's joined the group of NATO authors. The relation started on the topic of energy security, "when NATO first began to discuss its role in energy security, I asked Lord Levene to brief NATO Ambassadors on the risks and challenges of ensuring reliable energy supplies" (Scheffer, 2008), said Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at that time NATO Secretary General, at a dinner organised in London on October 23, 2008 by Lloyd's. And Lord Levene of Portsoken, chairman of Lloyd's of London, remarked: "Until now, energy security has felt like a very high level geopolitical problem. One which is best left to governments and strategists, and something that is very far removed from the boardroom. There is certainly no doubt that energy security is a very complex subject. But with a more dynamic global operating environment affecting almost all of us, at Lloyd's we believe that it is an issue of increasing importance for boards everywhere. A former US defence secretary said: 'Instead of energy security, we shall have to acknowledge and to live with various degrees of insecurity'. To some extent, perhaps we are already doing this, whether we recognise it or not. Today's businesses typically face an increasingly complex supply chain, a growing presence in emerging markets, energy bills which are oscillating wildly, and growing pressure to 'think green'. For all these reasons, energy security is no longer an issue about which business leaders can risk being in ignorance" (Levene, 2008).

Can we say that in this operation in which NATO and Lloyd's come together we are witnessing a *ménage à trois*: the market-state¹⁰, its insurance company and a military structure?

On this “management of risk-future” it is interesting to remark how NATO was looking for new authors to contribute to its new “literature genre” and on 3 and 4 April 2009, NATO's Heads of State and Government tasked the Secretary General to develop a NATO New Strategic Concept (NNSC), which was later presented at the NATO summit in Lisbon (2010).

To facilitate the process, the Secretary General appointed a group of twelve experts selected from large and small NATO members and representing a combination of insiders and outsiders, including from the private sector, think tanks and the academic community. Dr. Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, chaired the group with Mr. Jeroen van der Veer, former CEO in Royal Dutch Shell, as vice-chair.

The other members of the group of experts were Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona (Italy), Ambassador Marie Gervais-Vidricaire (Canada), the Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP (United Kingdom), Ambassador Ümit Pamir (Turkey), Ambassador Fernando Perpiñá-Robert Peyra (Spain), Ambassador Dr Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz (Germany), Mr Bruno Racine (France), Ambassador Aivis Ronis (Latvia), Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland), and Ambassador Yannis-Alexis Zepos (Greece) (NATO's New Strategic Concept official web site).

The NATO official page is extremely clear in highlighting the genealogy of this narrative-enterprise which contributed to the re-writing of the NNSC (2010) which replaced the previous NNSC 1999 edition (approved at the 50th anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance in Washington DC on April 24th, 1999).

Undoubtedly, the presence of Mr. Jeroen van der Veer, former CEO in Royal Dutch Shell, stands out among the authors. Therefore, it can be perfectly comprehensible as representative of a particular interest on the topic of energy and energy security.

But the relation between NATO and Lloyd's continues.

10 “What are the characteristics of the market-state? Such a state depends on the international capital markets and, to a lesser degree, on the modern multinational business network to create stability in the world economy, in preference to management by national or transnational political bodies. (...) like the nation-state, the market-state assesses its economic success or failure by its society's stability to secure more and better goods and services, but in contrast to the nation-state it does not see the State as more than a minimal provider or redistributor. Whereas the nation-state justified itself as an instrument to serve the welfare of the people (the nation), the market-state exists to maximize the opportunities enjoyed by all members of society” (Bobbitt, 2003, p. 229).

Lord Levene of Portsoken, chairman of Lloyd's of London, together with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO, not only signed an article published in *The Telegraph* on October 1, 2009, on "Piracy, cyber-crime and climate change – bringing NATO and insurance together" but hosted a Lloyd's conference on the Alliance's updated Strategic Concept: "360 with NATO: Climate Security, Cyber Crime, Piracy" (Fogh Rasmussen, 2009 and Levene, 2009). The article states that "industry leaders, including those from Lloyd's, have been involved in the current process to develop NATO's new guiding charter, the Strategic Concept; indeed, the vice-chair of the group is the former chief executive of Shell, Jeroen van der Veer." (Levene and Fogh Rasmussen, 2009).

Again, we can appreciate the particular sensibility on linking management of risk-future to energy interests, and the establishment of the official liaison between NATO and insurance. This liaison was further reinforced at the "Lloyd's / NATO 360 Risk Conference", held in New York on October 30th, 2009.

At the Lloyd's 360 live debate "Managing Risk in the 21st Century," leading experts discussed piracy, cyber security and climate change for an audience of more than 200 insurance executives, risk managers and business leaders.

"The joint Lloyd's and NATO conference would not have happened 20 or even 10 years ago. However, today, forming new coalitions is an essential part of risk management," Lloyd's CEO, Richard Ward commented. "In the modern era, we are able to form new alliances to fight our common threats."

"We need to speed up our response," said Ward. "This calls for a combination of visionary policies, thinking the unthinkable and pragmatism- finding ways to mitigate and adjust to a new reality."

In addition, Ward was echoed by Admiral Luciano Zappatta, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation for NATO: "Threats changed from a cold war scenario with a well-defined enemy, to a wide spectrum of risks, threats and potential strategic surprises, and during the past decades NATO has extended incrementally its interests outside the traditional area of responsibility" (Lloyd's/NATO 360 Risk Conference).

All the above was summarized in May 2010 into the analysis and recommendations of the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO: "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement": "Threats to the interests of the Alliance come from the outside, but the organisation's vigour could as easily be sapped from within. The increasing complexity of the global political environment has the potential to gnaw away at Alliance cohesion; economic headaches can distract attention from security needs; old rivalries could resurface; and the possibility is real of a damaging imbalance between the military contributions of some members and that of others. NATO states cannot allow twenty-first century dangers to do what past perils could not: divide their leaders and weaken their collective resolve. Thus, the new Strategic Concept must clarify both what NATO

should be doing for each Ally and what each Ally should be doing for NATO” (NATO 2020, 2010, p. 6).

2b. The NATO Imaginary-Pathos. Securing Our Future: The Emerging Security Challenges.

I decided to call the whole production of NATO’s perception of threats, which goes under the slogan of “Securing our Future”, as a no-imaginary map where the pathos is constructed. As we noted, pathos is one of the three modes of persuasion used in Aristotle’s rhetoric, and as a communication technique it is used to produce emotional appeal. As I will show, this emotional appeal is provoked through the use of metaphor, or story telling. And to be sure, this “story telling” is the result of the overlapping of a NATO discourse with a NATO map, which, capturing the attention and the readers’ sympathies and emotions, is capable of producing that pathos which causes an audience not just to respond emotionally but to identify with the writer’s point of view -- to feel what the writer feels.

The discursive part of the map is provided by the “NATO emerging security challenges” as reported on the speech of the NATO Secretary General Rasmussen on emerging risks (London, Oct 1, 2009). “The challenges we are looking at today cut across the divide between the public and the private sectors” (Fogh Rasmussen, 2009) the NATO Secretary General said. Furthermore, his speech embraced the following pretexts for NATO interventions. This future “casus belli”, in his own words, includes:


- piracy;
- cyber security/defence;
- climate change;
- extreme weather events – catastrophic storms and flooding;
- the rise of sea levels;
- population movement ... populations will move in large numbers ... always where someone else lives, and sometimes across borders;
- water shortages;
- droughts;
- a reduction in food production;
- the retreating of the Arctic ice for resources that had, until now, been covered under ice;
- global warming;
- CO2 emissions;
- reinforcing factories or energy stations or transmission lines or ports that might be at risk of storms or flooding;
- energy, where diversity of supply is a security issue;
- natural and humanitarian disasters;
- big storms, or floods, or sudden movements of populations, and
- fuel efficiency, thus reducing our overall dependence on foreign sources of fuel.

Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of
NATO's 'Critical Security Discourse'

As Rick Rozoff pointed out in a 2009 article, “none of the seventeen developments mentioned can even remotely be construed as a military threat and certainly not one posed by recognized state actors” (Rozoff, 2009).

On the other hand, the NATO map was provided by Lieutenant General Jim Soligan, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, of the NATO Allied Command Transformation on Apr 17, 2009, at “The Second International Symposium on Strategic and Security Studies”, organized in Istanbul by the University of Beykent, one of Istanbul's many universities (Soligan, 2009).

In his presentation, the NATO General showed a map of potential areas of intervention for NATO and defined potential regions of crisis as “Multiple Stress Zones”, adding that “Instability is likely to be greatest in areas of Multiple Environmental Stress”.



According to General, the impact of these Emerging Security Challenges on NATO will produce security and military implications:

The Security Implications are:

- rethinking Article 5¹¹;
- enhancing and creating new partnerships;
- expanded opportunities to positively shape and influence ideas, values, and events and
- changes in military operations: technological vulnerabilities.

While as Military Implications, NATO will have to:

- adapt to the demands of hybrid;
- adapt force structures, doctrine to train other nation's security forces;
- adapt C2 and organizational structures;
- enhance WMD detection and Consequence Management;

¹¹ As one of my commentator correctly highlighted: “Not to mention the link between the reformulation-rethinking of art.5 and the huge business interests linked to the development of missile defence”.

- strengthen EU/NATO/UN relationships, and
- win the Battle of the Narrative.

If we overlap General Soligan's presentation with the speech of the NATO Secretary General, we will see that not only the main points regarding the possible security challenges are the same but, at geopolitical level, the threats (Multiple Stress Zone) are all outside the territories of NATO countries.

If, until the implosion of the Soviet Union, the terminology of the balance of power, nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, and the communist enemy was framed in a "defence" vernacular, now - with the disappearance of a concrete, identifiable and definable enemy - the foe becomes a situation (Multiple Stress Zone) in which the particular interests of NATO countries are at risk.

"Securing Our Future" re-represents the old Cold War Manichean dichotomy between us (normally the good ones) and the others (which can represent the threat to our interests). As General Soligan highlighted in his presentation, one of the military implications for NATO will be to win the "Battle of the Narrative".

To sum up, it is NATO itself which tells us that we are dealing with a narrative.

2c. The NATO Reality-Logos: The Madonna Curve; NATO's Strategic Concepts (1999, 2010)

The last of the three elements of persuasion listed by Aristotle is represented by logos, the argument itself, which, according to the Greek philosopher, means "reasoned discourse" (Rahe, 1994, p. 21). It is in this "reasoned discourse", which I consider the reality of the discourse itself, that the real purpose and intention of the narrative are revealed.

If one of the military implications for NATO is to win the battle of narrative, then the main argument, the logos, has been constructed accordingly a commercial-market approach.

NATO, in its efforts, to regain an image which is more believable to face potentials new threats, and with the aim of maintaining a "narrative" which justifies its "aesthetic surgery", the alliance has relied on two elements:

1. a marketing approach defined as the Madonna-curve, and
2. the evolution of NATO terminology which has exploited a critical security studies language.

"The quality of adapting to new tasks whilst staying true to one's own principles is something which business analysts qualify as the Madonna-curve. This curve is named after the legendary pop-diva who reinvented herself each time her style and stardom went into inevitable decline, but whose audacity has lifted her up to ever higher levels of relevance and fame" (van Ham, 2008).

According Peter van Ham's 2008 article, NATO, to be successful, needs a package-deal of painful compromises, where each member state has to give and take. These painful compromises could be:

1. "First, allies need to find a workable consensus about the legitimacy of using military force in non-article 5 operations (i.e., for purposes other than self-defence), and, in the extreme, even without an explicit UN Security Council mandate. In a way, this has been the most controversial, unresolved issue of the 1999 strategic concept, which has gained even greater relevance with the US invasion of Iraq and the American doctrine of preventive wars. (...)

2. Second, choices must be made regarding NATO's future as a defence organisation. Obviously, collective defence remains the backbone of the Alliance. But what does this mean in an era where energy cut-offs and (cyber-) terrorism are the preferred lines of attack? NATO's collective defence clause under Article 5 was duly invoked after 9/11, which means, in theory, that NATO as a whole remains in a quasi-state of war. The fact that we simply forget this indicates that the Alliance needs to rethink the nature of collective defence, its responses, and the importance of retooling its operational kit to address new security challenges more effectively. NATO's military operations suggest a new strategy of "forward defence", where allied interests and values are protected "at the Hindukush." But with energy security topping the agenda and relations with Russia at freezing point, the true, and possibly novel, meaning of Article 5 requires serious collective thought. (...)

3. Third, NATO should bring its relationship with new, often global partners and key players like the EU and UN to a new level. (...) Since numerous NATO member states remain reluctant to risk life and limb in these dangerous missions, the Alliance risks becoming a "coalition of the willing", which would undermine internal solidarity, and hence NATO's *raison d'être*. If NATO chooses to go truly global, it must draw global partners closer to the organization, and clarify their rights and obligations under new and transparent rules of the game. (...)

4. Fourth, confronting NATO's strategic choices and dilemmas head-on will have a cleansing effect within the Alliance."

Therefore, if Madonna had to adapt her style and songs in order to sell more CDs, than NATO too had to re-write its lyrics.

Here, we can appreciate a chronological approach to its narrative adaptation.

The first official change happened with the approval of the NATO New Strategic Concept (signed April 24th 1999) in which two specific articles mention the possibility to have the NATO countries' interests jeopardized by "critical-security threats" (Dannreuther, 2008, p. 210).

With this 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, the Alliance started developing a role in collective security (Gulnur, 99) and Articles 20 and 24 are very clear examples of linking threat-instability-interests:

- Art. 20: “Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability”;
- Art. 24: “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources” (NATO Summit, NATO's official web site, 1999).

In 2006, at the Riga NATO summit, entitled “Transforming NATO in a New Global Era” (Riga Summit, 2006), three important moments stood apart. The first was the declaration made by the former American President George Bush Jr. according to whom “NATO is in transition from a static force to an expeditionary force”, then in line with Rasmussen's more recent speeches. The other two moments were embodied by two specific initiatives which confirmed the inseparable link between energy security, global war on terror and a new NATO geopolitical map.

The first was made by the American Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which comparing energy to a weapon suggested the possibility for NATO countries to invoke art. 5 in the case their energy supplies were cut off by force (Dempsey, 2006). The other, promoted by Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning, saw the possibility for the creation of a NATO Energy Security and Intelligence Analysis Cell responsible for the gathering of information on terrorism and energy security from various sources (Shea, 2006).

Another important moment was represented by the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit in which the American initiative to let Georgia join the Alliance was rejected by various NATO members. I cannot see the importance of Georgia in NATO without thinking about the strategic and economic importance of the various pipelines which, crossing the territory of Georgia, carry energy resources from Central Asia. Despite American pressure on this initiative other Alliance countries understood that in case of troubles in Georgia (as was the case in Aug 2008) resolution was not through military means, something which in reality happened.

The last historical moment in the construction of this narrative and which can be regarded as the accomplishment of changes requested by the Madonna Curve is represented by the recent NATO Strategic Concept approved in Lisbon on Nov 10th, 2010 (NNSC 2010). Accordingly, the defence and security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation “will be based on an Active Engagement, Modern Defence”:

“4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO's territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

a. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

b. Crisis management¹². NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises (before, during and after conflicts). NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

12 While NATO is adopting a Crisis Management approach, one of the major author/actor of the Alliance, the United States of America, has embarked, since the terrorist attack of Sept 11th, 2001, in a massive re-adaptation of its "defence" apparatus in various sectors and through new methodologies and style. "America is at war, and we live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies are realities. The Army has analytically looked at the future, and we believe our Nation will continue to be engaged in an era of "persistent conflict"—a period of protracted confrontation among states, non-state, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends." This is what the USA Army General Williams V. Wallace wrote on the foreword of the FM 3-0 American Army Operations Manual (FM 3-0 American Army Operations Manual, 2008). The USA final product which resembles to the NATO one of Crisis Management is represented then by "Stability Operations". To arrive to this final product the American administration has operated in various sectors always keeping in mind the original purpose to be "engaged in persistent conflict" (in the Multiple Stress Zones?). In 2001 the State Department initiated a program of Critical Language Scholarship Program for American students of Arabic, Persian, Azerbaijani, Bangla/Bengali, Hindi, Indonesian, Korean, Punjabi, Turkish, Urdu, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian (Critical Language Scholarship official website). At the same time in 2006 the USA started putting in practice the "Lawrence Legacy" as the US forces will be engaged in irregular warfare around the world, using "an indirect approach", they should build and work with others, and seek "to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are strongest or in a manner they expect to be attacked" (Quadrennial Defence Review, 2006). Then in Oct 2008 the Field Manual 3-07 "Stability Operations" (Field, Manuel 3-07, 2008), puts stability operations into doctrine after they were introduced in the above mentioned FM 3-0, Operations, and where their importance were elevated to the same level as offensive and defensive operations. "America's future abroad is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire" said Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. "Instead, we will work through and with the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering. Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate 'soft' power to promote participation in government, spur economic development and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations; and the private sector" (Harlow, 2008).

c. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards" (Active Engagement, Modern Defence, 2010).

The reality-logos is summarized by those strategic tools which are used to win the NATO battle of Narrative which become this Madonna's curve and interests-security-military terminology. But these reality-logos themselves, in the end, come to negate the Madonna's curve principles: "the quality of adapting to new tasks whilst staying true to one's own principles." If NATO's own principles are solidarity, freedom, security and transatlantic link, then these are achieved through a military structure and are valid for its members. Thus, the new tasks are not the ones for which the Alliance was constructed. The genealogical approach above aims at highlighting the fact that this "quality of adapting" is based on a "re-adapted" narrative, as could be the case of Madonna's old songs, for something which has nothing to do with an ideological and military enemy. What are constants in this re-adaptation efforts are the words "fear" and "threat", but what there hides behind this "mise en scène" is only a sixty years old Madonna who tries to catch on the time and wants to continue making money by selling cheap music. And not everyone is interested in buying and listening to her music¹³.

13 In this combination of NATO narrative and marketing approach personified by the Madonna curve in order to produce an "hegemonic" convincing discourse I see a resemblance with a product of "Culture industry". Culture industry is a term coined by critical theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheim, in their 1947 book "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (in the chapter dedicated to "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception"). Adorno and Horkheimer saw this mass-produced culture as a danger to the more difficult high arts. Culture industries may cultivate false needs; that is, needs created and satisfied by capitalism. True needs, in contrast, are freedom, creativity, or genuine happiness.

"Today the culture industry has taken over the civilising inheritance of the entrepreneurial and frontier democracy – whose appreciation of intellectual deviations was never very finely attuned. All are free to dance and enjoy themselves, just as they have been free, since the historical neutralisation of religion, to join any of the innumerable sects. But freedom to choose an ideology – since ideology always reflects economic coercion – everywhere proves to be freedom to choose what is always the same. The way in which a girl accepts and keeps the obligatory date, the inflection on the telephone or in the most intimate situation, the choice of words in conversation, and the whole inner life as classified by the now somewhat devalued depth psychology, bear witness to man's attempt to make himself a proficient apparatus, similar (even in emotions) to the model served up by the culture industry" (Adorno and Horkheim, 2002, p. 94-136).

2d. The Model Reader: The NATO Reader

If one of the military implications for NATO, as seen earlier, is to “win the battle of Narrative”, then the main question is, who/what is the target? As in the case of Madonna, the target was the market -the listeners, the ones who buy and/or listen to her music, in the case of the NATO Narrative, the goal is to convince those who read the NNSC 2010 and NATO narrative in general.

Any text, as it appears in linguistic layout, represents a chain of expressive artifice which must be actualized by the addressees themselves (Eco, 1979/2006, p. 50).

Clearly, this is so in the case of the NATO Narrative, which I view in its whole expression as a text. In order to win the battle of narrative, it is of primary importance that the text is interpreted according to the author's prediction.

Parenthetically, the Italian semiotician Umberto Eco implicitly uses the translation metaphor when he speaks of the original and its actualizations, or tokens. For Eco, reading is a translation process, which sees the proto-text as a type and its interpretations or sense-making readings as actualizations of that type. Therefore, the meaning of a text is complete only when the text is read and it is clear that a well-rounded writer tries to prefigure the model of his reader. In this way, he imagines what can be the model of actualization of his text.

Interpretive cooperation is part of the text and the text is not complete without taking into account if, when and how it is interpreted. Otherwise, the sense of his text is trusted to the casual meeting of his text with any empirical reader.

By “empirical reader” we mean a given concrete reader reading a text, one of the many concrete actualizations of the abstract notion of “reader”. “Model reader” is instead one who, apart from the author, is able to interpret a text in a similar way to the author who generated it. “The author has thus to foresee a model of the possible reader (the Model Reader) supposedly able to deal interpretatively with the expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively with them” (Eco, 1995, p. 7). That is, “the Model Reader is a whole of happiness conditions, textually established, which has to be satisfied in order to have the text fully actualized in its potential content” (Eco, 1979/2006, p. 62).

In our case, the Model Reader is what I call the NATO Reader, the reader who physically belongs to the cultural-geopolitical space of the Alliance Countries. The NATO reader is one who, reading the NATO Narrative is capable of understanding and psychologically experiencing the NATO anxieties because the terminology of the alliance narrative is a terminology which belongs to the reader's cultural, sociological, economic and historical environment. Consequently, as I said earlier, the NATO reader is capable of identifying with the writer's point of view – and of feeling what the writer feels. The NATO reader is the only one capable of cooperating with the NATO narrative.

3. The Function of the Geopolitical-Narrative Framework

At this point, the image of the Geopolitical-Narrative Framework is complete. All the classical elements of any communicative and persuasive process are present within its parameters: the broadcaster, the message, and the receiver.


But as we have seen so far, this GPNF has a particular task to accomplish, which is that meant to “win the battle of narrative”.

“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation, or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future” (Cox, 1981, p. 126-155).

Using the oft-quoted article of Robert Cox, I would like to say that narrative is always for someone and for some purpose. Thus, the GPNF is a grand text which has been produced for someone and for some purpose, and this is not to believe in any superficial conspiracy theory because it is the NATO document's very author who confesses that the NATO-narrative-text is for NATO and that its purpose is to win the NATO battle of narrative.

This GPNF then becomes a vital text, and a specific idiom¹⁴, which its “interpretative fate is part of its creative process: to produce a text means carrying out a strategy in which the moves of the adversary are foreseen. In the military stra-

¹⁴ As George Orwell in his book “1984” (published in 1949) describes “Newspeak” as the specific language-idiom created by the totalitarian ruling government-party “Ingsoc” (English Socialism) in the fictional state of Oceania, I see in the NATO narrative-discourse articulation of danger the creation of a “new language”. “Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism. (...) The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. (...) Newspeak was founded on the English language as we now know it, though many Newspeak sentences, even when not containing newly-created words, would be barely intelligible to an English-speaker of our own day. Newspeak words were divided into three distinct classes, known as the A vocabulary, the B vocabulary (also called compound words), and the C vocabulary. (...) THE A VOCABULARY. The A vocabulary consisted of the words needed for the business of everyday life—for such things as eating, drinking, working, putting on one's clothes, going up and down stairs, riding in vehicles, gardening, cooking, and the like. (...) THE B VOCABULARY. The B vocabulary consisted of words which had been deliberately constructed for political purposes: words, that is to say, which not only had in every case a political implication, but were intended to impose a desirable mental attitude upon the person using them. (...) THE C VOCABULARY. The C vocabulary was supplementary to the others and consisted entirely of scientific and technical terms. These resembled the scientific terms in use today, and were constructed from the same roots, but the usual care was taken to define them rigidly and strip them of undesirable meanings” (Orwell, 1990, p.312-326). On the role of interpretation in the articulation of danger, see Campbell, 1998.



tegy, the strategist builds up a model of adversary” (Eco, 1979/2006, p. 54).

The GPNF comes to define the field of existence of a big text in which the battle of narrative has to be won. To “Win the battle of narrative” is to win it inside the time and space of the GPNF in which the “doxa”, the public opinion is constructed.

Within the GPNF there operate two opposing forces, the centripetal and the centrifugal force, and in two directions:

1. “for someone” and
2. “for some purpose”.

“For someone”, the GPNF reinforces and recreates the author identity, in this specific case the NATO identity (centripetal force). In this part, the GPNF constructs the plot, the anxieties, the threats, the enemy and the hero in which the reader will identify. At the same time, as far as it produces this narrative, NATO spreads out a message which, as a centrifugal force, captures the reader who is present (physically and/or emotionally or for interest) in its geopolitical field of existence.

“For some purpose”, which we know is to win the battle of narrative, is achieved through a combination of emotional-identity-cultural elements which have the aim of “interpellating”¹⁵ the readers. They find themselves hit by the centrifugal force spread by the text and are sucked into it (centripetal force). The text will interpellate these readers, and it will participate in constructing their identities in which, in turn, they will identify themselves. The model reader, as a Don Quixote, will live in the text and see the reality through the text.

We know that reading is a semiotic act: the reader (the model reader, the NATO reader) gains meaning from that text. Given that semiosis is an interpretative act, reading is a succession of interpretations and reinterpretations in the light of what the text says about itself, of what the text says about the world, of what the text says about other texts. Every time the readers find a new sign before them, they have to undertake a process of decision making, often forcing themselves to predominantly trust one sense to the detriment of other senses, which then determines a chain of consequences for the interpretation of the signs that follow, and on the interpretation of the whole of the text.

In this view, reading is a process having something in common with games of skill or of strategy that have a set of rules that do not impose a predetermined behaviour on the player, leaving room for individual creativity and ability (Gorlee, 1994, p. 71). But in the case of NATO Narrative, the NATO reader becomes a target (the Madonna’s curve) which will not have possibilities to cooperate autonomously. The authors will do the maximum to use a terminology and to construct situations which the model reader will completely understand. They will push their style in order to stimulate a precise effect, and, to be sure that a horror reaction will arise, they will speak early and say “at this moment something terrible has happened”. On a certain level, the game will work (Eco, 1979/2006, p. 57).

Some texts are interpreted according to the author’s prediction, while others are decoded in cultural contexts completely different from the ones that have been foreseen. In other words, a closed text foresees only one form of decoding. All those not foreseen (open text) are not ‘legitimate’, from the author’s point of view.


The case of the GPNF is that of a closed text in which the whole of NATO narrative has to be interpreted only through a specific geopolitical, cultural and economic position and code.

15 “Interpellation refers to the process by which people, when ‘hailed’ by discourses, recognize themselves in that hailing. Interpellation assumes that different representations of the world incorporate patterns of identity and ways of functioning in the world, which are located within different power relations and which make different interests possible. Concrete individuals come to identify with these subject positions and the representations in which they appear. As subjects identify them, the power relations and interests entailed in discourse are naturalized and these representations seem to reflect the world as it is.” (Fierke, 2007, p. 86).

The GPNF, being a closed text, at the same time establishes precisely the intellectual profile of the model reader -- an ideal reader who has the capacity to interpret the world only through and inside the GPNF and which puts the GPNF at the centre of a bigger world. A reader who, at the same time, moves and lives inside the GPNF space and whose behaviour is the outcome of mental maps provided to him by his local culture (Monaghan and Just, 2000, p. 54).

In short, the GPNF has to educate and, more importantly, has to “interpellate” the reader in order to win the battle of narrative: “you are addressed (by ads, for instance) as a particular sort of subject (a consumer who values certain qualities), and being repeatedly hailed in this way you come to occupy such a position” (Culler, 1997, p. 45).

I would like to say that the text creates an audience, and in this case while it manufactures a myth at the same time it forges the “homo NATO” “because it only suffice to speak about something to make it exists” (Eco, 2010, p. 385).



But what is specific of this GPNF is that it represents the space where the security relationship (McSweeney, 1999, p. 14-15) is constructed and assembled. Because, despite the commercial-marketing approach identified in the Madonna's curve, what is very specific here is a relationship based on emotion, and a very particular one: anxiety.

“Language and culture shape our feeling of anxiety” (Salecl, 2004, p. 17) and the language we have been analysing until now is one in which the supposed management of the future has been a constant. Moreover, the human impossibility to control the future provokes anguish. Consequently, as a result of the narrative produced by the author, the readers are induced in an emotional state of anxiety which, in this case, works as an adhesive in the relationship between them and the author-authority.

Vamik Volkan has observed that in time of peace the relation between citizens and political leader is based on “normal trust”. But when anxiety, fear, threat, or even if war are added into the geopolitical context the relationship becomes a “blind trust” one: the citizens believe completely in their political leaders.

As in the case of “large group identity-conflict”, in which a threat against a large group identity brings a psychological regression that can spark an identity conflict. Here “the concept of large-group identity describes how thousands or millions of individuals, most of whom will never meet in their life-times, are bound by an intense sense of sameness by belonging to the same ethnic, religious, national, or ideological group. (...) When large groups are threatened by conflict, members of the group cling evermore stubbornly to these circumstances in an effort to maintain and regulate their sense of self and their sense of belonging to a large-group. At such times, large-groups processes become dominant and large-group identity issues and rituals are more susceptible to political propaganda and manipulation. Political, economic, legal, military, and historical factors usually figure prominently in any attempt to manage and solve large-group conflicts, but it is also necessary to consider the profound effect of human psychology, especially specific large-group processes that evolve under stress or after massive trauma and are manipulated by leaders” (Volkan, 2004).

The GPNF became a large political stage where we can realize what Jackie Orr defines as “Psycho-power”. “Psycho-power is the name I would suggest for technologies of power and techniques of knowledge developed by a normalizing society to regulate the psychological life, health, and disorders of individuals and entire populations. In part, conceptual kin and strategic ally of modern bio-power, psycho-power operates through psychological monitoring, measurement, and discipline, administering order in the unruly psychic realms of perception, emotion, and memory” (Orr, 2006, p.11). Thus psycho-power can be seen as an exercise of “engineering of consent” (through reason, persuasion and suggestion) which, as a manufactured product resembles so much to the “panic broadcast” experiment carried out by Orson Wells on Oct 30, 1938, with his radio play adaptation of H.G. Well’s novel “The War of the Worlds” (Orr, 2006, p. 33-77).

Concluding this paragraph, one can state that the GPNF is the space where security as a cultural, idiosyncratic concept is constructed. Security as an idiosyncratic concept is the result of the combination of two elements (cultural idiosyncrasy and individual idiosyncrasy¹⁶) in which anxiety acts as a catalyst. For cultural idiosyncrasy, I consider what is peculiar of a culture that can spark particular anxiety-fear emotions in individuals in its geopolitical context. Then being a cultural phenomenon, it carries with it its own particular cultural relativism. Whereas for individual idiosyncrasy, I consider the particular nature of the poli-

16 Here I adapt the two concepts of cultural idiosyncrasies and individual idiosyncrasies developed by Jared Diamond to the concept of security (Diamond, 1988, pp. 405-425).

tical leader, or agency, to which is recognised an authority and then can perform the speech-narrative act. The combination of culture, symbolism, myth, policy, and interests, together with the political activity and nature-character of the leader-agency and the emotional element, bring as a result a cultural concept of security which is conscious of its cultural relativism.

4. KPAX: Challenging the Geopolitical-Narrative Framework, Empirical Reader, and the "Strategicalization" of Global Politics.

But what happens when the GPNF is not read by a model reader (the NATO reader) but by an empirical one who is an outsider to the GPNF space? "Those texts that obsessively aim at arousing a precise response on the part of more or less precise empirical readers [...] are in fact open to any possible 'aberrant' decoding. A text so immoderately 'open' to every possible interpretation will be called a closed one" (Eco, 1995, p. 8).

In the quoted sentence, Eco says that closed texts are the most 'open': it is, of course, a play on words, a small provocation. The stiffer a set of rules is, the greater the possibility to transgress. By analogy, the narrower a narrative strategy, the more probabilities there are to encounter unforeseen decoding, which actually renders these texts extremely open.

Then to challenge the GPNF and to highlight its cultural relativism I need a character that not only does not belong to the GPNF but even to our planet (the one who has not been transformed in "animal symbolicum"-*"Homo Videns"*-NATO Model Reader-Homo NATO).

To do this, I will take as a tool a 2001 American science-fiction film (K-PAX¹⁷) about a mentally ill patient who claims to be an alien from the planet K-PAX (hereafter I will refer to the patient as KPAX). This outside position of KPAX's will help us to understand the cultural relativism¹⁸ intrinsic into the GPNF and the inconsistency of its positions vis-a-vis the threats it foresees.

17 "K-PAX" is a 2001 American science fiction film directed by Iain Softley.

18 "Among the moral, philosophical, and political consequences of the emergence of the concept of culture has been development of a doctrine of 'cultural relativism'. We start from the premise that our beliefs, morals, behaviors (even our very perceptions of the world around us) are the products of culture, learned as members of the communities in which we are reared. If, as we believe, the content of culture is the product of the arbitrary, historical experience of a people, then what we are as social beings is also an arbitrary, historical product. Because culture so deeply and broadly determines our worldview, it stands to reason that we can have no objective basis for asserting that one such worldview is superior to another, or that one worldview can be used as a yardstick to measure another. In this sense, cultures can only be judged relative to one another, and the meaning of a given belief or behavior must first and foremost be understood relative to its own cultural context. That, in a nutshell, is the basis of what has come to be called *cultural relativism*" (Monaghan and Just, 2000, p. 49).

KPAX represents for me what Eco calls the “empirical reader” who is “the concrete subject of acts of [textual] cooperation”; he “deduces a model image of something that has previously been verified as an act of utterance and which is textually present as an utterance” (Eco, 1979/2006, p. 62). In short, he is the one who views the text pragmatically. Not only does KPAX read the narrative but he also “reads” the motivation behind the recent conflicts in which the NATO-author has been involved.

NATO countries are already fighting a Global War on Terror against a no-state actor in Afghanistan as a result of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Another coalition of NATO countries is employed in Iraq to fight a counterinsurgency war after a war to establish democracy in that country was won in 2005. KPAX understands that with the disappearance of the communist evil the Alliance needed another evil, another threatening entity. And being the United States of America, one of the major authors of NATO narrative, its administration has intensively worked not only to have its own tailor-made “enemy” but even to impose it as the major threat of the whole Alliance.

In his 2006 article published on “International Affairs”, Barry Buzan sustains the thesis that “Washington is now embarked on a campaign to persuade itself, the American people and the rest of the world that the ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWOt) will be a ‘long war’. This ‘long war’ is explicitly compared to the Cold War as a similar sort of zero-sum, global-scale, generational struggle against anti-liberal ideological extremists who want to rule the world. Both have been staged as a defence of the West, or western civilization, against those who would seek to destroy it” (Buzan, 2006, p. 1101-1118).

Despite the fact that the above conflicts have in common the presence of a very well defined (or definable) enemy, even if there is not a globally- accepted definition for terrorism (both wars were initiated with the aim to win terrorism), in reading the NATO narrative concerning the Alliance’s future security threats, we see that the reality is too far away to be clear and the fog is thicker.

And it is the lack of precise definitions and explanation about the necessity to use a military organization to face the future security challenges which open the field to the use of ontological¹⁹ questions related to the validity of the GPNE:

¹⁹ Ontology (from the Greek ὄν , genitive ὄντος ; of being (neuter participle of εἶναι : to be) and -λογία , -logia: science, study, theory) is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality in general, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology deals with questions concerning what entities exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities can be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences. Principal questions of ontology are "What can be said to exist?", "Into what categories, if any, can we sort existing things?", "What are the meanings of being?", and "What are the various modes of being of entities?".

Reading the GPNF pragmatically as KPAX, we should be able to answer the following two sets of questions in order to test the supposed "universal" message of peace and security NATO narrative.

First:

- What is reality? Is it the one portrayed by the GPNF, or is the NATO reality the only one among various possible realities?
- What is real knowledge? Can we assume the GPNF as real knowledge and not as a strategic manipulative narrative in order to win a battle of narrative and maintain in life an old military Alliance?
- What can we do? Is the NATO military response the only one possible? And what when the military response is to be employed outside the territory of the GPNF as apparently will be the case in the future?

And second:

- What is being secured? Apparently the aim of the GPNF's possible military interventions is to protect the NATO countries interest. Thus, the security referent object is the NATO interests and the survival of NATO organisation itself.
- What is being secured against? Who are the enemies? Who defines them? And in General Soligan's map, apparently all the enemies are outside the territory of the GPNF.
- Who provides security? If NATO wants to secure our future (of the NATO countries), then it is NATO who will provide that security.
- What methods can be undertaken to provide it? Apparently, the methods are the forward defence, the war against terrorism, and all the military actions to provide energy security.

KPAX reads the GPNF from a different position, from a non-perspective as mentioned by Cox. Being a no-NATO reader, he is not enchanted and captured by the text. He does not collaborate with it accordingly to the intention of the authors, and least of all he is not even interpellated or hailed by it.

In addition, when he reads the whole NATO GPNF, which goes under the title "Securing our future", the main question that arises is how to define "our". Who are the "our"?

The "our" is only represented by the NATO countries and their allies who, in securitizing their future as an issue, present it "as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p. 23-24).

When we look at the issue of energy security, which was the first motivation for NATO and Lloyd's to come together, the scenario is extremely interesting. The GPNF is composed of NATO countries and NATO readers who import energy resources thus making them energy dependent, not to mention the fact that the NATO countries, with their population of around 1 billion people, consume and use

(and pollute) and use the highest percentage per capita of oil in the world. A USA citizen uses 28 barrels of oil per year, a European 20, and a Chinese citizen 1.5.

The GPNF is a specific geographical map in which a large number of security-economic interests of NATO are in territories outside the boundaries of its map. At this point is more than clear that the NATO narrative is nothing more than an attempt in the “strategicalization of global politics” – the rendering of events as subject to human mastery at the hands of statesman and to the logic of a peculiarly contemporary, i.e. post-war strategic discourse.” And “by talking of ‘strategicalization’, we identify processes by which political domain is extended beyond realms of immediate sovereignty” (Klein, 1994, p. 27). And despite the NATO usage of a critical security studies terminology which refers to security with a more broad meaning (in which the referent object of security is the human being) than defence (typical of the Cold-War period), the danger here is represented by a return to a pseudo-colonial approach to international politics. “What is distinctive about ‘strategicalization’ is the extent to which state behaviour becomes encoded within world views and then becomes the basis of the whole bureaucratic apparatuses – of security analysis, intelligence estimates, and international surveillance” (Klein, 1994, p. 127).

Conclusion: We Have to Reinvent Ourselves

I would like to conclude this paper by stating that the human species is living in a particular moment in which globalisation has made the world smaller and where not everybody is a NATO model reader. NATO readers should need to reinvent themselves and face the world outside their GPNF, and this is a discourse close to the concept of “emancipation” developed by Ken Booth.

“As discourse of politics, emancipation seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others. It provides a three-fold framework for politics: a philosophical anchorage for knowledge, a theory of progress for society, and a practice of resistance against oppression. Emancipation is the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing humanity” (Booth, 2007, p. 112).


Undoubtedly, the NATO Reader has to re-read the world because he can not pretend to live as an immortal human being in a NATO-kept castle and forget or ignore not only the two clocks but even the world outside it. The Alliance structure would really like that its clock could be as the one of Benjamin Button and run backwards into the time of its youth, and NATO definitely act as it will live “in aeternum”. And this is because, despite the NATO narrative, despite the fact that NATO is “the most successful alliance in human history” (Ash, 2011), outside the NATO GPNF-cave, and NATO lines other realities are taking shape.

1. Other countries like China (with a population of 1.5 billion) have produced their own concept of war. “Unrestricted Warfare” is a book on military strategy written in 1999 by two colonels in the People’s Liberation Army, Qiao Liang

and Wang Xiangsui. The book rather than focusing on direct military confrontation examines a variety of other means which can be summarized in the Formula: Schwartzkopf + Soros + Xiaomolisi + Bin Laden (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999).


2. At the G20 Seoul meeting (2010) even the map of the world financial crisis was changed. Despite the western countries depicted the financial crisis as a global one, its perception from other global actors and emerging economies was completely different. According to O'Neill (Goldman Sachs), policy makers in Asia were referring to the global credit crisis as the "North Atlantic Crisis" (BBC News, Today, 2010). Thus, and for the first time, the "others" defined our military alliance as a financial system.

3. When we look at the "Multiple Stress Zone" map presented by the NATO General Soligan in 2009, how can we not see that is the exact copy of Pentagon Map which was produced in the year 2004 (Barnett, 2004) to highlight the grand strategy for the American foreign policy? Furthermore, the Pentagon Map is much more than a simple cartographic representation of the planet, it is a division of the world countries between the Functioning Core, characterized by economic interdependence, and the Non-Integrated Gap, characterized by unstable leadership and absence from international trade. The Core can be sub-divided into Old Core (North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia) and New Core (China, India). The Non-Integrated Gap includes the Middle East, South Asia (except India), most of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Northwest South America. Thus using a realist terminology the Functioning Core can represent the land of order while the Non-Integrated Gap the land of anarchy and disorder and also it can be seen as a tentative to "ethnicalize" the world (Aime, 2004, p. 73-100). And if what can happen in the Non-Integrated Gap can produce security concerns to the NATO countries (which are part of the Functioning Core) and justify a military intervention in their internal affairs then "fear is something that is actually missing in a situation of international anarchy, and because it is missing it must be invented and skilfully deployed" (Weber, 2005, p. 23).



4. World Population Growth Rate: “By 2003, the combined population of Europe, the United States, and Canada accounted for just 17 percent of the global population. In 2050, this figure is expected to be just 12 percent. (...) Today, roughly nine out of ten children under the age of 15 live in developing countries. (...) Indeed, over 70 percent of the world’s population growth between now and 2050 will take place in 24 countries, all of which are classified by the World Bank as low income or lower-middle income, with an average per capita income under \$ 3,855 in 2008” (Goldstone, 2010 and Minois, 2011).

5. Consumption factor. We have already seen that the estimated one billion people who live in developed countries, which, coincidentally, is the same number of NATO people (the “our”), have a relative per capita consumption rate of 32, while the rest of the “others” (the 5.5 billion people that constitute the developing world, have relative per capita consumption rates below 32, mostly down toward 1). How will it be possible to “secure our future” and then maintain a consumption factor of 32 when the “others” will want to consume like us? “The World Bank has predicted that by 2030 the number of middle-class people in the developing world will be 1.2 billion (a rise of 200 percent since 2005). This means that the developing world’s middle class alone will be larger that the total populations of Europe, Japan, and the United States combined. From now on, therefore, the main driver of global economic expansion will be the economic growth of newly-industrialized countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey” (Goldstone, 2010).



6. Life expectancy rate. Will the people living in the “multiple stress zone” (the non- integrated gap) accept their dramatic living conditions, and live less than the people living in other parts of the globe? Will they accept the status quo that has produced their misery or will they rebel? And the peace that NATO will impose on them will be a “positive peace” or a “negative peace” which will reproduce the same “structural violence” that provoked unrest and internal conflict, and not seeing instead the “civil war as a system” (Keen, 2009, p. 11-24)?

We should accept the reality and we should reinvent ourselves. And the first step to take will be to re-read the world out-side the NATO narrative because we have to be aware of the advice which one of the supposed fathers of Realism gave to the Prince: "Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. (...) because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it."²⁰

Then conscious that in front of us there is a narrative which "has to appear" we have to free ourselves and not act as the Pavlov's dog but illuminated by the doubt in front a narrative which pretends to narrate the reality and re-read the world outside the NATO keep.

It is the gift of the doubt which, as the Italian writer Leonardo Sciascia wrote some years ago, distinguishes the intellectual from the charlatan. Because "in the historical and human history the truth can appear confused and the lie can assume the appearance of veracity" (Sciascia, 1963).

Then it is in the intellectual intention to emancipate the reader from a well-defined image-interpretation of a supposed reality that the "security analyst needs to engage as a political philosopher. This is because the value of security is in constant tension and interdependence with other values, most prominent of which are the values of freedom, prosperity and justice" (Dannreuther, 2007, p. 8).

Thus emancipate the "homo videns", who is entrapped in a NATO GPNF which reminds us of Plato's Cave and means to give him back his capacity of abstraction and return to him his ability to think, and act autonomously and responsibly and not as a proficient apparatus.

And instead of "securing our future" in which "our" means the NATO people, replace it with "we", the international society, because we have to accept that in this earthly life there are two clocks and the evolution of the human being has to be continuous. We are responsible for the coming generation to which country, race, religion, and the like belong because "we" are all human beings, all "Homines sapientes".

²⁰ "Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite. (...) For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest on. One prince of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time." (Machiavelli, 2007 (1513) p. 157-158).

Reinventing ourselves will be like being re-born free and emancipated. For this reason, I would like to conclude this paper with the manifesto of the Italian Renaissance, the Oration on the Dignity of Man, because what is at stake in this historical moment is not a question of identity but of human dignity. It is up to us whether to face life as beasts or as divine.

“Finally, the Great Artisan (...) made man a creature of indeterminate and indifferent nature, and, placing him in the middle of the world, said to him ‘Adam, we give you no fixed place to live, no form that is peculiar to you, nor any function that is yours alone.

According to your desires and judgement, you will have and possess whatever place to live, whatever form, and whatever functions you yourself choose. All other things have a limited and fixed nature prescribed and bounded by our laws. You, with no limit or no bound, may choose for yourself the limits and bounds of your nature.

We have placed you at the world's centre so that you may survey everything else in the world.

We have made you neither of heavenly nor of earthly stuff, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with free choice and dignity, you may fashion yourself into whatever form you choose.

To you is granted the power of degrading yourself into the lower forms of life, the beasts, and to you is granted the power, contained in your intellect and judgement, to be reborn into the higher forms, the divine” (della Mirandola, 15th C CE).

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Özet:

1990'ların başında Sovyet Birliği'nin çöküşü ve bu süreçte Soğuk Savaş'ın etkisini yitirmesini takiben NATO kendi kurumsal varlığının meşruiyetini yeniden değerlendirmek ve temellendirmek arayışına gitmiştir. Meşruiyetin temellendirilmesi süreci bugün de NATO üzerine gerçekleşen strateji ve güvenlik araştırmalarında etkili bir rol oynamaktadır.

Bu çalışmada ele alınan, NATO'nun meşruiyetini ve amacını temellendirme sürecinde nasıl bir söylem oluşturduğu, bu söylemin “model okuyucusu” (model-reader) tarafından nasıl algılandığı ve söylemsel inşa sürecinin gerçek ile örtüşüp örtüşmediğidir. Eleştirel teorinin perspektifinden bakarak, çalışma aynı zamanda NATO'nun söylemsel değişim süreci ile birlikte “savunma” söyleminden “güvenlikleştirme” söylemine geçişine de ışık tutmaktadır.

Çalışma, söylem analizi yöntemini kullanarak, NATO'nun resmi söylemini oluşturan aktörler ile birlikte, bu aktörlerin göndermiş olduğu mesajın ulaştığı ve yorumlandığı (kod açımını yapan aktör) okuyucu-alıcının niteliğini de incelemektedir. Buna göre, NATO varlığının ve amacının meşruiyet zeminini öncelikle

söylemsel olarak oluşturmakta ve bunun inşasını yaparken bir “Gelecek güvenliği riski” söylemi üzerinden politikasını belirlemektedir. Bu bağlamda, “Geleceğimizi güvence altına alıyoruz” (Securing our Future) sloganı, bu söylemin ana damarını oluşturmaktadır.

NATO'nun söylemini üreten “aktörlerin” (author-narrator), “Jeopolitik Anlatım Çerçevesini” (Geopolitical-Narrative-Framework) oluşturmalarındaki en önemli yapı taşlarından biri “savunma” anlayışından “güvenlik” anlayışına geçişte meşru bir zemin inşa etmeleridir. Bu anlayışın izdüşümü hakkında ipucu verecek kavram olan ve yukarıda bahsi geçen “Geleceğimizi güvence altına almak” sloganı Jeopolitik Anlatım Çerçevesini oluşturmaktadır. Bu anlatım çerçevesinin ve genel olarak NATO söyleminin zemininin yerine oturması ise “kolektif güvenlik” kavramının ve dolayısıyla NATO'nun varoluş amaç(lar)ının yeniden tanımlanmasıyla ilgili bir özellik taşımaktadır. NATO'nun meşruiyeti için ise, tanımlama sürecinden doğan söylem, model-okuyucunun (model reader) yanı sıra, NATO'nun etki bölgesinde yer almayan ve model-okuyucu olarak tanımlanamayacak bir kitlenin de ilişki kurabileceği bir söylem olma zorunluluğu taşımaktadır.

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