AN ARENDTIAN EVALUATION ON PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION FROM A 'GOOD GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE': AN ASSESSMENT ON DEMOCRATIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

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HANNAH ARENDT’İN ‘İYİ YÖNETİM ANLAYIŞI’ AÇISINDAN KATILIM VE TEMSİLİYET KAVRAMLARI ÜZERİNE BİR DEĞERLENDİRME: DEMOKRATİKLEŞME VE KAMU POLİTİKALARINA DAİR TARTIŞMA

Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler: Kamu Siyasası, temsiliyet, müzakere, Hannah Arendt, Katılım

Abstract

This work aims to elaborate on the nexus between democratization and public policy from the perspective of Hannah Arendt, one of the most prominent respectable names of contemporary political theory. Given the impact of liberal democracies’ inherent tensions between notions of administrative state and political action within their public administration schemes, the proposed work targets to gain an understanding of how the terms such as participation and representation can be conceived from an Arendtian perspective of ‘good government’. Entailing an account of what Arendt has to offer for the public

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policy as a sub-field and public administration as a field, the analysis will underline the necessity that Arendtian reading of policy in modern times shifts from the question of representation in the public policy making to the exchange of opinions and judgment in the phases of public policy implementation.

**Keywords:** Public Policy, representation, deliberation, Hannah Arendt, Participation

"Feelings mutual to all are coming into words in language, in new words that come into use. There are two words primarily which already by their formation betray which loss of freedom, which lack of identification-possibilities with the general we all feel; a young word and an older one, which however encompasses almost unlimited areas of use: Technocracy and Bureaucracy. Both word-formations apparently rely on the word "autocracy" – at least they share with the word "autocracy" (and not with similar words such as aristocracy and democracy) the stigma of powerlessness towards the over-powerful, and that not only in the sense in which all rational force of the facts limits and disempowers the individual will."


**1. Introduction**

A central issue facing contemporary policy-making field has been the set of discussions surrounding the status of administrative design of an attainable and a more democratized public policy making scheme before the challenges of contemporary political life. In the middle of the debates surrounding the democratization of policy making, this study aims to elaborate on the nexus between policy and democratization in terms of what Hannah Arendt offers, if yet, her perspective of notion of ‘good government.’ Indeed, the “very to be problematized theme” for this study has to do with the platform of the ongoing crisis of the liberal democratic political systems and its links to administrative systems and schemes.

In grasping the nature of the liberal representation crisis in relation to administrative mechanisms, two themes will be discussed respectively, the first is the issue of the relationship between the administrative and the representative processes and the question of technical rationality in modernist public policy-making. By means of handling the question of crisis of liberal democratic regimes from the point view of the one of the
most prominent names of contemporary political theory, namely, Hannah Arendt, the proposed study elucidates several fault lines between democratization and the administrative state.

From the drawn perspective, by means of concentrating on the notion of Arendt’s good government which is explained as ‘the identification and administration of tasks needed to "keep the world" is an important human endeavor that runs alongside political life that is driven by the non-instrumental values of dignity and freedom’ (Rodriguez, 1998:489), the study will elucidate the transformation of public-policy making to a more deliberative process in which citizens are transformed from partners to technocratically designed field of public policy under the hegemony of expertise knowledge with the potential of the right to participate.

The analysis will be three parts, the first of which shall elaborate on the basic Arendtian terms related to the crisis of the modernity yielding up to the crisis of liberal democratic societies including the terms of the distinction between thinking and knowing along with “three fundamental human activities labor, work, and action”. The second part will entail a discussion of Arendtian notion of ‘good government’ and the debate will evaluate on the tension between democracy and administrative state and what it entails for democratization and policy-making. Thirdly, the study shall problematize the nature of policy making in the modernity perspective with its assumptions and relate this very problematization discussion to the Arendtian notion of good government.

Finally, the study will underline the argument that Arendtian mission of ‘good government’ will have much more than to offer to understand how we can have a broader framework to comprehend the democratization of policy-making in liberal democratic societies.

2. Arendtian Perspective: Arendtian Theoretical Perspective and Tools and Problematization with Modern Liberal Democracies

In Hannah Arendt’s world, “three fundamental human activities labor, work, and action” exist. Each of activities correspond to a need or a function of human beings. “The human condition of labor is life itself… The human condition of work is worldliness… Action… corresponds to the human plurality… this plurality is specifically the condition of all political life” (Arendt, 1958:7). So Arendt bases her argument on these
three fundamental human activities and the transformation of their importance and position in time with the changing conditions.

As each of the three activities correspond to some aspects of human capacities, it is easy to understand that Arendt equates action with political life, whereby she gives examples from the ancient philosopher in order to explain the position of action within politics. She explains vita active as “a life devoted to public-political matters” (Arendt, 1958:12).

As for the first of these activities, labor is an activity which corresponds to the biological processes and necessities of human existence, the practices which are necessary for the maintenance of life itself. In other words, labor is a never-ending process and produces nothing of permanent in nature whereby labour’s efforts are quickly consumed (IEP, Hannah Arendt). For the sustainability of life the process must continuously be renewed. In this perspective humans resemble animals which Arendt expresses as “What men share with all other forms of animal life was not considered to be human” (Arendt, 1958:84).

Yet, work as a second category of human action is a distinct one. According to Arendt, as “the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not embedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species’ ever-recurring life-cycle” becomes nothing but the fabrication of an artificial world of things, artifactual constructions which endure temporally beyond the act of creation itself (SEP, Hannah Arendt). Thus, work as the second activity after labor, creates “a world distinct from anything given in nature, a world distinguished by its durability, its semi-permanence and relative independence from the individual actors and acts which call it into being” (IEP, Hannah Arendt).

The main actor in such a mode of activity for the Arendtian argumentation is the homo faber. Whether s/he be the builder of walls (both physical and cultural) dividing the human realm from that of nature, s/he will provide a stable context (a “common world”) of spaces and institutions within which human life can unfold (SEP, Hannah Arendt). The typical representatives for such homo faber would be the builder, the architect, the craftsperson, the artist and the legislator as “they create the public world both physically and institutionally by constructing buildings and making laws” (IEP, Hannah Arendt).

From the Arendtian perspective, problems pertaining to labor, economy and polis are the oikos of household’s private realm envisaged as in the Aristotelian distinction of the oikos and the polis, the public realm of the
political community. Henceforth, problems of oikos nature come to be transformed into the problems of polis, therefore bringing forth the rise of the social “by subordinating the public realm of human freedom to the concerns mere animal necessity” (IEP, Hannah Arendt). In this respect, such a framework suggests that once the economy is prioritized with the ascendency of capitalism and market economy, possible openings of meaningful political agency and the pursuit of higher ends which should be the proper concern of public life get shattered (IEP, Hannah Arendt).

Action, however, is a higher form of activity in which “humanity represents/articulates/embodies the faculty of beginning. It follows, from this equation of freedom, action and beginning that freedom is “an accessory of doing and acting; Men are free…as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same” (SEP, Hannah Arendt). This capacity for initiation gives actions the character of singularity and uniqueness, as “it is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever happened before” (IEP, Hannah Arendt).

Suffice to say, from the drawn perspective above, labor and work produce what is necessary or what is required, for instance labor provides survival and work provides a human made product whereas action is something quite different, is something free from necessities and it is the action that made men free and made ancient Greek so political. However, for Arendt, after the ancient Greek polis, the term vita activa lost its meaning and it is used to describe “all kinds of active engagement in the things of this world” (Arendt, 1958:17).

From this point on, dichotomies come into the scene in the work of Arendt. First dichotomy is between the action and contemplation. She argues that contemplation was chosen over action. According to her, from the late antiquity on, contemplation triumphs and the action remains in the background as a necessity of life. For her, in Christianity, it is easy to find the triumph of contemplation. Contemplation makes human beings distant from the world we live in, and action, on the other hand, is a great quality of human beings and the only one that separate us. Action is related to public realm and by choosing contemplation over action, human beings disappear from the public realm and thus from the politics (Arendt, 1958).

Another dichotomy, which is related to the previous one, is the eternity and immorality and it is discovered by Socrates when he understands that politics is not the higher principle (Arendt, 1958:18). For Arendt, those
who seek eternity are those who chose *vita complentativa* over *vita activa*. First, immortality is sought among human beings. In an ancient world, only human beings are mortal. All other things are immortal. For Arendt, human beings’ admire and need for immortality keep them active, in the sense that, they seek to be immortal through their writings. “By their capacity for the immortal deed, by their ability to leave nonperishable traces behind, men, their individual mortality notwithstanding, attain an immortality of their own and prove themselves to be of a "divine" nature” (Arendt, 1958:19).

It seems like that Arendt put greater importance to immortality as the idea of immortality produce action because action “creates the condition for remembrance, that is, for history” (Arendt, 1958:9). It produces something new and unexpected; it produces action. For Arendt due to the philosophical shift from *vita activa* to the *vita complentativa*, and the collapse of the Roman Empire, eternity… eternity makes the world we live in meaningless and in a sense encourages human beings not to act.

As for the distinction between public and private realm, about society and transformation of these subjects, Arendt emphasizes the uniqueness of action to human beings. She says “of all the activities necessary and present in human communities, only two were deemed to be political and to constitute what Aristotle called the *bios politicos*, namely action and speech…” (Arendt, 1958:25). After a time, action and speech became independent and speech became the instrument for persuasion and persuasion started to be understood as politics (Arendt, 1958:26).

The most important differentiation that Arendt makes is the distinction between public and private realm. Private realm is limited to the household and public realm is the political realm. Household can use violence to master his necessities in the private realm; his necessities can be satisfied through slaves or wives. In the public realm, there are no slaves and no rulers, there is no rule or to be ruled. “The polls was distinguished from the household in that it knew only equals” (Arendt, 1958:32).

Freedom is located in the political realm and in order to join this political realm, men must be the master of necessities. Necessity is seemed as something pre-political and therefore it does not have a place in the public realm which is political whereas in the private realm men can master their necessities. “No activity that served only the purpose of making a living, of sustaining only the life process, was permitted to enter political realm” (Arendt, 1958:37).
As for the public realm, two dimensions exist that she discusses, the first of which she (1958: 45-46) asserts:

“It means, first, that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For us, appearance—something that is being heard and seen by others as well as ourselves—constitutes reality. Compared with the reality which comes from being seen and heard, even the greatest forces of intimate life—the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses—lead an uncertain and shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance.”

A second dimension of public realm is, as Arendt (1958:52), explains:

“The term ‘public’ signifies the world itself, insofar as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world, however, is not identical with the earth or with nature, as the limited space for the movement of men and the general condition of organic life. It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together. To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time.”

In the light of public realm comprehension in Arendtian framework, Hannah Arendt’s critique of modern democracies starts from her understanding that the political in contemporary liberal regimes has been occluded by the social. The social corresponds to a predominance of different human understandings as colonizers nominalized as *homo faber* and *animal laborans* in the social sphere. In other words, for the modern times, Arendt argues that there is no clear cut separation of social and political in the modern world as politics becomes an instrument. “Politics is nothing but a function of society” (Arendt, 1958:33). She relates this to the increase in the private, and the rise of the society.

Private concerns become everybody’s concerns, and thus, become public. Indeed, there is no room for the action in the realm of the social. The social is the realm of labor, biological and material necessity, the reproduction of our condition of existence. In such respect, the problem with modern liberal systems renders its self as the dominance of the values of *animal laboring* and *homo faber* over the ideals of Ancient
Greece which Arendt presupposes as a reference point for the democratic tradition with critical involvement.

However, what Arendt understands from the social is a sphere in which humans engage in critical debate over problems as it did happen in Ancient Greece. Yet, such a notion is inextricably linked to the crisis of modernity in itself as accounted in her works of *The Human Condition* and *Between Past and Future* in which she is adamant in putting forth how the eclipse of tradition, religion and authority have paved the way to the modernity’s crisis characterized with problems emerging in meaning, identity, and value dimensions (Benhabib, 1996; Arendt, 1961; Arendt, 1965; IEP, Hannah Arendt). Also the reverse is valid, which is bringing all human activities into the household, namely to the private realm. Arendt explains this through analyzing feudalism. Feudal system makes it easy due to their territorial power and “feudal lord could render justice within the limits of his rule” (Arendt, 1958:34). This belonged to the public realm at first, but politics takes place now in the household.

Due to the rise of the social, there has been a change in the meaning of public, social and private. Private, in the modern understanding, became the opposite of not public but social (Arendt, 1958:38). This is due to the increase in conformism and also related to the end of “action”. Through socialization, individuals become same, conformity increases and instead of act, individuals start to behave in a mechanical way. From this point, one can infer that thinking loses its meaning and everything became single.

In Arendtian discussion of the occlusion of the private by the social, Arendt elaborates on the action and its plurality. There are many ways of action but there is one way of conforming, conforming the majority. It is easy to correlate this with the majoritarian democracy and pluralist democracy. Majoritarian democracy dictates the norms of democracy whereas in pluralist view of democracy, debates are taken place, arguments are made and opinions are discussed. When there is rise of socialization of human beings based on modern equality, it is hard to act but conform. Thus, pluralist view of democracy, where democracy finds its meaning, disappears (Arendt, 1953; Arendt, 1971).

Like her predecessor, Weber, Arendt sees the crisis inherent with the modernity as the loss of the world in which Arendt sees from the perspective of the restriction or elimination of the public sphere of action and speech in favor of the private world of introspection and the private pursuit of economic interests (Benhabib, 1996). In such regard, mass
society becomes the base of modernity which witnesses the predominance of the social thanks to the liberal distinction between the private and the public highlighted with the victory of animal laborans over homo faber and the classical conception of man as zoon politikon.

In this new era, modernity becomes a setting which bureaucratic labor and anonymous labor assume hegemony without resorting the notions of politics and action and in this perspective, they rather solely depend upon the elite domination and the manipulation of public opinion. Indeed in the modern Occidental historical era, namely in the twentieth century, modern states happen to utilize more and more terror and violence as an end relative to their predecessors which used terror and violence as only means. The catastrophic experiences of Nazism and Stalinism become two horrific eras which history transforms itself into fabric of actions and events with emphasis on terms such as homogeneity and conformity, thereby leaving no room to plurality and freedom (Arendt, 1963; Arendt, 1951).

The rise of the social is linked to development of capitalist development characterized by marketing economy which realized the increasing accumulation of capital and social wealth. The very process related to the rise of the social makes everything an object of production and consumption, relating each and every part of life as a matter of acquisition and exchange while the lateral stages of the expansion of the market economy paved way to the blurring of the distinction between the private and the public. The result of such a process brings the dominance of values of life, productivity and abundance over values such as durability stability, permanence of the world of homo faber along with values inclusive of solidarity, plurality, freedom that are attached to the world of action and speech. Therefore, the victory of animal laborans triumph the values of labor over those of homo faber and zoon politikon.

As the social realm lacks a forum for action and speech, modern democracies experience a dominance of process and a dearth of meaning. Given the Arendtian account, this becomes more and more concrete as the system overemphasizes productive capacities of animal laborans and homo faber. In this very setting there is no place for contemplation but calculative and strategic calculations of capacity and demand are always on the agenda, putting forth the need to redeem the productive capacity. From this perspective, Arendt argues, “economics… could achieve a
scientific character only when men had become social beings and unanimously followed certain patterns of behavior” (Arendt, 1958:42).

It means conformity put economy to the shelf of science. As action is replaced with behavior, and behaviors become more similar than ever, human beings start to be predictable in a sense due to the conformity. There is also a part explaining the absurdness of political economy and it is also an interesting evaluation.

Arendt argues that there cannot be such thing as political economy as economy belongs to the private realm, it belongs to the household and therefore political economy is oxymoron in a sense. Arendt also adds that “Economic growth may one day turn out to be a curse rather than a good, and under no conditions can it either lead into freedom or constitute a proof for its existence” (Arendt, 1972:219). In addition to the relationship between economics and freedom, Arendt (1963, ch.6) remarks:

“When we were told that by freedom we understood free enterprise, we did very little to dispel this monstrous falsehood. Wealth and economic well-being, we have asserted, are the fruits of freedom, while we should have been the first to know that this kind of happiness has been an unmixed blessing only in this country, and it is a minor blessing compared with the truly political freedoms, such as freedom of speech and thought, of assembly and association, even under the best conditions”

3. Arendtian Good Government as an Indispensable Way of ‘Housekeeping The World’

In Arendtian cosmos, the thinker, first and foremost, differentiates government and administration. The term 'administration' becomes rather something that the former will disintegrate government into which it can disintegrate. In such regard, Arendt argues that “a complete victory of society will always produce some sort of ‘communistic fiction,’ whose outstanding political characteristic is that it is indeed ruled by an ‘invisible hand’, namely, by nobody. What we traditionally call state and government gives place here to pure administration....” (Arendt, 1958: 44). The world of expertise and technical knowledge triumphs in a world when " where representatives think of themselves as experts “government has degenerated into mere administration” (Arendt, 1963: 237). The culprit of such a transformation is basically and inextricably linked to the public realm such that as she (1963:178) argues “the transformation of government into administration, or of republics into
bureaucracies, and the disastrous shrinkage of the public realm that went with it have a long and complicated history throughout the modern age. ...” In regard to the definition of bureaucracy she rather remarks “bureaucracy is the form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act” (Arendt, 1963:178).

In the aftermath of these reservations, Arendtian ‘good government’ notion refers to an administration that shall, in her words, ‘keep the world’ despite her basic identification of the term that may be located on a continuum of totalitarian government styles with centralized administration of the modern times, thereby negatively affecting status of action. The term is, in this aspect, irritant and serves as an important counterpart to the notion of political action. The question to pose is what kind of relationship is conceivable, if yet, with the administrative state characterized by expert provision of social services in a paradigm of modernist policy making (Rodriguez, 1998:489).

As noted implicitly in the previous section, in the Arendtian perspective, politics is a field that has its origins in freedom and distinctiveness while administration serves to the administration of bodily needs (Arendt, 1963). Indeed, perspectives that dominated the modernist policy making including Wilsonian ‘administration and politics dichotomy’ and Weberian ‘iron cages of bureaucratism’ have been far from grasping what sort of administration will be compatible with the administration more or less pejoratively portrayed in the Arendtian perspective as the former isolated the citizens from the field of policy-making and administration along with the latter which the domination of instrumental rationality over substantive rationality contributed to the exclusion of citizens from the body of administration (Rodriguez, 1998).

Good government for Arendt has its origins in the American Revolution with the basic comprehension that such government style recognizes both administrative action and the distinctiveness of political action (Arendt, 1965; Arendt, 1953). Henceforth, the first dimension of "good government" has its origins in the Hamiltonian notion that men are capable of establishing government from freedom and choice in other words, practical American concerns paved way to the governing arrangements which rendered the administrative tasks feasible (Arendt, 1963:157-159).

A second dimension of good government in Arendt’s thought in her own words, “ … it is the task of good government and the sign of well ordered republic to assure of their political realm’(Arendt, 1963:157), that is to
say political actors when they act in association become obstacles with many challenges to the administration, the authority of instrumental imperatives. The basic motive behind such this lies in the fact that political actors in question act with sense of freedom. This love for the freedom contrasts with the trajectory of a purely instrumental rationality of public policy. Therefore, political actors do not perform well with daily administrative tasks schemes (Rodriguez, 1998).

For the Arendtian understanding, the XXth century witnesses the inability of national governments to deal with providing civil services due to ethnic and class clashes, and, yet one more catastrophic outcome (Arendt, 1963). That outcome is the totalitarian forms of governments assuming modern planning in exchange for the notion of the government in service of people (Arendt, 1963). The problem inherent in totalitarian regimes is not per se the incapacity of fluffing provision of service to people however in Rodriguez terms “that they ruthlessly destroyed a sense of the world as the result of the shared endeavor, a repository of hopes for the future, and a place where human freedom provides a framework a potential force in the world” (Rodriguez, 1998:493). In such respect, once totalitarian regimes assume office, the first deprivation emerges in the deprivation of fundamental human rights which subsequently brings forth the deprivation of a possible world emphasizing and underlining the role of opinions and actions in a more effective sense (Rodriguez, 1998).

Departing the basic types of human endeavors as the study discussed in the first part of the study, laboring, fabricating and actingspheres of these activities namely, life, world, and plurality come to be interlinked to the discussion of what kind of administration may serve the needs of political action. Arendt emphasizes that modernity becomes a setting in which fabrication is the basic characteristic of the new era and needs of human laborers get to be the basic reference points for the administration (Arendt, 1958). Arendt calls this process ‘nation wide housekeeping’ whereby private familial and economic concerns are transformed into objects of modernist public policy whereby she explains “In our understanding, the dividing line is entirely blurred, because we see the body of peoples and political communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping” (Arendt, 1958:28).

Henceforth, the modernist policy from an Arendtian perspective is defined in relation to the needs of life, yet, administration as a tool of housekeeping maintains that an interrelation is set up between life,
plurality and the world. Arendt’s notion of "housekeeping" becomes a necessity from the perspective of administration of things despite the fact the latter is an awful idea in her own terms “the world in which we live in has to be kept” (Arendt, 1958). However, from the modernist public policy-making perspective of "keeping the world" is a more broad term as programs that we design for the public may have their limits as the public policy programs may face opposition and refusal to the extent that they cannot embrace political aspirations of the communities and the strategic interests of different groups generalized under the political pressure (Rodriguez, 1998).

"Housekeeping" as a must function of good government, faces different challenges from the political community as citizens become passive objects in modernist policy-making. The problem of high importance for citizens is inherent in the limitations that are brought by modernist public policy designs. Adhering to the famous dichotomy of Wilson, public policy programs are considered to be technical issues at which people are not expert and are deemed to be myopic in terms of the repercussions of potential public policy programs (Rodriguez, 1998).

In this regard, the technical rationality inherent in public policy programs brings forth the domination of expert knowledge, the professionals and the proliferation of professional associations. In her own statements, this becomes more concrete while she writes that “in a not too distant future we shall be able to deal with all economic matters on technical and scientific grounds outside all political considerations” (Arendt, 1962:17).

The background of scientific progress against, which technical rationality rests upon, is also susceptible to criticism such that “the progress made by science has nothing to do with the I-will; they follow their inexorable laws, compelling us to do whatever we can regardless of consequences” (Arendt, 1963: 183). The legitimacy of administration is solely defined on the basis of specialized knowledge whereby the compartmentalization of knowledge demanded by technical rationality contributes inevitably to contextless, or timeless practices (Rodriguez, 1998). Henceforth, meaningful engagement with the larger ethical and political concerns of a society are precluded by the practice of professionalism, fed and nurtured by technical rationality. The result is inexorably the emergence of a naked public square with little or no sense of context, thereby forming the anti-political dimension of modernity (Arendt, 1954).

For Arendt, the problem related to the previous aspect discussed is also inherent in the questions of political representation and administration. It
is here quite interesting to note that liberal democratic regimes do very well in ensuring individual interests. However, good government may be less than capable in appreciating the opinions. In Arendtian perspective interests are due to arise from objective groups like ethnicity, gender and race, being a question whether individuals will pursue after the interests linked to these objective classifications. In contrast, according to Arendt, opinions are unique in the sense that their articulation through aggregate categories is impossible. It is at this point that a world emerges once opinions are formed, shared and disputed critically in public (Rodriguez, 1998).

Thinking from a policy-centric view, public policy schemes cannot create an interactive dialogue with unrepresentable and plural opinions which will not come into being until the policies get implemented. It will be argued that public policy may assume a role of high importance in dealing with opinions. Therefore, it is not solely a matter of electing representatives or legislating a jurisdiction, as a process, that can cope with the exchange of ideas and opinions with a capacity to proceed throughout the implementation. In such regard, Arendt vests a great deal of trust in opinions in terms of their capacity to reveal the reality of the world throughout the discussions of the implementation.

In this perspective, Wilsonian politics versus administration dichotomy is more problematic than the tension between political representation and administration as she derives the legitimacy of administration from its role in implementing the law in a general system which is accountable to the public opinion. Yet, Arendt defines power as a concept that “springs up whenever people act together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than any action that may follow” (Arendt, 1963:151). In this regard, Arendt thinks that such a Wilsonian notion will not be compatible with the effective exercise of the right to be a participant (Rodriguez, 1998).

Arendt also elaborates on the public deliberation mechanisms which emphasize that citizen should be actively engaged in public deliberation mechanisms as simply mere information and judgment perspectives in the application of laws and legal arrangements in regard to specific and local situations. The opening of public policy to such deliberation mechanisms has been strengthened by arguments indicating that politics may serve as a process of collective will formation followed by the criticisms that non representative and partial interests may hinder the policy formation and implementation. According to Arendt deliberation mechanisms surrounding public policy programs have been more than problematic.
She reasons this by stating that such schemes are designed under the orthodoxy of Wilsonian politics and administration dichotomy coupled yet with another problematization “which comes before and after a procedurally correct decision” (Rodriguez, 1998).

To sum up, the focus in the Arendtian perspective is, therefore, rather shifted from the question of representation in the public policy making to the exchange of opinions and judgment in the phases of public policy implementation. Henceforth, one is suggested s/he consider the role of political action not only in the processes of public policy but also in the concrete ramifications of such designs in the real world.

4. Problematizing Public Policy From an Arendtian Perpective

The classical definition of grasping policy in its classical sense as Titmuss indicates: "...the principles that govern action directed towards given ends. The concept denotes action about means as well as ends and therefore, implies change... [it] is only meaningful if we...believe that we can effect change in some form or another" (Titmuss, 1974:23-24), may prove out to more problematic than for Arendt. Indeed such a classical understanding will indicate a matter of means and ends and the relationship within the terms of the administrative state understanding and bureaucratic mentality.

According to Colebatch, there are several aspects attached to the notion of public policy term that emerge out of three axiomatic characteristics of the modern human world. Accordingly these are namely: "instrumentality (the assumption that all organizations are goal-oriented); hierarchy (the assumption that government works in a ‘top-down’ fashion); and coherence (the assumption that everything fits together into some kind of system)"(Colebatch, 2002 as summarized by Jenkins, 2005).

Given the axioms of the policy understanding, in line with the Arendtian terms, policy becomes a theme about order, authority and expertise (Hill, 1993; Hill, 1997). Henceforth, policy as a tool of administration and notion of good government may very well contribute "creating order, avoiding ‘arbitrary and capricious’ decision-making, and constraining possible courses of action" (Jenkins, 2005:6), along with the understanding of the Wilsonian distinction in which policy is deemed to rest in legitimate authority notwithstanding nature of its delegated and indirect character.
In the light of the nature of policy as a tool of administrative nature based on expertise - 'expert knowledge', the policy might still have new openings for the notion of 'good government'. The task is no easy one. The term policy along with the Arendtian notion of 'good government' may still be broad with implicit characteristics in terms of their scope as they tend to be embedded "in multi-stranded ongoing processes and many different contexts" (Jenkins, 2005).

In terms of policy design, it still remains within the instrumental rationality of instrumental action, as "policy may be at least as much about producing an appearance of coherence and order, as actual coherence and order; simply ‘having a policy’ may be the most important thing in any given social setting or field " (Jenkins,2005). Along with the process, according to Hill, policy serves as an _ex post facto_ rationalization of emergent trends and practices. However, there may be times when policy may be interrelated with no decisions indicating silences as well as statements (Hill,1993).

In spite of the potential drawbacks, Arendtian notion of good government may facilitate an understanding of the term policy as "a process of representation, and of the production and reproduction of meaning." In this regard, these representations can be set up and interrogated locally in parallel with the articulation between national and local representations and frameworks of meaning coupled with the course of action. Moreover, if policy processes are, designed and deemed as a matter of the relationship as a doctrine of administrative state, good government on the very notion courses of action shall not have much to say for the process. Within this perspective, right to be a participant throughout all the stages of public policy making is essentially important to comprehend what people say and what they do.

Arendtian notion of action and plurality is also an important tool for the design of public policy designed for "good government." Therefore, emphasis on liberal insistence on representation is shifted to participation. In other words, policy becomes an important process whereby the right to be a participant is continuously recognized -the need for plurality and the expression of opinions. Policy designs therefore should give access to the opinions into the processes that policy formulation and implementation are thoroughly implicated in each other. The interaction will be the _basic modus vivendi_ for such a public policy design through tools of interpretation, resource allocation, evasion, subversion, and so on.
5. Concluding Remarks

Questions in relation to the public policy making in modern liberal democratic systems inevitably affect the contemporary times. It is the view of the present work that Arendtian notion of good government is important to diagnose certain tensions inherent in the public policy schemes. These challenges, whether the problematization in regard to administration and participation in administration or other problems of instrumental/technical rationality modernist public policy-making paradigms, can be offered remedies by Arendtian reading of the tensions that has been shaped by Wilsonian and Weberian perspectives.

Arendt’s basic point of reference becomes opinion to what extent good government that incorporates opinion gets to be a criterion, henceforth the distinction between political and administrative will be not of relation to functions before and after a procedurally correct decision. In this regard opinions are the kernels of political action that have their roots in freedom and human distinctiveness reflecting the world characterized by plurality. It is in this perspective that public policy mechanisms are emphasized to be more sensitive to the opinions in a substantial sense, not in a procedural and rational sense to grasp an incorporation of opinions as they may not solely be directed at actions centering on policy.

In the dynamic character of opinion more or less defined around the notion of political action, Wilsonian classical politics-administration dichotomy paradigm does not offer a valid and practical framework with its insistence that political comes first, and then the administration. There may be a wide array of circumstances that the vice versa might bevalid or it does not mean that what is political of nature and what is of administration may proceed together.

Notwithstanding the point that we have made, Arendt remains realist when she considers both the political and the administrative sides of the notion of good government, thereby indicating, the administrative side of good government is in an attempt of expansion, continuously contracting the political. Arendt does not fail to realize that alongside with increasing human welfare, a good government notion public policy scheme should be missioned with the task of creating more and more possibilities for the political action to emerge.

Yet, in liberal democratic regimes characterized by constitutional and administrative state, separation of powers brings forth several challenges. Governments get to carry out certain administrative functions, which jeopardize the effective right to be a participator for citizens. It is rather at
this very point that public policy schemes get transformed into objects within the fields of the practices of the tyranny of expertise knowledge. The discontent of Arendtian analysis of administrative state, Therefore, lays at this very point that citizens no longer become participators yet rather passive audience or incorporated agents consenting at the voter ballot boxes. Arendt does not have assertive means to get out of such a cul de sac but is rather content with the notion of ‘keeping the world’.

In a world less and less characterized by plurality, public policy making as a sub-discipline of public administration should look for new paths to develop the schemes that will facilitate the participation right. It is important, once again, to underline the fact that the very task before the challenges of liberal democratic systems' policy making perspective, namely representation and participation, is no easy, rather requiring a mentality revolution. The 20th Century has been an era of scientific rationality and progress which targeted to attain more welfare, yet these progressive achievements have brought forth other dilemmas to the social world that has been deprived of the opinions. From the perspective drawn in the study, democratization and policy sciences will need to meet the challenge of strengthening participation right

References


