THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE ANNAN PLAN: WHY ONE MORE FAILURE?

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the ongoing conflict on Cyprus between Greek and Turkish ethnic groups in conjunction with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s peace plan and discusses why the plan failed to produce a mutually-accepted solution. The study first portrays a comprehensive analysis of the issue, reviewing both internal and external dynamics of the conflict. Following that Annan’s peace efforts, in general, and his plan, in particular, were evaluated and criticized. In this regard, the plan’s failure is attributed to Annan’s strategic mistakes and more important, his plan’s failure to capture the relational dimensions of the conflict. Based on the critiques, the direction that future peace efforts ought to follow is also addressed.

INTRODUCTION

Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, has witnessed an intermittently-bloody conflict since the latter part of the twentieth century. The birthplace of Aphrodite, the goddess of love, turned into a battle ground between Greek (about 76 percent) and Turkish (about 20 percent) ethnic groups. Hundreds died and thousands became refugees. Despite various efforts by third-parties, no solution has been achieved to date.

From an international perspective, the Cyprus conflict somehow needs to be resolved. In its over forty-year stalemate, the conflict not only weakens the credibility of the international community to deal with intra-state conflicts, which have gradually replaced the Cold War’s ideological clashes as the principal sources of post-Cold War conflicts but also intensifies the pessimistic belief that two ethnic communities cannot co-exist under a single state, which does not fit the optimistic agenda of the “new world order” of the 21st century.

In this respect, Cyprus is particularly seen by the United Nations (UN) as the “laboratory” for the new world order. If resolution succeeds, the Cypriot state would be the model to which many other nations and peoples will look to guide the resolution of their own conflicts and ethnic tensions. For this reason, the UN has always given a special importance and priority to the Cyprus problem, and UN Secretary Generals put great efforts to resolve the issue.

Albeit well-intended, most UN efforts, however, have failed to capture the realities of Cyprus and hence, the utility of peace efforts remained limited. The purpose of this article is to analyze the conflict in a comprehensive way and discuss recent peace efforts by the UN, specifically the so-called Annan
Plan, in order to illustrate the gap between the intricacy of the Cyprus issue and simplicity of the UN initiatives. The ultimate aim is to balance the sources of and appropriate responses to the conflict to help determine the direction of future peace efforts on the island by the international community.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

Due to its strategic position on the main routes between Europe and Asia, Cyprus has long been the focus of political conflict. It was invaded, bought and sold, and transferred from one ruler to another without the inhabitants ever being consulted. The occupying forces can be listed as the Assyrians (707-650), Egyptians (570-546), Persians (546-333), Ptolemies (320s-58), Romans (58 BC-330 AD), and Venetians (1489-1571).

Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1571. Under the Venetians, from whom the Ottoman Turks took over the island, the island’s population had dwindled to little more than 200,000, consisting almost entirely of Greek-speaking people. After the conquest, about 30,000 Turks were sent in from the mainland in order to form a Turkish element in the population.

Ottoman rule continued until 1878 and during that period, there was no overt conflict between the Turks and Greeks of the island. Rather, the Ottoman authority abolished feudalism and serfdom, terminating the Latin persecution of the Greek-speaking Christians as well. The Ottomans also officially recognized the Greek Orthodox Church as an autocephalous, self-governing Archbishopric. The Greek Cypriots enjoyed self-government, mainly through the church, which regulated their social, educational and religious affairs. To many analysts, this system, indeed, fortified the cohesion of the ethnic Greek population (Necatigil, 1982: 1-2).

In 1878, the Ottomans “leased” Cyprus to the British with the understanding that the British would help the Ottomans’ defense against the Russians. When the Ottomans joined the Central Powers in World War I, however, Britain unilaterally annexed the island (1914) and British rule was formally recognized by the Turkish government in 1923, with the Treaty of Lousanne.

Under British rule, particularly in the period after 1931, the Greek Cypriot movement for enosis (union with Greece) became the dominant influence in the political life of the island. Initially, the Turkish Cypriots reacted to the enosis campaign with anti-union pronouncements and demonstrations. As the British signaled their departure in the 1950s, however, they began pursuing taksim, the division of the island between the two communities.

In the mid-1950s, terrorism prevailed on Cyprus after a Greek underground organization, the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants), was formed to work for enosis. The Turkish Cypriots, in turn, formed their own underground organization, namely Volkan, which was later replaced by the better-led TMT (Turkish Defense Organization).

In February 1959, in the midst of inter-communal violence, Britain, Greece and Turkey, all NATO members, came together in Zurich to find a solution to the issue. This was mainly done, among other concerns, to preserve the unity of NATO against a possible Soviet attack under the threatening climate of the Cold War. (As Robert H. Stephens astutely observed, “the outlook was black not only on the island but internationally. Khrushchev, flushed with the success of Russia’s first Sputnik, was putting pressure on the Western powers over Berlin. There was a call from Washington for a closing of the ranks in NATO to meet the new Soviet threat. Cyprus was drifting into a civil war which threatened to involve Britain, Greece, and Turkey—all NATO members—in deepening conflict. All of the parties concerned found they had reasons for considering a compromise” (Stephens, 1996: 175)). The negotiators rejected enosis or taksim, and instead found another formula. That was to create an independent Cyprus.

Accordingly, on August 16, 1960, the Republic of Cyprus came into existence as a compromise between the Greek demand for enosis and Turkish counter-demand for taksim. It is an irony that when the Cypriot state was set up, the consent of the Cypriots was not actually considered. In fact, the state was formed rather against the will of the Greek and Turkish communities, who were in fight and who showed no urge to live under a common state. Under this climate, it was already too optimistic to evaluate the Cypriot state as a solid, durable Republic.

As expected, shortly after independence, serious problems began to arise between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the interpretation of the constitution, which was also shaped by the three outside powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey (It was decided that the president would be a Greek
Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot, and that there would be a Council of Ministers (7 Greeks, 3 Turks) and a House of Representatives (70 percent Greek, 30 percent Turkish) elected by a universal suffrage for a term of five years.). Successive constitutional crises paralyzed the government and eventually spilled over into inter-communal fighting. In 1963, three years after the establishment of the Republic, large-scale violence broke out and the “reluctant state of Cyprus” (See, Xydis, 1973) de facto collapsed. A buffer zone marked by “the green line” was drawn between the opposing groups, and in 1964, UN peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) were sent in, most of which still remain there.

In July 1974, the National Guard of Greek Cypriots, with the support of Greek military regime governing Greece since 1967, staged a successful coup. The common plan was to realize enosis. President Makarios fled to London and Nikos Sampson, a former EOKA member, pro-claimed himself new President. Fearing of enosis, Turkey militarily intervened immediately and justified its action based on its guarantor-state status, which was – and still is- actually the case according to Zurich and London agreements of 1959, 1960. The Turkish forces seized about 38 percent of the island’s territory, dividing the island into two as well: southern section is Greek, northern section is Turkish, a status that has been continuing to date.

Following the Turkish intervention, there were numerous efforts to negotiate a new state structure between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with the assistance of Dr. Kurt Waldheim, former UN Secretary General, but none succeeded. The Turkish side demanded a Greek-Turkish bi-regional federation with strong regional governments, whereas the Greek side favored a multi-regional or cantonal federation with a strong federal government.

With the talks ended without solution, on February 13, 1975, a “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC) was proclaimed in the northern part of the island. Greece protested this move and denounced it as a threat to peace, while Turkey recognized it. Afterwards, inter-communal talks were resumed and continued throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, but as in the earlier efforts, no agreement was reached.

On November 15, 1983, the TFSC made a unilateral declaration of independence as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). Like the TFSC, the TRNC was recognized only by Turkey and in April 1984, full diplomatic ties were established between the two countries.

Since then, further efforts have been made, some of which with the help of third-parties. Especially important was former UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “set of ideas”, which, at least, motivated the parties to initiate more serious efforts to work on a solution, whereby several summit meetings were actually arranged between the Cypriot leaderships.

As known, the latest, and perhaps the most popular effort, is present UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s peace plan. This plan generated great hopes for the international community as it received a certain degree of support from the Cypriot communities, as well as Athens and Ankara. It also succeeded in arranging a referendum on April 24, 2004 between the parties for the first time. But the result of the referendum was not positive as the majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan. At present, the stalemate continues although negotiations intermittently go on between the Cypriot leaderships (For further and latest information about the history of the Cyprus conflict, see Hannay (2005) and Kızilyürek (2005).)

THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT: CAPTURING ITS COMPLEXITY

Most studies of the Cyprus conflict have a tendency to portray the problem from the perspective of a single, dominant cause, which would be, for instance, the stubbornness of the leaders on both sides, differing political opinions, the need to keep a balance of power, outside interventions, or widening economic gap between the communities. These factors may negatively affect the conflict, but such “real world” issues do not really explain the emotional refusal of the Greeks and Turks to enjoy togetherness.

A more comprehensive analysis of the problem calls for a holistic view and in this respect, a need arises to examine both internal and external dynamics of the issue simultaneously. Without capturing this complexity, it would not be possible to understand the conflict in a correct way, and thus to be creative on the way to finding a durable solution.

Internal Dimension

As far as internal dimension is concerned, the essence of the collapse of the Cypriot state shortly
after independence can be tied to the absence of Cypriot identity. A state can survive provided that the majority supports the state authority. In this regard, a solid state reflects, or should reflect, the majority’s social identity. The social identity in question here does not necessarily refer to ethnicity, or narrowly-defined, blood-based identity. But somehow, there must be a common sense of togetherness widely shared by the public.

In the case of Cyprus, however, the state, as summarized above, was created by outside powers without a Cypriot identity supporting it. There were Greek and Turkish people, other than Cypriots, who historically identified themselves with motherland nations. Hence, the very foundation of the Cypriot state was fragile, in fact, hollow.

The question arising in this respect is: Why was there no Cypriot identity at the time of independence? The two communities had lived together for almost four centuries, and from an objective viewpoint, that was an enough time for formation of a local, common identity. Why didn’t this happen then?

Roughly speaking, a Cypriot identity failed to develop for four reasons.

First, Greek and Turkish Cypriots differ from one another along lines with ethnic origin, religion, and language. Greek Cypriots are Orthodox Christians and speak Greek. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, are Muslims and speak Turkish. Only a small minority of the Cypriot population has a working knowledge of both Greek and Turkish. This, combined with their different religious affiliation, gave rise to a low level of interaction between the two communities from the beginning of togetherness and helped reinforce ethnic separateness for centuries.

Second, the political system during Ottoman rule also encouraged ethnic separation. Under the millet system, the Greek and Turkish communities were institutionalized as distinct cemaats (communities), exercising separate rights, electing their own judicial and administrative officials. This exclusive political socialization over a long period of time contributed to the crystallization of separate ethnic identities and aspirations.

Third, as an extension of the millet system, each community set up its own system of education conducted in its own language. Educational programs were mainly transferred from the motherlands and members of both communities learned each other as historic enemies. Similarly, limited opportunities for higher education on the island led the Cypriot youth to go to motherland universities. This way, the young minds were also negatively affected by the stereotypes that the Greeks held for the Turks and the Turks held for the Greeks alike (For example, in November 1989, PIAR and ICAP, two major public relations firms from Turkey and Greece, respectively, carried out a joint poll in order to measure the public views. As expected, they found that both sides mistrust each other, with 81 percent of the Greeks and 73 percent of the Turks suspicious of the other (Quoted from Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1989: 167).)

Finally, such separation was reinforced by the traditional tendency of the Greek and Turkish communities to identify themselves with larger Greek and Turkish nations. This meant that the two communities’ perceptions of each other and their relations with each other were greatly influenced by the historically adversarial relations between larger Greek and Turkish nations. Although not all disputes between the motherland Greeks and Turks were replicated in inter-communal violence on Cyprus, they, nevertheless, had the impact of perpetuating separate self-views and inhibiting any disposition to Cypriot national identity (Volkan, 1989).

In sum, throughout the colonial rule, it was hardly possible to talk about a distinct Cypriot identity. Few, if any, Cypriots felt and considered themselves as Cypriots. The ethnic separateness of the two communities determined, in large measure, the pattern of their settlement on the island. They lived mostly in separate quarters in towns and mixed villages, and most villages were either entirely Greek or entirely Turkish.

But nonetheless, most historical accounts indicate that the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus co-existed relatively peacefully during the most colonial period. The event with the greatest consequence for both communities was the start of the Greek Cypriot movement for enosis. Though potentially existed, the national consciousness of Turkish Cypriots grew in direct proportion to the rise of the Greek Cypriot national consciousness. As Greek Cypriots intensified the struggle for union with Greece, Turkish Cypriots began feeling more nationalistic, declaring their own ethnic interests and aspirations (Markides, 1977: 23). As long as Turkish Cypriots were confident that the British were determined to remain on the island indefinitely, they might have limited their political activism to reminding the governor of their loyalty to the colonial status quo and their opposition to enosis. But when the enosis movement took a more
activist turn beginning in the late 1940s and there were signs that enosis could become reality through the armed campaigns of the EOKA, the Turks launched their own militant opposition through clandestine operations, such as the creation of Volkan and TMT.

Accordingly, Greek Cypriot agitation for union with Greece, and Turkish Cypriot opposition to it created periods of tension and eventually turned into a violent fight from the mid-1950s onward. The Republic of Cyprus came into existence under this climate as a reluctant state. Although its birth stopped inter-communal violence for a while, mutual hostility and suspicions continued. While Turkish Cypriots believed that Greek Cypriots would never give up their aim to unite the island with Greece, Greek Cypriots were similarly unconvinced that their compatriots had abandoned plans to partition the island. Indeed, there were inflammatory speeches from both sides reinforcing mutual suspicions. For instance, on September 4, 1962, President Makarios said: “Enosis did not die. Unless this small Turkish community, forming a part of the Turkish race, which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism, is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated” (Quoted from Volkan, 1989: 19).

Likewise, two months before the December 1963 constitutional breakdown, a popular Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Halkin Sesi, wrote: “Whether the Greeks want or not, Cyprus will one day be partitioned and then they will realize who is really dreaming” (Quoted from Markides, 1977: 27).

Difficulties in implementing the constitution only triggered the very existing tension and in 1963, again large-scale violence broke out. The period between 1963 and 1974 can be described as the period of Turkish side’s suffering. The Turkish Cypriots were forced to live enclaves on their own and during that period, they controlled no more than 5 percent of the island’s territory, whereas they had owned about 35 percent at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey’s intervention in 1974 ended Turkish suffering but initiated the suffering of the other side. As the northern part of the island was seized by the Turkish military, about 180,000 Cypriot Greeks became refugees, fleeing to the south. Also, approximately 6,000 Greeks and 2,500 Turks died in the Turkish military action. These events undoubtedly exacerbated the psychological barriers between the Cypriot communities.

Since 1974, there has been no large-scale inter-communal violence on the island, for the two communities are physically separated. For the Greek Cypriots, the present status quo is politically unacceptable because 20 percent of the population controls 38 percent of the island’s territory without allowing access to Greek entry and because the declaration of independence on the Turkish side in 1983 is illegal, emotionally unacceptable because the island was a “Hellenic island” and must remain so, and finally economically unacceptable because northern section has more fertile soil and richer minerals compared to southern section. For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, a tightly united Cyprus means Greek domination over the Turks, and hence unequal treatment. The dominant group wish on the Turkish side is not to be a minority but a separate community which should have all the legal, political, and economic privileges the Greek Cypriots have.

**External Dimension**

Cyprus is also an arena in which broader Greek and Turkish nationalism operates and clashes. That is, the conflict is not just between the Cypriot communities, but between Greece and Turkey, or Greeks and Turks at large, as well. Both nations have brought their past grievances and ideals to the Cyprus problem. The island simply became the “latest encounter” (See, Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994).

The origin of Greek-Turkish hostility goes back to the fall of Byzantine Empire by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. The Greeks could not forget their lost Empire and maintained a strong wish to restore it for centuries. This gradually turned into an irredentist political ideology in the nineteenth century, known as the megali idea (great idea). Greece gained its independence from the Ottomans in 1830 and began to expand almost immediately, mostly toward north and the Balkans. By the end of the nineteenth century, it well doubled its territory. It also gained Crete in 1905 and most Aegean islands during the Balkan Wars (1912-13). Greek invasion toward Western Anatolia began in 1919, following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. But it was not successful and ended with a defeat in 1922.

Following this unsuccessful attempt, Greece turned its eyes to Cyprus and at least wanted to re-gain this “historically-Hellenic island”. To be sure, the Greek Cypriot movement for enosis was actively supported and sometimes even directed by Greece, particularly from the 1950s onwards. Initially, Greece was careful to avoid any overt confrontation with the British. In the early 1920s, a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus was
formulated by the famous Greek leader Eleftherios Venizelos. But at the societal level, there were many organizations working for enosis, such as the Cyprus Central Committee whose motto was “long live Greek Cyprus”, the Cypriot Students Brotherhood, the Society of Friends of Cyprus and the Cyprus National Bureau (Panteli, 1984: 156-157).

As the British administration weakened following World War II, however, Greece politically began its involvement. The policy of non-interference was gradually replaced by informal calls for enosis. Eventually, in 1954, Greece made its intention known and brought the Cyprus issue to the UN, within the principle of self-determination. But it failed to receive any positive result. Afterwards, a Greek army colonel, George Grivas, formed the EOKA to achieve enosis through violent means and exercised terrorist activities throughout the late 1950s and afterwards.

Greece’s involvement also continued after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. For instance, in 1963, nearly 12,000 Greek troops landed in Cyprus to help Greek Cypriots to deter what they called “Turkish aggression”. Similarly, the successful coup of 1974 was directly engineered by Athens to realize enosis.

On the other hand, Turkey, too, involved into the Cyprus issue. During British rule, Turkey initially did not challenge the status of the island and accepted British rule as a reality, for the primary concern of Turkey, following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, was economic and social reconstruction. But as the British signaled their departure in the late 1950s, Turkey actively involved into the problem and tried to prevent enosis. It did so through supporting Turkish Cypriot underground organizations, Volkan and TMT, and later seizing northern Cyprus in response to the Greek-engineered military coup of 1974.

What lies behind Turkey’s interest on the island?

First of all, from a historical and legal standpoint, Turkey claims a special interest on Cyprus due to the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1878, whereby Turkey voluntarily relinquished its administration of the island to Britain, and the Treaty of Lousanne in 1923, when full sovereignty devolved onto Britain. Therefore, Turkey, at times, insisted that the Cyprus problem was of concern only between Turkey and Britain.

Legal and historical points aside, Turkey’s main interest on Cyprus can be said to be strategic. Due to its position overlooking the southern ports of Anatolia, the island controls Turkey’s vital strategic approaches and is consequently of fundamental importance to her security. Already feeling hemmed in by Greek islands in the Aegean, the Turks feel that Greece’s sovereignty over Cyprus would enable it to control access to their southern ports of Mersin and İskenderun, and thereby completing Turkey’s encirclement.

Finally, Turkey also concerns that under Greek rule, Turkish community would be treated poorly, much as the Thrace Turks have been in Greece. Hence, for Turkey, the best for the Turkish Cypriots is to be a separate political entity, supported by the motherland.

Consequently, both Greece and Turkey have become part of the Cyprus conflict. By keeping alive and even exacerbating their mutual suspicions, the two countries make a rapprochement over the Cyprus issue all the more problematic when other issues crop up. In theory, Greek and Turkish Cypriots can reach a political settlement. In reality, it is difficult to envision such an outcome without the supportive involvement of Athens and Ankara.

SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION: A CRITIQUE OF ANNAN’S PEACE EFFORTS

Given the complex interplay between internal and external dynamics summarized above, it must be understood that a quick resolution to the Cyprus conflict is neither possible nor desirable. The conflict is not simply a conflict of substantive issues, such as territory, refugees, etc., but mostly a conflict of mistrust, fear and suspicions, rooted in historical hostilities.

But on the other hand, despite its complexity and difficulty, the Cyprus conflict somehow needs to be resolved. The present situation, the divided status of the island, does not fit the agenda of global politics. It provides a negative example for growing secessionist movements around the world. Nor is the idea of double enosis, the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey, which was actually proposed by the United States as an option in the 1960s, politically acceptable. It creates emotional problems for Greek Cypriots, who still harbor a wish to “own” the whole island, as well as for Turkish Cypriots, who have over thirty years’ experience in running their own lives and businesses as a separate community.
A settlement can be reached in one of the two ways: Either the two communities themselves will reach an understanding or the international community will devise and impose a solution. The latter has actually been tried before, in the 1959 and 1960 Zurich-London Agreements, of which Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain were a part. That solution did not last. Although some scholars showed the quality of the agreements as the principal source of their failure (i.e., the agreements were too rigid, too much in favor of the Turkish community — Hampson, 1996: 540), it was indeed not the content of the agreements, but the very imposed nature of them that mainly bought about their downfall. As discussed earlier, both Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks basically viewed the Zurich-London agreements as the denial of their national aspirations, enosis and taksim, respectively.

Thus, perhaps the best solution will be the one found directly by the parties themselves. Yet the major difficulty affecting policy making for years has been each side’s conviction that the other side has irredentist ambitions. The mutual fear of becoming victim again, being attacked one more time by the other side, perpetuates a hostile vigilance and an unwillingness to take risk. It is for this reason that intervention by third-party groups is essential if the cycle of mutual hostility is to be interrupted, and subsequently the conflict is to be carried forward.

But who should be the right third-party, or parties?

It might be thought that the United States (US), much more than any other third-party, can particularly be helpful, since it is the only power that has considerable influence over the four key players: the two Cypriot communities, as well as Athens and Ankara. Indeed, the US did intervene in the conflict as a mediator from time to time. For instance, in the aftermath of the Dayton Accords, former assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke proclaimed that 1996 would be the year of the Cyprus settlement, working actually vigorously on the issue (See, Peacework 17, 1997). Later, in April 1998, he made another attempt, albeit without a positive result. Since then, the US has provided diplomatic support, either directly or via the UN, for a solution. However, in the eyes of most Cypriot Turks, the US, regardless of which party actually occupies the White House, is an agent of the Greek lobby (and thus the Greek government), which pushes for a Cyprus settlement only for domestic political reasons. Therefore, the US should be careful in pushing for an agreement, although it may help the parties to communicate and improve their relationships (passive mediation role).

The European Union (EU) would be another option. In fact, this organization appears poised to play a larger role in the conflict by constantly encouraging the Cypriot parties to negotiate. But because Greece and now Greek Cypriots are members of that body, while Turkey and Turkish Cypriots are not, most Turkish Cypriots believe that the EU cannot play an impartial role. Hence, whether the European organization can overcome the serious perception of bias held by the Turks is also uncertain.

Needless to say, Greece and Turkey cannot function as third-parties, since both countries are parts of the issue.

The elimination of these options would perhaps leave the UN as the potentially most helpful third-party in the overall peace process. Though this institution is routinely disparaged and derided, it is, nevertheless, the only institution that can play an impartial third-party role. As the supposed guardian of international peace and security, the UN is less likely than states to exploit the conflict. In fact, UN secretary generals periodically worked in the past to put Cyprus together again. Particularly, Dr. Boutros-Ghali made great efforts and managed to arrange several summit meeting between the Cypriot leaders. Although repeated UN efforts did not result in a mutually acceptable solution, they, nonetheless, helped the parties to narrow their differences to a certain extent.

Among the UN efforts, present Secretary General Kofi Annan’s plan has become particularly significant. Annan was determined to solve the long-lasting Cyprus problem and worked vigorously to that end, eventually coming up with a detailed peace plan. The original plan, first presented on November 11, 2002, actually changed three times in accord with the parties’ objections in 2003, 2004 and a final version (March 31, 2004) was taken to a referendum on 24 April, 2004 (For full text of the Annan Plan, visit http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org). In determining the future of Cyprus, the people’s opinion, other than the politicians’, was taken into account most seriously with this plan and that itself was a revolutionary change. But contrary to the expectations, the result of the referendum was not positive, as the Turkish Cypriots said “yes” but Greek Cypriots said “no”. For sure, this result was emotionally shocking for the international community.
But what went wrong? Before the referendum, it had been largely believed that Annan’s plan was a fair plan, indeed, the most sophisticated one by that time, and when the people of Cyprus were asked, they would accept it. So why was the result negative?

The answer to that vital question lies in Annan’s strategic mistakes, as well as his plan’s under analysis of the conflict.

First of all, Annan made a strategic mistake, as a third-party, by forming the plan by himself and his foreign consultants, without consulting, or consulting adequately, with the Cypriot leaders and communities. No matter how good it is, no third-party can understand, and feel, a conflict as much as the parties themselves. The intention may be good and third-party’s data collection may be excellent. But still, a third-party is an outsider, hence, it cannot be as creative as the parties, the insiders.

Contemporary studies of mediation (i.e., Zartman and Touval, 1996; Moore, 2003) reveal that in order to be effective, mediators use basically three modes to accomplish their purposes—communication, formulation, and manipulation, in that order.

When conflict has made direct contact between the parties impossible, thereby preventing them from talking to each other and from making concession without appearing weak or loosing face, the mediator can serve as communicator. In this situation, it simply acts as a conduit, opening contacts and carrying messages. This role is completely passive, with no substantive contribution by the mediator.

The second mode of mediation requires the mediator to enter into the substance of the negotiation. Since a conflict may not only impede communications between parties, but be so encompassing that it prevents them from conceiving ways out of the dispute, the parties need a mediator as formulator too. Formulas are the key to a negotiated solution, for they provide a common understanding of the problem. In this case, the mediator also leans on the parties to adopt its perceptions of ways out.

The third modes requires the mediator to act as a manipulator. Here the mediator assumes the maximum degree of involvement, becoming a party to the solution. As a manipulator, the mediator uses its power to bring the parties to an agreement, pushing and pulling them away from conflict into resolution.

Given this framework, it is clear that instead of following these steps in order and starting as a communicator at first, Annan worked particularly as a formulator from the very beginning. But since his ideal formula did not fit that of the parties, his plan was subject to frequent changes, whereby too much time was unnecessarily vested. More important, both parties looked at the plan with a great degree of suspicion and evaluated it as a tricky document, shaped by an outsider power. In the end, even the goodwill of the UN Secretary General was underestimated and the plan was taken to the referendum rather reluctantly by the parties.

The second strategic mistake Annan made was that he focused especially on the Cypriot administrations in his effort to solve the problem. From an objective viewpoint, this may be considered natural, for the conflict is the conflict of the Cypriots and any other party is an outsider. Yet as summarized in the analysis part of the issue, Athens and Ankara have been pretty much involved in the issue. Indeed, the conflict, once again, is also a conflict between two clashing forces, Greek and Turkish nationalism, rooted in mutual historical traumas. Thus, a durable peace on Cyprus cannot be achieved without an active support of Greece and Turkey. Despite the fact that many positive steps were taken by both Greek and Turkish governments during Annan’s peace process, the governments were, nonetheless, careful about “not selling out” Cyprus to the “enemy”.

In light of both critiques, a more appropriate strategy Annan could have followed was arranging a four-sided conference in a neutral setting in which Greek and Turkish Cypriot administrations, as well as Athens and Ankara could participate from the very beginning. Such a meeting would have led the parties to communicate for a reasonably long time in which a preliminary agreement, or a “smell” of it, could likely to appear. Following that, Annan could have helped the parties shape and improve their common points, while excluding non-common ones. This way, step by step, a formula that the parties could accept would have been reached eventually. In short, Annan should have started as a communicator (passive mediation role) and then played a more active role as a formulator.

The third, and perhaps the biggest, mistake of Annan was his under analysis of the conflict and thus neglect of the psychological barriers between the Cypriot communities. As noted earlier, the
Cypriot state was created in 1960 by outside powers rather against the real wishes of the Cypriot communities and in the midst of two opposite struggles - enosis (by Greek Cypriots) and taksim (by Turkish Cypriots). The mourning process over this change, the creation of the Republic, has not been completed by both communities. Generally speaking, there still exists no Cypriot identity on the island other than dominant Greek and Turkish identities. Some efforts to create a Cypriot identity have actually been made by the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) on the Greek side, their utility has remained rather marginal. With this exception, most major Greek Cypriot parties, including the Unified Democratic Union of Cyprus (EDEK), the Democratic Party (DEKO), and the Democratic Rally (DESY), have so far stressed Greek nationalism and Greek identity, while also opposing the division of the island that confines autonomy on an envisaged Turkish Cypriot state in the north. On the Turkish side, Denktaş administration, who had monopolized political power for over thirty years, similarly emphasized frequently the right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots. Only recently has this view begun to soften with the election of the Republican Turkish Party leader Mehmet Ali Talat as the new president, who seems to favor the re-start of Cyprus negotiations within the UN framework.

Once again, a state is normally based on the people called nation. On Cyprus, there still exists no Cypriot nation supporting the Cypriot state. There exist two communities, each with its distinct national identification, not counting linguistic and religious differences. The Republic could have evolved towards a nation-state if the two communities had lived together peacefully, and long enough, and seen the advantages of becoming a nation. But things have evolved the other way and from the beginning of independence, at least one of the sides, perhaps both, did not want themselves to evolve into a Cypriot nation. If we add the historical Greek-Turkish enmities and more recent traumas on the island to this identity issue, the conflict becomes even more problematic.

Accordingly, under these circumstances, it is rather doubtful whether it would be wise to push the Cypriot communities to reach an immediate agreement. Representing the international community at the highest level, the UN wants to see a quick result. This is understandable. In its over thirty-year stalemate, the conflict creates a negative example for increasing secessionist movements around the globe. Yet under the existing psychological barriers on the island, a forced togetherness, even if succeeds, would not actually solve the problem, but would make it even worse.

What can be done, however, is to help the parties to create an infrastructure that sustains present and future peace efforts. This infrastructure ought to involve at least two dimensions. The first one is geographic separation so that distinct identities of the two communities can be secured. Particularly given the Cypriot Turks’ concern about Greek Cypriot domination, it is certain that re-unification is not possible in any other way. But since both communities will be linked in matters of common concern through functional agencies, cooperation between them will be inevitable and this, over time, would produce a common Cypriot identity. A Cypriot identity by no means can be achieved through outside “pushes”, but can only be derived from internal dynamics. Thus, rather than treating the Cypriots as a single nation, the UN should acknowledge the existing gap and help the parties address it in an appropriate way, virtually meaning convincing the Greek side for the necessity of a geographic separation.

The second dimension that needs to be addressed is the issue of deep mistrust, which still continues to separate the Greek and Turkish communities like an invisible wall (See, i.e. Denktas, 2004). Aside from the historic Greek-Turkish hostilities, which have been transported to Cyprus due to the communities’ “total body identification”, identification with motherland nations, the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus have experienced many traumas at the hands of each other. Turkish Cypriots, for instance, still remember the period between 1963-1974 as their major trauma, while Greek Cypriots similarly refer to their own traumatic period that has started with the Turkish military intervention in 1974. Past hurts affect the interactions of the two communities in a negative way, as they do the formal negotiation process. As a matter of fact, it is usually observed that when Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks come together for negotiations, both sides revert to in-group justification and out-group condemnation. Accordingly, without overcoming, at least reducing, deep mistrust between the parties and creating a new climate of confidence, a solution may be unattainable. This process attributes important duties to the international community, in general, and to the UN, in particular, since the parties themselves may not easily take unilateral actions due to the suspicious, if not hostile, atmosphere that still exists on the island.
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT

There is no easy or quick solution to the problems separating Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Both sides have outstanding claims and deeply mistrust one another. In addition, Cyprus is an arena in which broader Greek and Turkish nationalism clashes. Therefore, the conflict is not an isolated issue having its own “private life”, but an integral part of the larger Greek-Turkish issue with a thousand-year history.

In the above discussion, this complex structure of the conflict was addressed and outlined. The aim was to criticize the pushy and overoptimistic, thus unrealistic, approach of Annan’s peace efforts. Given his role as the UN Secretary General, Annan’s attitude can be understandable, for he wants to see a result to the long-lasting problem as soon as possible. Yet his expectation does not seem to fit the realities of Cyprus.

Undoubtedly, third-party efforts will be very helpful in the peace process, but the ultimate decision will come from the parties themselves, mainly from the Cypriot communities, as well as from Athens and Ankara, anyway. To that end, the short-run problem is now the lack of political will on both of the sides. There are certainly individuals who wish one or another type of togetherness. Yet the dominant group wish on the Greek side is still “owning” the whole island, while the dominant group wish on the Turkish side is still not to be a minority but a separate community.

Closely linked with that the long-run issue that needs to be somehow overcome is the problem of psychological barriers between the Cypriot communities. This issue requires particular attention and calls for carefully-planned strategies. Such strategies must especially target areas of nationalistic education on the island that leads historic enmities to be transmitted from one generation to the other, mutual stereotypes that inhibit creative thinking and dialogue, as well as economic gap between the Greek and Turkish communities that generates a serious problem of redistribution of welfare in a united Cyprus (See, Yılmaz, 2005).

Although the UN has been relatively successful in keeping the conflict calm by deploying peacekeeping forces for over four decades and keeping the door open for negotiations, very few measures were taken to deal with larger, community-based problems. This should be the area in which future peace efforts must go, since besides preparing the communities of Cyprus for peace, such a “bottom-up” approach may also be helpful in overcoming the lack of political will for solution in the long-run.

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