CONSTITUTING THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PURSUIT OF BEING A COHERENT AND EFFECTIVE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ACTOR IN GLOBAL POLITICS

ORTAK DIŞ VE GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASININ OLUŞUMU: AVRUPA BİRLİĞİNİN KÜRESEL SIYASETTE TUTARLI VE ETKİN BİR DIŞ VE GÜVENLİK POLITİKASI AKTÖRÜ OLMA ARAYIŞI

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this article is to evaluate European States’ efforts to develop a coherent and effective foreign and security policy in the context of historical evolution of the CFSP. In this article, European states’ efforts to develop a coherent and effective foreign and security policy will be evaluated in three international political contexts. First period is Post World War II Period, second one is Post-Cold War Period and third one is Post September 11 Period. The main argument of this article is that in order to be an important and effective actor in global politics, EU Member States should act coherently and speak with one voice. Their influence on important international issues is greater if they act as a coherent actor rather than acting individually.

Keywords: Common Foreign and Security Policy, Coherence, Effectiveness, Foreign and Security Policy Actor.

ÖZET

Bu makalenin amacı, AB’nin ODGP’nin tarihsel gelişimi içinde Avrupa Devletlerinin tutarlı ve etkin bir dış ve güvenlik politikası geliştirme çabalarının değerlendirilmesidir. Bu çalışmada, Avrupa Devletlerinin tutarlı ve etkin bir dış ve güvenlik politikası geliştirme çabaları üç uluslararası siyasi çevrele ele alınmıştır. İlk dönem, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemi, ikincisi Soğuk Savaş Sonrası dönemi, üçüncüsü de 11 Eylül sonrası dönemi kapsar. Bu makalenin temel argümansı, AB’nin küresel siyasette önemli ve etkin bir aktör olabilmesi için, AB Devletlerinin tutarlı bir aktör olarak hareket edip tek sesle konuşmalardan gerekli olduğudır. Eğer AB Devletleri bireysel olarak hareket etmek yerine tutarlı bir aktör olarak hareket ederlerse, önemli uluslararası meseler üzerindeki etkileri daha fazla olur.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, Tutarlılık, Etkinlik, Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası Aktörü.


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INTRODUCTION

European states’ efforts to become a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics have continued since the 1950s. This article aims at evaluating European states’ efforts to develop a coherent and effective foreign and security policy in the context of historical evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While evaluating this, European states’ efforts to develop a coherent and effective foreign and security policy will be examined in three different international political contexts. The first period is Post World War II Period, the second one is Post-Cold War Period and the third one is a new and continuing period: Post September 11. The main argument of this article is that if European Union (EU) States intend to make the EU an important and effective actor in global politics, they have to realize that they should act as a coherent actor and speak with one voice. Their influence on important international issues will be greater if they act as a coherent actor rather than acting individually and they should sacrifice their individual interests for the sake of the common interests of the EU. EU states’ solo diplomacy and their diverging voices undermined the EU’s effectiveness and international credibility as observed recently in the Iraq Case and the ex-Yugoslavian Conflict in the early 90s. In this article, first of all, main concepts of ‘Actorness’ and ‘Coherence’, which help us to conceptualize European Foreign Policy throughout the EU’s quest for being an effective and coherent foreign and security policy actor in global politics, will be examined. Secondly, European states’ efforts to develop a coherent and effective foreign and security policy will be examined in three different international political contexts, Post World War II Period, Post-Cold War Period and Post September 11 Period.

THE CONCEPT OF ACTORNESS

The concept of ‘Actorness’ was introduced by Gunnar Sjostedt. Christopher Hill (1993: 309), following Gunnar Sjostedt, elaborated the features of an international actor as: to be delimited from others and from its environment; to be autonomous in the sense of making its own laws and decisions and to possess certain structural prerequisites for action at the international level, such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties.

Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 37) stated that Sjostedt first of all assumed that the EC meets two basic prerequisites of actorness which are discernible from its environment and having a minimal degree of internal cohesion, and this enabled him to conclude that the EU had a degree of autonomy necessary for it to be considered as an international actor. Joseph
Jupille and James Caporaso (1998: 218) claimed that having a minimal degree of cohesion is the main criteria for actorness which differentiates it from presence.

Apart from Sjostedt, Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 38) elaborated five basic requirements for actorness: shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles, the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies, the ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system, the availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments, domestic legitimation of decision process and priorities, relating to external policy.

In addition, Joseph Jupille and James Caporaso (1998: 214) proposed four criteria for assessing the EU’s actor capacity in global politics: the first one is recognition which means acceptance of and interaction with the entity by others; the second one is authority which means legal competence to act; the third one is autonomy which means institutional distinctiveness and independence from other actors and the final one is cohesion which refers to the degree to which an entity is able to formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences.

According to John Vogler (2002), actorness implies volition. It is a measure of the unit’s capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system. Over the past decade, the EU showed an aspiration to enhance its status as a distinct actor.

THE CONCEPT OF COHERENCE

Coherence means the action or fact of sticking together and remaining united in arguments. As a second meaning, it means the logical or clear interconnections or relation: consistency, congruity of substance, tenor, or general effect (Abellan, 2002: 3). According to Krenzler and Schneider, coherence when applied to European Foreign Policy refers to coordinated behavior, based on agreement among the EU and its Member States, where comparable and compatible methods are used in pursuit of a single objective and result in an uncontradictory foreign policy (Abellan, 2002: 4). Abellan (2002: 9-11) also offered a tripartite categorization of coherence: horizontal coherence which refers to the coherence between different policies of the EU as well as the coherence within the EU and within the foreign policies of Member States; that is the relation between the intergovernmental CFSP and the supranational European Community (EC); vertical coherence which refers to the process of coherence between Member States and the EU and vice versa; institutional coherence which refers to the coherence between the two different bureaucratic apparatus, intergovernmental and
communitarian. According to Antonio Missiroli (2001: 182), coherence is more about synergy and adding value.

Jörg Monar is the one who preferred to use the term coherence to assess and evaluate European foreign policy critically. He writes the significance of unity and coherence as an important criterion for effective foreign policy in some cases, being the most important one the participation of the EU in international conferences and organizations (Abellan, 2002: 3; Duke, 1999: 3). According to Monar, coherence has to find its corollary in interaction and when a policy is coherent and the interaction occurs accordingly, then all outward distinguishing marks between economic and political external relations will fade away (Abellan, 2002: 3-4). Thus, following Jörg Monar’s evaluation, Abellan (2002: 4) thought that coherence refers to the fact that action in one sphere of European foreign policy needs to support action in another sphere and both must be interactive.

In this article, the concept of coherence in EU’s foreign and security policy refers to the European states’ ability to act together and speak with one message in several issues related to the EU’s external relations or several security issues without undermining the EU’s or each other’s efforts. It is argued in this article that EU Member States’ coherent approach towards security or other issues related to external relations creates a synergy among them and this will increase their weight and effectiveness in global politics.

THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE COLD WAR

During the Cold War, the need for coherence for being an effective and important actor in world politics was mentioned for the first time in the London Report, which was agreed by foreign ministers of EC Member States on 13 October 1981. In Part I of London Report, foreign ministers believed that

In a period of increased world tension and uncertainty, the need for a coherent and united approach to international affairs by members of the European Community is greater than ever. They note that in spite of what has been achieved, the Ten are still far from playing a role in the world appropriate to their combined influence. It is their conviction that the Ten should seek increasingly to shape them and not merely to react them (Hill & Smith, 2000, 115).

As a result, foreign ministers emphasized that in order to play an important role in a world in which tensions and uncertainties increased, EC Member States should combine their efforts and play an active role rather than a reactive one. Foreign ministers, in Part I of London Report, emphasized the importance of consultation among EC Member States and
their commitment to consult each other before adopting final positions or launching national initiatives on all important questions of foreign policy, which concern all EC Member States. Furthermore, foreign ministers stated that EC Member States should take into account the position of other partners and consider the desirability of achieving a common position important. Especially in important international conferences, whose agenda include issues under the European Political Cooperation (EPC) discussions, EC Member States should consult each other and try to adopt a common position. More importantly, foreign ministers emphasized that it is increasingly possible for EC Member States to speak with one voice in international affairs. Moreover, in addition to common position, joint action was regarded within the capacity of EC Member States (Hill & Smith, 2000: 115).

In the preamble of Solemn Declaration on the European Union or the Stuttgart Declaration which was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of Member States of the EC meeting within the European Council on 19 June 1983, it is stated that by speaking with a single voice in foreign policy including political aspects of security, Europe can contribute to the preservation of peace (Hill & Smith, 2000: 126).

Abellan (2002: 5) also asserted that by the Stuttgart Declaration, the concern about the EC as a global actor and the need for a consistent international action was reflected for the first time in an official document, and it was also stated that the European Council ensures consistency between the EC and EPC. In between the meetings of the European Council, the General Affairs Council was tasked with that responsibility. In addition, the importance of greater consistency and close coordination at all levels in order to allow global and coherent action was emphasized.

The Single European Act (SEA) was signed by 12 members of the EC on 17 February 1986, and came into force on 1 July 1987. According to Pascal Gauttier (2004: 25), the SEA first introduced the concept of coherence in a clear and explicit way in the Founding Treaty of the EC. He also claimed that in the SEA, two faces of coherence (vertical and horizontal) were clearly laid down. Abellan (2002: 5) asserted that the political concern of search for coherence between EPC and EC policies was translated into legal terms in the Single European Act which not only linked the Community and intergovernmental processes, but also contained several references to the requirement of consistency and the emphasis on its enhancement. Gauttier and Abellan addressed the Preamble of the SEA which stated “awareness of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to protect its common interests and independence...”.
The SEA imposed on EC Member States a commitment to Inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions on the implementation of joint action (Cameron, 1999, 19).

In addition, the SEA imposed an obligation on EC Member States to refrain from any unilateral action that impair their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international organizations (Hill & Smith, 2000: 144). According to Michael E. Smith (2004), becoming a cohesive force in international relations was an explicit motive behind the inclusion of the EPC into the SEA.

Abellan (2002: 5) claimed that Article 30.5 was the main provision concerning coherence which stated that external EC policies and policies agreed in the EPC must be consistent and the Presidency and Commission have the responsibility to ensure such consistency. Abellan claimed that by the SEA, for the first time, Founding Treaty of the EC had created an obligation and had conferred responsibility for ensuring its observance on the Presidency and the Commission. As Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith (2000: 138) quoted from Simon Nuttall, the EC had gained a second pillar by the SEA, that is the EPC. David Allen (1998: 49) called this as ‘twin pillar structure’. Abellan (2002: 5) put forward that the spirit of the SEA was to allow coordination and coherence between the EC and EPC while at the same time keeping them separate and maintaining their separate identities.

THE BIRTH OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

During the early 1990s, the Cold War which shaped international politics since the early 1950s ended and the security perceptions and the security environment in Europe changed. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) no longer posed a threat towards Europe and the bipolar character of international politics faded away. The new security challenges for Europe can be summarized as political and economic instability in Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic and nationalist conflict, cross-border terrorism, massive immigration, destruction of environment, organized crime, spread of nuclear weapons and massive violation of human rights (Sjursen, 1999; Sakellariou & Keating, 2003: 84).

In the Post-Cold War period, two important events convinced EC Member States to further their cooperation in the areas of foreign and security policy and the launch of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty. These
events were the Gulf War in 1991 and the Yugoslav Conflict in the early 1990s.

During the Gulf Crisis and War, EC Member States failed to maintain a common position on the crisis due to the diverging domestic political considerations and varying national interests of EC Member States. Especially, on the issue of European hostages in Iraq and Kuwait, some of the EC Member States’ unilateralist initiatives, i.e. those by France, Britain and Germany, undermined the coherence of EC Member States. The Gulf Crisis and War significantly affected the shape of the EC’s common foreign and security policy. The Gulf Crisis and War changed the course of discussion on common foreign and security policy. Before the war, the EC’s foreign policy laid on peaceful lines. The trend of history laid in disarmament and dismantling of military alliances and it was accepted that the EC’s contribution to the new security environment in Europe was through nonmilitary means as a civilian power (Nuttall, 2000: 147). However, the Gulf War obliged the Member States to confront their global responsibilities in the post-Cold War world, and the security and defence dimensions of the CFSP gained more importance (Nuttall, 2000: 129). The Gulf War demonstrated the limits of EPC in maintaining the cohesion and unity of EC Member States. The hostage crisis and diplomatic initiatives to solve the crisis showed that when domestic pressures was too strong, maintaining the cohesion demanded by EPC became very difficult (Nuttall, 2000: 129).

During the breakdown of ex-Yugoslavia, EC Member States lacked coherence in their approaches toward the Crisis. Especially, on the issue of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and on the issue of military intervention, the EC Member States could not agree on a common position. Therefore, EC Member States were not able to stop the conflict and bloodshed in the region. Their lack of coherence during the crisis undermined the EC’s effectiveness and international credibility. The effectiveness of the EC was undermined, because EC Member States were not able to stop civil war in Yugoslavia and bloodshed continued until the UN got involved in the conflict. The international credibility of the EC was undermined, because although in the early days of the conflict, Jacques Poos declared it was the hour of Europe not of the Americans, and that the Yugoslav conflict could only be solved by the Europeans, it could not turn into reality, the hour of Europe had lasted 14 months (Nuttall, 2000: 223).

Andreas Kintis (1999: 185) also shared the views that the lack of cohesion among EC Member States undermined the EC’s effectiveness in the Yugoslav conflict and asserted that the fact remains that these measures failed to resolve the crisis; the EU’s limited competence in security and defence matters and more importantly, its Member States’ disparate foreign

policy objectives ensured that the EU’s ambition to assert its presence as an international actor was impaired by its inability to maintain common positions. Even though the EU succeeded in maintaining a relatively cohesive position in its initial response to the crisis, its later inability to compose divergent views undermined its effectiveness.

Christopher Hill (1993: 306) expressed that both the Yugoslav Crisis and the Gulf War showed that the EC is not an effective international actor in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and impact on events.

Thus, it can be concluded that EC Member States needed to adopt and maintain a coherent position in order for the EC to become an effective international actor and have an impact on international events. The recognition crisis during the Yugoslav Conflict and the hostage crisis during the Gulf War demonstrated the limits of EPC’s ability in coordinating the foreign policies of Member States and motivated them to form a common foreign policy rather than a coordination of foreign policies of Member States. The Gulf War and the Yugoslav Conflict also broke the deadlock on security and defence issues in Maastricht negotiations. EC Member States realized the risk of serious security and defence problems in the Post-Cold War era and the deficiencies in the ability of EPC to influence the foreign policies of most powerful Member States like Germany. Also, the reluctance of the US to be involved in the conflict led the Europeans to believe that they should have taken more responsibility for their own security in the Post-Cold War era (Smith, 2004: 179).

By the Maastricht Treaty, which was agreed at Maastricht European Council, signed by the twelve EC Member States on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993, the European Community took the name of the European Union and it was constructed on the three pillars. These pillars are the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.

By the Maastricht Treaty, a single institutional framework was established and all three pillars were put under the single institutional framework. By doing this, coherence in the constitutional structure of the European integration increased (Smith, 2004: 211). With the introduction of the CFSP, political cooperation in the areas of foreign and security policy as in the EPC, was replaced by common policy.

According to Michael E. Smith (2001: 173), the concept of coherence throughout the Maastricht Treaty had been the guiding principle behind the CFSP. Pascal Gauttier (2004: 27) also claimed that the principle of coherence permeates the Maastricht Treaty as a whole and it may be one of the fundamental principles of it. By Articles A and C, the EU was charged
to guarantee the coherence of its actions, in particular “the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies.” (Smith, 2004: 211)

Furthermore, the replacement of the old Ministerial Meetings of the EPC with the General Affairs Council (Foreign Ministers) as the only decision-making body at ministerial level for all matters concerning foreign affairs and the merger of EPC Secretariat with the General Secretariat of the Council demonstrated the effects of the adoption of a single institutional framework and this was an attempt to increase the institutional coherence within the EU.

In addition, in Article J.1 of Treaty on European Union (TEU), it was stated that the CFSP shall cover all areas of foreign and security policy and in Article J.8 (2), it was stated that European Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union, these two articles also demonstrated the importance of the coherence in the areas of foreign and security policy. In order to increase the coherence and effectiveness in the areas of foreign and security policy, the Maastricht Treaty brought strong commitment to Member States as observed in Article J.1 and Article J.2, Article J.1 (4) stated that

The member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with. (Hill & Smith, 2000: 154)

In addition to that, according to Article J.2 (1) Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action. In order to ensure concerted and convergent action of Member States, two new instruments of action were introduced: common positions and joint actions.

On the issue of security and defence, according to Article J.4, all questions related to the security of the Union was put under the CFSP and the Western European Union (WEU) was accepted as integral part of the development of the Union or as the defence arm of the Union and tasked to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. According to Abellan (2002: 7), making the WEU an integral part of the development of the EU, i.e. elaborating and implementing decisions which have defence implications demonstrated Maastricht Treaty’s attempt to seek greater coherence by linking foreign policy with security policy.
According to Michael E. Smith (2001: 171), improving the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external capabilities was a key motivation behind the Maastricht Treaty. For him, formally linking the capabilities of the three pillars with each other through a single institutional framework was an important step toward the improvement of the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external capabilities.

According to Michael E. Smith (2004: 211), the concept of coherence used in the Maastricht Treaty is not new. It sustains a trend that had been developing for some time in the EU’s external affairs under the EPC. Becoming a cohesive force was an implicit incentive behind the inclusion of the EPC into the SEA, and the Maastricht Treaty only attempted to clarify, reinforce and broaden this principle across all three pillars of the EU. As a result, the CFSP represented the next stage in a transition from the EPC’s main focus on damage limiting objective, i.e. Member States shall avoid any action or position which impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations and international organizations, toward equipping the EU with the means to act coherently in world politics. So, it represented a transition from negative integration toward more positive integration.

Although the Maastricht Treaty was a big step in improving the coherence and the effectiveness of the EU in the areas of foreign and security policy, it was not satisfactory; the unfinished business of the Maastricht Treaty was postponed to another IGC in 1996 and a new treaty.

THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AND THE NICE TREATY: A NEW IMPETUS FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

In order to complete the unfinished business of the Maastricht Treaty, which was to improve the coherence and effectiveness of the EU in the areas of foreign and security policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed by the fifteen EU States on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999.

The Treaty of Amsterdam emphasized the importance of effective and coherent external policy. It can be understood from the title of the Irish Presidency Draft Text, i.e. ‘An Effective and Coherent Foreign Policy’. In order to improve the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced several innovations.

In order to increase the coherence of the CFSP, a new policy instrument was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, that was common strategies. According to Michael Smith (2004: 227), while common strategy was a CFSP policy instrument, it can be actually involved in all three EU
policy pillars and help orient and mobilize these pillars toward a single foreign policy goal and he quoted from a CFSP insider that common strategies have completely changed the landscape of the CFSP and helped move it toward a true operational capability.

Another important innovation brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam was the establishment of the post of High Representative for the CFSP, which is intended to reply Henry Kissinger’s classical question “who speaks for Europe”. The holder of the post can be viewed as “Mr. or Mrs. CFSP”, ‘Monsieur Politique étrangère et de sécurité européenne (PESC)’ or ‘telephone number of Europe’.

The reason behind the introduction of the post of High Representative for the CFSP was to strengthen the cohesion in the EU’s external representation and to give the EU a single visible voice in the international system. Although the Presidency has provided leadership in the EU’s external representation, it has been difficult to ensure cohesion and efficiency with a rotating Presidency. Therefore, a post of High Representative for the CFSP was needed. Simon Duke (2000: 144) affirmed this view and asserted that the introduction of the role of High Representative could both provide a more coherent voice for Europe and could introduce the idea of a spokesperson for the EU on CFSP matters. Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO was appointed as High Representative for the CFSP for five years by the European Council on 18 October 1999 and started his new occupation in November 1999. Solana was reappointed as High Representative for the CFSP for another period of five years starting from 18 October 2004 by the EU Heads of the State.

Furthermore, by the Treaty of Amsterdam in order to ensure full coherence with the EU’s external economic and development policies, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit shall be established in the General Secretariat of the Council under the responsibility of Secretary General of the Council.

The Nice treaty was signed on 26 February 2001 by fifteen Member States and entered into force on 1 February 2003. The Nice Treaty made a few arrangements concerning the CFSP. As Michael E. Smith said (2004: 233) Nice Treaty attempted to address much of unfinished business of Amsterdam. With the Nice Treaty, provisions defining relations between the WEU and the EU have been removed from the TEU and the defence aspects of the CFSP were arranged by the EU itself.

Furthermore, an important innovation was brought by the Nice Treaty. It was the extension of enhanced cooperation, which was previously established in the area of JHA, to the CFSP. Antonio Missiroli (2001: 191) claimed that the Nice Treaty addressed the issue of CFSP coherence in a
more direct fashion, namely in the new provisions on enhanced cooperation.

According to Article 27a of the Nice Treaty, enhanced cooperation in the CFSP should aim at safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene and should respect the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign and security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy; the powers of the European Community and consistency between all the Union's policies and its external activities. Therefore, Article 27a of the Nice Treaty stated that enhanced cooperation under the CFSP shall respect both the consistency of the CFSP (the vertical one) and the consistency between all the EU's policies and external activities (the horizontal one) (Missiroli, 2001: 192).

However, matters having military or defence implications were excluded from application of enhanced cooperation. Missiroli (2001: 192) suggested that the exclusion of matters having military and defence implications inserted a potential device for incoherence in that it set Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) apart from the rest of the CFSP as a no-go-area, i.e. it has made it impossible to apply any form of enhanced cooperation to the crucial area of defence industry and procurement as well as having operational implications. In addition, it has also made it de facto impossible to apply enhanced cooperation to crisis management proper as its military component cannot be incorporated.

In short, the main contribution of Nice Treaty to the CFSP was the simplification of existing arrangements, especially of rules on enhanced cooperation and the clarification of new obligations in more detail (Missiroli, 2001: 192).

THE COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: LAUNCH OF THE DEFENCE DIMENSION OF THE CFSP

In the Treaty of Amsterdam progressive framing of a common defence policy was decided as an objective of the CFSP and the decision to frame a common defence policy was given to Member States when they consider appropriate. Two important developments acted as a catalyst for launching the defence dimension of the CFSP.

The first development was the Kosovo Conflict which made the size of military and leadership gap between the US and its European allies visible (Pond, 1999: 80). In the Kosovo Crisis, European Allies of NATO relied on US military capabilities for crisis management and this showed major
shortfalls in European defence capabilities (Bağcı, 2002: 58). Kosovo illustrated that burden-sharing imbalances within NATO has been critical; European military hardware was significantly inferior to the US with regard to strategic transport and logistics, intelligence (satellites, sensors, computers) and high-tech weaponry (precision-guide explosives, cruise missiles) (Hulsman, 2000: 10).

European leaders were disappointed and frustrated, since they failed over the scale of the effort mounted by European forces compared to that of the US and since once again they appeared weak and incapable when responding a security challenge in their own backyard- the Balkans after the Yugoslav Conflict. In Europe, after the Kosovo Crisis, ministerial statements have frequently suggested that more forceful military intervention is necessary to affirm the EU’s identity and provide the EU enhanced capability in the eyes of European citizens disappointed with their governments’ failure in the Balkans (Young, 2002: 106).

The second development was the change in British attitude towards European security. The reason behind the change of British attitude towards European security was the change in Tony Blair’s attitude towards European security. After winning 1997 elections Tony Blair tried to give a leading role to Britain in the establishment of European defence force. He wanted to take part and play a leading role in the restructuring of European defence cooperation to compensate for Britain’s self-chosen exclusion from main step in economic integration, i.e. European Monetary Union. Blair thought that Europe had a limited ability for autonomous military action and he called for major institutional and resource innovations to make Europe a more equal partner in the transatlantic alliance (Sloan, 2003: 171).

On 3-4 December 1998, French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair met at Saint Malo. The two leaders issued a Joint Declaration on European Defence at Franco-British Saint Malo Summit which was accepted as the starting point for the defence dimension of the CFSP, i.e. the ESDP. In this declaration, it was stated that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

Saint Malo Summit was a historically important event in the development of the foreign and security policy of the EU. First of all, it represented a change in the UK’s security policy. The UK, which had an effective 50-year veto on the discussion of defence matters within the institutions of the EEC/EC/EU, gave up its veto and accepted urgency and legitimacy of an EU security capacity at both political and military levels (Howorth, 2001: 769). The British government thought that the US will no longer regard European security in the same way as during the Cold War.
and that the maintenance and strengthening of the NATO depended on the ESDP. According to the British government, enhanced European military capability was the most effective way of silencing the voices of isolationism or the advocates of burden-sharing in the US (Howorth, 2000: 34).

Secondly, Saint Malo demonstrated the determination of the UK and France, the two important military actors in the EU, to provide the EU a degree of actorness in the security field in line with constant French will to open up the prospect of the EU emerging as a security actor in its own right with autonomous capacity to take decisions politically and to implement them militarily (Howorth, 2001: 769).

Finally, Saint Malo demonstrated the determination of the UK and France to prevent the EU from focusing only on civilian power, because they believe that military means constitute an important tool to be an influential international actor. Saint Malo Summit converged upon a common point that the EU required to develop a military capacity to sustain a coherent, effective and credible European foreign and security policy (Tonra, 2003: 1).

After Franco-British Joint Declaration on Defence at Saint Malo, in Cologne European Council (3-4 June 1999), Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States welcomed Saint Malo Declaration and decided to launch the CESDP (the phrase ‘CESDP’ was first used in Cologne European Council).

The main reasons behind the inclusion of defence dimension into the CFSP were as follows: firstly, related to internal European debate and policy, a defence dimension was seen necessary in order to complete the CFSP and give the EU more coherence in its foreign policy; the lessons from the Balkans Crisis and furthermore the weakness of the EU during the military campaign in Kosovo played an important role in the decision to include defence dimension into the CFSP. Secondly, related to transatlantic relations and the future of NATO, a European military capability was considered necessary to compensate for the new uncertainties over US military involvement in crisis management in Europe. It would also be a way for the Europeans to seriously influence US military strategy when the US decides to be involved and thirdly related to empower NATO by strengthening European military capabilities (Gnesotto, 2002: 205). The last reason behind the inclusion of defence dimension into the CFSP was to push the EU toward the ever closer union. According to this view, the CESDP with its common strategic concept and centralized long-term force planning would be likely to have positive effects on strengthening central institutions of the EU, on consolidation of the CFSP. The CESDP would also bring more coherence to EU foreign policy and give the EU credibility in the eyes of its citizens (Sangiovanni, 2003: 197). Strengthening of
European military capabilities was intended to develop stronger and more balanced transatlantic partnership.

In the European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence annexed to the Conclusions of the European Council Meeting, Heads of State and Government stated that in order to pursue the objectives of the CFSP and the progressive framing of a common defence policy, they are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the “Petersberg tasks”. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO (Hill & Smith, 2000: 250). At the Cologne European Council, the EU as a whole embraced the Saint Malo ‘spirit’ and incorporated its wording in a common declaration (Missiroli & Quille, 2004: 116).

At the Cologne European Council, it was decided to establish a new security and defence decision-making structures in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations. With this, the EU can decide and conduct EU-led Petersberg operations effectively. These new security and defence decision-making structures were the regular meetings of General Affairs Council consisting of EU foreign affairs and defence ministers; Political and Security Committee (PSC), a permanent body in Brussels consisting of representatives with political military expertise and the task to steer the CFSP and manage the CFSP's defence dimension; a Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the PSC on military matters and a Military Staff consisting of more than 11 officers and tasked to inform and prepare the deliberations of the Military Committee and PSC on defence-related issues (Andréani, 2000, 85-86). The establishment of these new security and defence decision-making structures initiated institutionalization of the CESDP within the EU. The Cologne Summit affirmed the idea of establishing ‘a capacity for autonomous action’ and agreed to develop a common EU policy on security and defence requiring a capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies (Bağcı, 2002: 57). With Cologne Summit, a decision was taken for the full integration of the WEU into the EU. According to the decision, the WEU was expected to disappear as an independent institution and was expected to be integrated into the EU by the end of the French Presidency in the second half of 2000 (Sjursen, 1999: 8). In the Cologne Summit, it was agreed to redefine Eurocorps, which include forces from France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, into a European crisis reaction corps directly connected to the CFSP (Sjursen, 1999: 8). According

to the Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence approved and adopted by the European Council in Cologne, development of an EU crisis management capacity was to be seen as an activity within the framework of the CFSP (Cebeci, 1999: 20).

Helsinki European Council (10-11 December 1999) has defined a Headline Goal for Rapid Reaction Force for improving the necessary military assets to carry out full range of Petersberg operations. According to the Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, it was stated that

To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces (Hill & Smith, 2000: 452).

At the Helsinki European Council, Heads of State and Government of EU Member States affirmed their determination to institutionalize the CESDP and it was decided to establish new political and military bodies and structures within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to Petersberg operations, while respecting the single institutional framework. By March 2000, these new bodies, the PSC, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS) began to function as interim organizations as defined in Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusion.

Despite these efforts, realization of the objectives related with the CESDP set out in the Helsinki European Council and furthering of efforts concerning the CESDP faced several challenges. According to Jolyon Howorth (2001: 773), the CESDP is an unprecedented development within the European polity and making it work is an ultimate challenge. For him, firstly, rapid events of 1999-2001 have increased the capabilities-expectations gap and Europe seems to have draped itself in the apparel of actorness long before it could conceivably engage in action and everybody is
praying that the next serious crisis will be considerate enough to wait until the EU is ready to handle it. Secondly, the EU has no tradition of power politics or energetic political action and will have to make a big effort to get the politics of security policy-making right. Thirdly, failure would both damage transatlantic relations and EU’s political integration and EU’s international role. Also, Hans Christian Hagman (2002: 77) asserted that lack of political cohesion among EU Member States and lack of effective strategic decision-making structures were other challenges for the success of the CESDP. According to his point of view, in order for Europe to carry more weight or credibility, effective strategic decision-making structures and effective coordination of economic, military elements were necessary.

Mette Eilstrup Sangiovanni criticized the CESDP and claimed that the CESDP is the wrong policy for Europe. For him, Europeans cannot launch a fully-fledged CESDP capable of rebalancing the transatlantic alliance in the military terms and let alone of exerting the respect for European military power that some Europeans regard as a precondition for influence on the US (Sangiovanni, 2003: 198). Sangiovanni (2003: 198) claimed that realization of Rapid Reaction Force by the year 2003 is impossible, because the cost of modernizing and equipping the RRF required more than 100 billion euros and this is more than 70 % of what European NATO allies spend on defence per year, so under this condition the RRF will not be fully operational until 2010.

Sangiovanni asserted that the CESDP might lead to a rift among European states. According to him, it seems difficult for Europeans to agree on a common strategic concept or an effective institutional framework for the CESDP any time soon. Their various interests will lead to development of plans for enhanced cooperation which will allow a core group of EU members to proceed down the road to closer defence cooperation without explicit consensus of all Member States (Sangiovanni, 2003: 201-202).

According to Sangiovanni (2003: 202), the CESDP could not fulfil most of the goals cited as reasons for adopting it, the CESDP could not rebalance Atlantic Alliance or reverse American unilateralism or significantly improve transatlantic burdensharing or propel EU faster towards a federal union. On the contrary, the CESDP risks triggering a US withdrawal from Europe before Europeans have substituted US forces in Europe and it risks enlargement by increasing divisions among current and future Member States.

Furthermore, Christopher Hill (2002b: 87) claimed that in the long term geopolitical and cultural concentration might enable European states to speak only with one voice. However, this may not be desirable or wished by a majority of the EU’s citizens, so, in the medium term it will be more realistic to utilize enhanced cooperation in foreign and defence policy, with
opt-outs, coalitions of the willing and continued close working with the US and NATO. Marta Dassu and Antonio Missiroli (2002: 88) asserted that in order to create an appropriate institutional framework for common operational and industrial efforts, enhanced cooperation should be extended to defence and military matters with a clearer role for the High Representative for the CFSP as its institutional and operational pivot.

Gilles Andréani (2000, 93) advocated that a bottom-up approach is appropriate for the CESDP. This means that groups of countries should propose capabilities they would endeavor to develop in cooperation and fold these into the process, rather than expecting the collective consideration of the defence needs of 15 states to produce all the answers. Moreover, in the case of a military operation, ad hoc coalition within the EU is suitable rather than endeavors of 15. Andréani (2000, 93) also claimed that key group of countries for defence cooperation will naturally include Germany, Britain and France and they should not organize themselves formally and their geometry must be flexible and they should take the lead in renationalizing defence structure and shaping EU policy.

Looking at the development of the CESDP since its launch at Saint Malo, diverging interests and views of Member States caused ambiguities about future development of the CESDP. Disagreements among Member States in defence matters make enhanced defence cooperation only viable solution for preserving the cohesion among EU Member States concerning the CFSP. As a result, in order to preserve the coherence among EU Member States, the application of enhanced cooperation in defence matters in which willing Member States participate and establishment of flexible ad hoc coalitions for military operations is more appropriate.

Moreover, in order to ensure effectiveness of operations under the CESDP, enhanced cooperation is only viable solution, because in defence matters, reaching consensus is very difficult and time-taking. Although during a crisis situation, a quick intervention is needed, consensus is required for such operations in the EU and in the case of lack of consensus, the EU’s intervention cannot be carried out swiftly and crisis cannot be stopped timely. In the Yugoslav Crisis, European States’ lack of consensus on the issue of military intervention prevented them from intervening and conflict escalated. As a result, in order to avoid such situations, instead of searching for consensus, a group of willing European States can form ad hoc coalitions in a crisis situation and such enhanced cooperation will be more effective. Especially after the last enlargement, application of flexible integration and enhanced cooperation in the area of security and defence will enable the EU to function smoothly and effectively at twenty five.
THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST SEPTEMBER 11 ERA

Seven months after the Nice Treaty, September 11 terrorist attacks against the US happened. After September 11 terrorist attacks, the US initiated a ‘war on terrorism’ on a global scale. After September 11 terrorist attacks, a new security environment, security perceptions and security threats emerged; global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organized crime were accepted as major security threats. Former Foreign Minister of Greece George Papandreou (2003: 54) stated that by September 11, third generation conflicts, or the so-called transnational conflicts, which do not have a specific territorial location, and are dispersed, horizontal and asymmetric, and have deep root causes and a massive character, and may turn against civil society, has emerged. He also asserted that this typology of conflict includes new threats, such as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and organized crime (Papandreou, 2003: 54).

Immediately after September 11 terrorist attacks, EU Member States declared their solidarity with the US in its fight against terrorism. Christopher Hill (2002a: 4) defined the EU’s immediate reaction to the attacks as effective solidarity. Nevertheless, in later phases, bigger Member States, especially the three big, France, Germany and the UK, by excluding smaller ones supported the US in its war against terrorism on a bilateral basis, i.e. not through the EU, and this led to divisions among the EU Member States and frustrations among the excluded smaller Member States. Charles Grant (2002: 138) named the tension between the EU’s bigger and smaller states as ‘Big against Small’.

Two mini-summits held by bigger Member States, one held before the European Council meeting in Ghent on 20 October 2001 and the other held in Downing Street on 4 November 2001, led to divisions among EU Member States especially between bigger and smaller states and undermined the solidarity and coherence among EU Member States. Thus, the mini-summits clearly undermined one of the most important purposes of the EU, i.e. to speak with one voice (Akgül, 2001: 18). EU Member States’ failure to speak with one voice also undermined their international credibility, because in their Joint Declaration just after September 11 attacks in the US, leaders of EU Member States declared that they shall continue to develop the CFSP with a view to ensuring that the EU is genuinely capable of speaking out clearly with one voice. In addition, Belgium’s limited diplomatic and military clout as the holder of the Presidency in the second half of 2001 led the EU to lose its international credibility, since the outside world especially the US does not take the EU seriously. Consequently, this led to increase in the need to reform or abolish the rotating presidency.
Michael E. Smith (2003: 3) asserted that in their initial response to September 11 attacks, EU Member States were extremely quick to speak with a common voice; they expressed their support for the US and offered troops to the effort, but on a bilateral and national basis rather than collectively on behalf of the EU.

Jolyon Howorth (2002: 1) also put forward that European response to September 11 was renationalisation of security and defence reflexes. National leaders all expressed their solidarity with the US on behalf of their respective countries. Each offered national military assets to the US and national leaders were keen to be seen to be engaging in bilateralism with the US administration; Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder raced with one another to the Oval Office. Three leaders talked to each other before their visits to concert their arguments, but they did not make any effort to speak for the EU when in Washington (Grant, 2002). The smaller Member States complained that by acting alone particularly in dealings with the US, the bigger countries undermined EU institutions and solidarity (Grant, 2002).

As a result, September 11 attacks and following US operation in Afghanistan hit the EU when it was trying to build a more effective and coherent CFSP (Grant 2001: 42). These events showed that the EU still had deficiencies in building an effective and coherent CFSP and the need to reform CFSP institutions has come on the agenda of the EU.

After September 11 terrorist attacks, EU Member States adopted a relatively coherent position on the fight against terrorism and the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan, but when US Administration decided to extend its war against terrorism to Iraq and shift war from Afghanistan towards Iraq, most of the European governments and citizens opposed the US decision to extend the war to Iraq. Most European governments and citizens willingly supported the US in its fight against Taliban and Al-Qaeda, because they regarded Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network as a threat, but very few Europeans regarded Iraq as a threat (Grant, 2001). Most of the Europeans thought that a war against Iraq would destract attention from the war against terrorism and might lead to uncontrollable escalation and mass casualties as well as further estrangement between the Arab world and the West. They also feared that a cornered Iraqi dictator might use his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and would almost certainly strike out against Israel, attempting to turn the conflict into a war between the West and the Muslim World (Nielsen, 2003: 100).

Some of European Governments supported the US Administration’s cause in the Iraqi Crisis and this led to divisions among them. Charles Grant called Iraq as Achilles heel of EU foreign policy (Grant, 2002: 152). During the Iraqi Crisis in early 2003, once again after the Gulf War in 1991, EU
Member States were not able to develop a common policy over Iraq. While Germany and France were against the US-led war in Iraq, some of the Member States and acceding states supported the US-led war in Iraq. These states were Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the UK, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia. The US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called this division as a division between ‘Old Europe’, including France and Germany who opposed US-led war against Iraq, and ‘New Europe’, including the Member States and accession states supporting US-led war against Iraq.

As a result, the division among EU Member States during the Iraqi Crisis prevented them from adopting a common position and also, this prevented them from influencing the US foreign policy and affecting the course of events. Therefore, the lack of coherence among them toward the Iraqi Crisis undermined their effectiveness. According to Christopher Hill (2002a: 14, 31), during the Iraqi Crisis, Europe has been timid; the CFSP has been almost wholly silent and the Europeans have produced the silence of the lambs, divided, powerless and frozen with apprehension.

Despite divisions among EU Member States, the Iraqi Crisis had a positive impact. EU Member States’ failure to act as a coherent actor during the Iraqi Crisis led to a renewal of efforts to improve the CFSP. In addition, according to Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane (2003: 183), the Iraqi Crisis has been a wake up call for Europeans and they thought that the EU’s handling of Iraq was an abysmal failure and there are signs that the Europeans are learning from that fiasco and are moving ahead. The Convention on the Future of Europe, European Security Strategy and latest developments in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were all signs of the European efforts to regroup and analyse what is wrong and adjust accordingly after failure in the Iraqi Crisis. Fraser Cameron (2003a) claimed that the divisions and disarray in the Iraqi Crisis will lead to genuine improvement in the CFSP once dust is settled.

**DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE AND THE CFSP**

Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome, brought many innovations, in order to make the CFSP more coherent and effective. The Convention on the Future of Europe under the Presidency of Valery Giscard d’Estaing, prepared the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

During the Convention, there had been widespread consensus on the need to make the EU a more coherent actor in the domain of the CFSP and to improve EU’s ability to speak with one voice. The introduction of the
post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, introduction of an elected and longer term Presidency of the European Council, introduction of a Solidarity Clause, extension of Petersberg Tasks and introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation are among the innovations brought by the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in order to make the EU a more coherent and effective actor in global politics.

By the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, a new post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs had been introduced. The post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs was proposed by the European Convention to promote coherence in EU foreign policy and provide an institutional bridge between the supranational European Commission and the intergovernmental Council. According to the European Convention, the post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs should merge the functions of Commissioner for External Relations, (1st pillar) with the functions of Council’s High Representative for the CFSP, (2nd pillar) (Gourlay & Kleymer, 2003). At an extraordinary meeting in Brussels on 29 June 2004, the EU Heads of State issued a Declaration which confirmed that on the day of entry into force of the Constitution, Solana will become the first EU Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The main reason behind merging of the roles of Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP and Chris Patten, the Commissioner for External Relations, is to ensure that in the future, the two arms of EU external relations work better together and also, by creating an EU foreign policy supremo, European interests can be better promoted around the world.

In order to overcome the problems created by rotating presidency and increase the international credibility and effectiveness of the EU, the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe introduced an elected and longer term Presidency of the European Council. First problem created by rotating presidency is lack of consistency, as each holder of the Presidency every six months imposes its own foreign policy preferences and priorities on the EU as a whole, this led to inconsistency. Second problem is the danger of small states without a huge diplomatic and military clout holding the Presidency at crucial moments as exemplified during the Belgian Presidency on September 11 (Menon, 2002: 7).

According to Article 6 of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the EU shall have legal personality. Most members of European Convention believed that a single legal personality lead to greater effectiveness in the EU’s external relations (Duke, 2003: 6).

In order to enhance coherence and efficiency of the external representation of the EU, the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe created the European External Action Service which is tasked to assist the future EU Minister for Foreign Affairs to perform his or her duties.

With the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, a Solidarity Clause was introduced. According to this clause, if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, the EU shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal including the military resources made available by the Member States, to prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States, to protect democratic institutions, the civilian population from any terrorist attack and to assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster.

According to the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

With the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Petersberg Tasks had been expanded to include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. The tasks are those for which both civilian and military means might be used and all tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including support to third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

By the extension of Petersberg tasks to the tasks for which both civilian and military means might be used, the previous division between Petersberg Tasks and the remaining civilian aspects of crisis management, many of which were not specifically mentioned in the Petersberg Tasks but nevertheless took their legitimacy from CFSP’s general mandate covering all areas of foreign and security policy, had ended (Duke, 2003: 21). This will lead to a greater coherence among civilian and military aspects of Petersberg Tasks.

According to the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in security and defence area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the EU framework.

EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

With the request of foreign ministers of the EU Member States, High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, drafted the European Security Strategy titled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ and presented to the Thessaloniki European Council on 20 June 2003 and after revisions by inputs from member and acceding states and independent experts, the second draft of the European Security Strategy was adopted by the EU leaders at Rome European Council on 12-13 December 2003.

The intention behind the preparation of European Security Strategy was to establish a common European security concept which will in the future prevent divisions among EU Member States in a possible crisis, like in the Iraqi Crisis and make EU a coherent and effective actor in foreign and security policy issues. Fraser Cameron (2003b) advocated the preparation of European Security Strategy. According to his point of view, individual Member States have their own security concepts, but the Iraqi Crisis showed that there is no security concept at the EU level and this led to divisions among Member States. Accordingly, during the Iraqi Crisis, EU’s lack of coherence damaged the EU’s identity, credibility and institutional structure and also impaired trust between Member States.

Steven Everts (2003) also shared the same views with Cameron and he strongly asserted that the EU urgently requires a security strategy, since Europe does not have a shared vision of current security threats and sufficient policy responses. For him, one of the main reasons behind the EU’s division during the Iraqi Crisis was the lack of a shared threat assessment (Everts, 2003). He also, like Cameron, thought that EU Member States first formed their own national viewpoint and then tried half-heartedly to find a common stance with its European partners (Everts, 2003).

Furthermore, Everts (2003) believed that in order to develop a successful foreign policy, Europeans must agree on a common view of nature of the international security environment which changed after September 11 terrorist attacks and the EU’s role within it. Moreover, they must develop a shared perception of the most serious threats, the most important opportunities that environment poses and appropriate policy responses to deal with major threats (Everts, 2003). Everts (2003) claimed that by the Security Strategy, Europeans could develop a coherent assessment of this new world, it would help them to decide on appropriate policy responses to deal with the new US. According to Everts (2003), a European Security Strategy would help to reconcile the activists, France and the UK, which want the EU to pursue an activist and global foreign policy; with the pacifists, Germany and neutral states, which want to keep the status quo or the EU to have a regional outlook, on the question of when the use
of force is justified. Moreover, Everts (2003) thought that European Security Strategy could also help the EU to devise concrete policies aimed at tackling concrete problems and establish connections between objectives and instruments and the European Security Strategy would help to identify what kind of developments would trigger what sort of reaction.

In the Security Strategy, the importance of coherence for making the EU an effective actor in global politics was emphasized and it was stated that the increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity within the EU make Europeans a more credible and effective actor and added that Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

In the Security Strategy, policy implications for Europe were examined. Under this heading, it was stated that the EU had made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management and added that if the Europeans wanted to make a contribution that matches their potential, they needed to be more active, more coherent and more capable and they would have to work with others. It was also stated that European states needed to develop a strategic culture that fostered early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention, to develop operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. It was stated that the EU should support the UN as it responds to threats to international peace and security and adopt a strategy of preemptive engagement, i.e. the ability to act before countries around the EU deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. By doing this, the EU could avoid more serious problems in the future. It was claimed that a EU which takes greater responsibility and which is more active would be one which carries greater political weight.

In the Security Strategy, the need for more coherence was emphasized and it was stated that the point of the CFSP and ESDP is that they are stronger when they act together. The need for greater coherence both among different EU instruments and capabilities, different EU policies and external activities of individual Member States was emphasized. Furthermore, in dealing with regional conflicts the need for coherent policies was emphasized and it was stated that problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support. In solving international problems the need for multilateral cooperation in international organizations and partnership with key actors was emphasized. Moreover, development of an effective and balanced partnership is accepted as an aim and in order to achieve this aim, the need to build-up further the EU capabilities and increase its coherence was emphasized.

According to Peter Van Ham (2004), the EU Security Strategy has offered an *acquis stratégique* by establishing priorities and setting clear policy
goals. According to Jean-Yves Hainé (2004: 110), preparing a security concept is a historic event for a post-modern organization like the EU. For him, the preparation of the European Security Strategy aiming at reaching an agreement was sufficiently broad to include widely varying strategic traditions, but precise enough to become a motor for international action: to maintain credibility in the eyes of other major international actors, above all the US and to address new threats without renouncing the EU’s particular acquis and identity.

According to Carl Bildt (2004: 23), the adoption of the European Security Strategy is the first time a more comprehensive attempt has been made to go beyond Henry Kissinger’s classical question of ‘where’s the telephone number’ to the far more important question of ‘what to say in the event that someone actually calls’. He stated that it will be the evolving operating system that makes it possible for the EU’s other programmes and policies to work in a comprehensive and coherent way.

Thus, the adoption of the European Security Strategy, which offered a common view of the nature of current international security environment, the EU’s role within it, the shared perception of the most serious threat, the most important opportunities in that security environment and appropriate policy responses that the EU should adopt in dealing with them, can be accepted as a major step in making the EU a coherent and effective actor in global politics.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

By looking at the historical development of CFSP, it can be said that the EU has already achieved its goal of becoming a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor. It could not be reached a conclusion that EU has already become a fully-fledged coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics, because of the divisions among EU Member States in the Yugoslav conflict, the Gulf War and recently in the Iraqi Crisis. In all these events, the existence of different national interests among Member States and their preference for national interests over common European interests prevented them from adopting a coherent position. Consequently, this led to a loss of effectiveness and international credibility of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in global politics. In all these events, the EC/EU could not act as an effective international actor, in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events.

Although EU Member States faced difficulties in their quest for being a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics, their efforts continued. Each failure of EU Member States to act as a
coherent and effective actor in the domain of foreign and security policy led to the renewal of efforts to improve the CFSP and made it more coherent and effective. After failures in the Yugoslav Conflict and the Gulf War, the CFSP was launched. The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and European Security Strategy were the signs of European States’ efforts to regroup and analyse what is wrong and adjust accordingly after failure in the Iraqi Crisis.

Recently, the main challenge for the EU to become a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics is enlargement. On 1 May 2004, ten Central and East European States became new members of the EU. After enlargement, developing a coherent and effective foreign and security policy will be more difficult for the EU, since ten Central and East European States with different international experiences and perspectives based on history, culture, economic and security needs become new members of the EU. This leads to increase in the diversity of foreign and security policy interests within the EU. This diversity within the EU will make it more difficult for the EU to agree on a common stance on foreign and security policy issues and to act as a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics.

Recently, the Iraqi Crisis demonstrated that in an enlarged EU, development of a coherent foreign and security policy will be more difficult for the EU. During the Iraqi Crisis, some of the acceding states including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, declared their support for the US position in Iraq without informing the EU Presidency or consulting with EU Member States. This showed that some of the acceding states have different foreign and security policy interests, analyses and approaches from some of EU Member States and they are ready to break the consensus, if it is against their interests and views.

After EU’s failure to act as a coherent and effective foreign and security actor during the Iraqi Crisis due to divisions among EU Member States and some of acceding states, larger countries within the EU, the UK, France and Germany, started to believe that in an enlarged Europe, important foreign and security policy issues could be best discussed among a smaller group of nations. As a result, they searched for ways to create a directoire among themselves to discuss important foreign and security policy issues. Especially, Prime Minister of the UK, Tony Blair and Foreign Minister Jack Straw were keen on meeting their French and German counterparts more regularly to discuss important foreign and security policy issues.

However, this kind of directoire will lead to further divisions among EU Member States, because smaller member states will oppose this. Emergence

of such a directoire constitutes an important threat for the EU to become a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics.

The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and European Security Strategy are important steps for making the EU a more coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics. In an enlarged EU, besides these two documents, Member States’ will will also determine the EU’s future as a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor.

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