THE ‘TRANSATLANTIC RIFT’: HOW DID THE SECURITY PERCEPTION CHANGE BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES?

Transatlantik Çatlağ: Avrupa ve Birleşik Devletler Arasındaki Güvenlik Anlayışı Nasıl Değişti?

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ABSTRACT
In this article, the dramatic shift occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War within the European security perception and the consequences of the rupture from the American-oriented security understanding will be handled. Within the historical framework of the evolution of the concept of security since its emergence in the seventeenth century, the ‘Europeanized security understanding’ appeared in the Continent as well as institutionalized in the European Union will be explained with certain instances in order to demonstrate the ‘rift’ between the two sides of the Atlantic. The heart of the study will compromise the reasons of this particular resolution and possible future projections upon the world-wide security. Drawing from the paper, the conclusion will attempt to position itself in favor of a more promising post-Cold War European security perception with respect to the traditional American model and its imminent failures on global security.

Key words: Post-cold war, Europe, United States, security.

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Anahtar kelimeler: Soğuk savaş sonrası, Avrupa, ABD, güvenlik.

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INTRODUCTION

The main argument of this article states that there has been a dramatic shift in European understanding of security from the pre to the post Cold War periods that occurred in favor much of a European flavor in world-wide security-making instead of bandwagon a hegemonic power, particularly that of the USA. Since the world was no longer full of devastated states after major world wars nor was divided within bipolar ideologies; especially with the winds of economic and political globalization paced after the end of the Cold War, Europe has been in search for a new sense of identity that urges a new Europe as a major actor in world-side security. This new sense of ‘we’, in Timothy Garton Ash’s words, in Europe, therefore, seeks for a new ‘other’ to redefine itself: “with the fading of Europe’s other Others, of which more below, Europeans are tempted to find that Other in the United States. We are to define ourselves by what we are not: America! And the wretched of the earth are to be saved not by the hard grid of Americanization but by the soft charm of Europeanization” (Ash, 2004: 12). This paper is devoted to construct a prominent example for this shift - as posited by Ash - in the field of security by going through the well-known debates and studies compromising the related concepts.

European Security during 18th Century- WWII

Indeed, the concept of security is a relatively new phenomenon for states, “since the seventeenth century, when the current system of states began to emerge, international security has been understood and practiced with reference to the needs and interests of states” (Bilgin, 2003: 203). The role of states, here, might range from providing ‘the security’ for their citizens to secure the very existence of themselves.

In the nineteenth century, no major wars among European ‘great powers’ occurred except perhaps the Crimean War between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom and France (1854-56). Unfortunately, Europe could not enjoy this period of no-war any longer than a century, and it was once again proved that wars would become catalysts of the state formation in the Old Continent, proving Tilly who states that since AD 990, “Europeans followed a standard war-provoking logic: everyone who controlled substantial coercive means tried to maintain a secure area within which he could enjoy the returns from coercion, plus a fortified buffer zone, possibly run at a loss, to protect the secure area” (Tilly, 1992: 70). Therefore, not only war made states and vice versa, but also state formation made security necessary and vice versa. Hobsbawm links the end of this absence of war during the nineteenth century with the Question D’Orient and the rising power of Russia, which triggered the break-up of the balance of power system in Europe (Hobsbawm, 1996: 118-122) while for Polanyi, the main actor in the break-up of the system was the overly-trusted self-regulating
mechanism of the liberal economic order, which was not supported by the requirements of the organized social life in the beginning of the twentieth century (Polanyi, 2001: 210-217). Despite reasons might vary, the inevitable end was at the gates for Europe: two annihilating world wars canned in thirty years.

**European (Common) Security during the Cold War**

The debris of the WWII led to the polarization of the world between the hegemonic aims of its two victorious powers — the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) — and the concept of common security constituted the major part of all Cold War discussions. Yet, another major consequence of the thirty one years of world worlds was the interaction between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Standing as the absolute -economic- triumphant of the World War II, the USA had the chance to spread all of her surplus capital and overproduction that had been overly accumulated before and during the War to other spaces on earth (Arrighi, 1999: 218-223). Hence, the American over-accumulation of capital, after Second World War, was mostly ‘fixed’ within European borders. The Marshall Plan was to ensure the reconstruction of devastated European structure and the short-time recovery of European economies. The American side was happy with the geographic expansion and transformation of its over-accumulated capital while the Europeans not only desperately needed the given ‘hot money’ but also used it beneficially with the tradition of capitalism (Negri, 2006: 56). In other words, the WWII defined one side of the Cold War polarization with the USA and (Western) Europe together.

In fact, the idea of common security, “based on the notion that security must be sought and maintained not against one’s adversaries but with them” (Bilgin, 2003: 204), was included into the ‘security genre’ by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1980s. The main motive behind the concept was triggered by what is called ‘the classical security dilemma’, proposed in 1950 by Herz, implying that the more one increases his military power, the more his adversary will increase his own military endowment because of the ever-rising feeling of insecurity against each other’s growing military capacity (Herz, 1950: 157-180). This endless vicious cycle could only be kept under control by common security notion that sought for mutual security counterparts.

Until Gorbachev’s decision to accept sufficiency, which eventually caused the end of the Cold War, the very characteristic of the European security was that it was divided with ‘the iron curtain’ between the US-sided (capitalist) West and the Soviet-sided (communist) East. Therefore, the only agents of ‘collective (not common) security’ were NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the Warsaw Pact. The Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Article IV of the Treaty of Warsaw, both, gave the
guarantee of collective security under any circumstances that threatened the individual security of any of the member states. The basic outcome of the articles, in turn, was the association of the individual securities of the Western European countries with the USA and those of the Eastern European countries with the USSR.

Taking the European integration process into account, Dinan, for instance, describes the Marshall Plan as “the main instrument used by the United States to encourage European integration” (Dinan, 1999: 16). Accordingly, apart from well-known economic aim, the Fund also had three more purposes, being humanitarian, political and security-related. In security perspective, Dinan argues that there was an “emerging consensus that postwar US security depended on increasing international involvement [and] the onset of Cold War provided a powerful incentive for the United States to play a leading part in European affairs” (Dinan, 1999: 17). In other words, during the formation of the EU, the American and European interests had a common idea and will that European integration would be progressed under American hegemony, including American military, economic and political involvement.

For Gartner “the Cold War system was based on the concept of balance of power” (Gartner, 2001: 125). He, indeed, follows Walt’s modification of the Morgenthau’s conception of ‘balance of power’, as the “balance of threat” (Walt, 1987: 7), since during the Cold War period, alliances were established based upon the fear against the other party, in the case of West, the threat perceived against Soviets, and vice versa. Therefore, Gartner continues, “this traditional model, where the existence of alliance and a potential threat were inseparable, is consistent with the bipolarity of the Cold War” (Gartner, 2001: 125).

Post-Cold War Security & the Ways Splitting Up between Atlantic Partners

The main attributes of the Cold War period were hence the guaranteed national securities under the alliance established, at first mostly economically, with America and the solid transatlantic alliance. With the ‘common security’ notion, spread throughout both capitalist and communist worlds as an initiative of Gorbachev, Cold War came into an end with a new world-wide perception of security, especially with the inclusion of the ex-Communists European states into the transatlantic cooperation, and an absolute hegemony of the USA in all economic, military, political and security-related means. At least, it was expected to be so.

Among those who expected and, indeed, foresaw the inevitable victory of the liberal side first came Michael Doyle. The idea of ‘democratic peace’ among liberal democracies, indeed, appeared first in 1983 in a Philosophy and Public Affairs article (Doyle, 1983: 205-235). Fukuyama, however,
made this very theory famous in his notorious phrase ‘the end of history’. He called ‘the end of history’ based on the idea that liberal democracy was now widespread all-around the world after the Cold War, hence history would, from then on, not indicate any large-scale war between great powers (Fukuyama, 2006b: 11-31).

“Because the word ‘international’ suggests an interstate framework that is no longer the locus of the security faced by many actors around the globe, the phrases ‘global security’ and ‘world security’ were proposed as alternative formulations” (Bilgin, 2003: 207) for ‘international security’ or ‘common security’. The debate on ‘human security’ was also proposed in the aftermath of the Cold War, not only in the academia but also in the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental institutions since the idea of globalization aimed to go beyond national borders and necessitated to focus on global humanitarian concerns.

The shift in the conception of security from the collective security of the Cold War to the global security of the post-Cold War was also supported by the American hegemony. Michael Mandelbaum, for instance, proposed a theory that sought for ‘the ideas that conquered the world’ in the aftermath of the Cold War, which were considerably affected by those theories of Doyle and Fukuyama, and praised in several American neo-conservative newspapers, think-tanks and journals. The major idea that Mandelbaum’s book evolved around was simple but powerful: the post-Cold War have been witnessing the victory of political liberalism and the Wilsonian triad of ideas that were democracy, peace and free-markets have already conquered the world. In a certain way, Mandelbaum was right to see the domination of these ideas in the wake of the Cold War; yet he went a little further than that: at that time, accordingly, “… liberal internationalism was not, therefore, universal. It was, instead, hegemonic” (Mandelbaum, 2002: 38). It was hegemonic, since, first, the war between the liberal and illiberal principles were won by the liberals; second, “liberalism triumphed decisively… [since] the winning coalition was united and united in favor of liberal principles” (Mandelbaum, 2002: 49).

Though highly criticized and received several rejoinders from academia; Mandelbaum’s thesis provides valuable information on two major grounds. First of all, it brings out the so-called American way in perceiving post-Cold War security and the (hegemonic) position of America in this picture. Secondly, it indicates the very breaking point where American interests and European interests diverged after almost half a century long convergence under collective and common security perceptions. Despite the fact that globalization paved its way to dominate the world in the aftermath of the Cold War, the globalization of ‘American way’, therefore, led to a break-up in the transatlantic security notion.
Post-Cold War European Security Institutions

After European Defence Community (EDC) and Fouchet Plans initiatives failed in 1960s, the third European attempt to establish an intergovernmental body within the EC, to act as an external actor, flourished in 1969 Hague Summit, and was drafted under the heading of Luxembourg/Davignon Report in 1970. The Davignon Report, in 1986, was formalized by the Single European Act, under the heading of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Having amended by 1973 Copenhagen Report and 1981 London Report, EPC differed from Fouchet Plans with its pro-Atlanticist nature, due to the inclusion of the United Kingdom (UK) into the Communities. For Becher, the EPC “took place in a messy period of economic and monetary crisis and deep disagreements on the future of the transatlantic link, with Kissinger’s Year of Europe as an attempt to solidify the common Western stance in negotiations with the Soviet Union on the one hand, and a French-inspired, widely held desire to finally stand up to the ‘defi American’ and establish Europe’s identity and role at a certain distance from the US, on the other hand” (Becher, 2005: 162). The EPC’s success, under these circumstances, might be evaluated as ‘problematic’, since, for instance, the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation of Europe (CSCE) was hopeful, yet the handling of the Balkan Wars (1991-1995) were disappointing (Callan and Carr, 2002: 128-129).

After the end of the Cold War, the EC entered into a path, in which it was willing to modify itself as a more political actor than its traditional image of an economic union (Çakmak, 2003). In 1993, by the Maastricht Treaty, not only did the Communities become a Union, but also introduced a three-pillar structure, first one being economic (the EC), second one being related to external representation and common security, and the last one being related to justice and home affairs. From the second pillar, was born the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At the heart of that Policy lied the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which aimed to Europeanize such tasks of humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, rescue and combat forces in crisis management as well as of peacemaking. The idea of ESDP was launched in Cologne and Helsinki European Council summits back in 1999. However, as Hyde-Price indicates remarkably, “although some progress has been made, the ESDP remains hamstrung by lack of a common European strategic culture and the diverse geopolitical interests of its current and future members. The heterogeneity and diversity of strategic cultures in Europe means that there has been no coherent or shared European reaction to the changed international security environment of the post-Cold War and post 9/11 world, thus exacerbating transatlantic and intra-European divisions on the use of force” (Hyde-Price, 2005: 141).

When it comes to the ‘legitimacy’ of the CFSP and the ESDP, a three dimensional set of problems occurs: the first problem is related to the
performance of the political system; second is about popular identification with the system; and third compromises the acquisition and exercise of power according to democratic values (Lord, 2005: 114). Yet, the legitimacy issue began to be a major concern with the establishment of the 2004-born European Defence Agency (EDA). The stated mission of the EDA is “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future” (EU Document, 2004). Therefore, the Agency aims to almost ‘standardize’ individual defensive research abilities of its members (all EU countries, except for Denmark) and even to pave the way for ‘militarization’ of the European Union, which is certainly apart from the particular reasons of its establishment at the beginning and might cause a major legitimization problem in terms of centralized decision-making and action-related purposes. However, the Agency is one of the better examples for seeing how European perception of security has been evolving from its roots especially in the aftermath of the Cold War, as will be dealt with in the forthcoming section.

**Post-Cold War European Security Perceptions**

Joseph Nye came up with arguably the most discussed security term that described the shift in the perception of security after the Cold War. The term, ‘soft power’, represented a third kind of power, apart from its military and economic kinds, which is mostly associated with ‘attraction’ and ‘co-option’. In 2004, furthermore, he published a whole book for the changing patterns in the world security under the term ‘soft power’. Accordingly, “soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them … [it] rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others … and soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction” (Nye, 2004: 5-6).

Although Nye’s new model, a new way of using power, was designed particularly for the US foreign policy, the term is ironically used to demonstrate non-American way of solving problems. The EU, in that sense, constitutes a flawless example for the concept. Nye, himself, emphasizes that “nearly nine in ten [of vast majority of Americans] agree that the EU can help solve world problems through diplomacy, trade, and development aid even though it is not as militarily powerful as the US” (Nye, 2004: 78). He continues that within the soft-power terminology, hence, the EU is reaching higher points with its attraction ability that has been prominent in years, at least for the Eastern Europeans and Turks.
The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), on the other hand, opened up a brand new phase in the transatlantic security relations. The most observable impact of the 9/11 was arguably on the threat perception department. International terrorism, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and so-called ‘rogue states’ were emphasized and they jumped directly to the first pages of the security agenda. Parsi states that “if we look at the military threat, the protagonist is Islamist terrorism, borne of fundamentalism, as became quite clear to all after 9/11” (Parsi, 2006: 19). “Now Islam is perceived as the biggest political enemy of many states” (Bağcı, 2006).

The reaction of the Union, as an external actor, was in line with those of its member states, which did not hesitate to declare instant messages of ‘unconditional support’ to the US government. The EU Foreign Ministers gathered in a special meeting three days later, where they were called to observe three minutes of silence and described the attacks as against not only to the US, but also against ‘humanity’ and ‘values of freedom’. The official statement was made as follows: “There will be no safe haven for terrorists and their sponsors; the Union will work closely with the United States and all partners to combat international terrorism” (Barry, 2001). Although such statements of ‘solidarity’ and ‘cooperation’ were very well received worldwide, the EU’s general position over 9/11 kept being considered weak. Brussels expected that the Europeans would choose to act through the Union rather than NATO, or through bilateral relations with the US, yet, it was certainly not the case. As Walker pointed out sharply, “The European Union took a back seat as NATO and Europe’s national capitals took the lead” (Walker, 2002: 1).

Analyzing this expectations-results gap, Shearman and Sussex concludes that the main difference between American and European understandings of security lies right behind the relatively new understanding after the 9/11. “First, these threats are perceived significantly different ways by Europeans on the one hand and Americans on the other. Second, they do not constitute a universal threat that necessitates cohesion and solidarity amongst ‘Western’ states” (Shearman and Sussex, 2004: 62). The underlying reasons of these differences are based on the fact 9/11 happened on American territory and was directed mainly towards the American global power. This clear distinction might also be pursued in the 2003 Iraq War. Although quite arguable, the drive behind the States to launch a war in Iraq was motivated, supposedly, by the emerging threats against Western democracies, liberty and civilization (Halliday, 2006). Yet, European powers, except for Britain and Spain –which indeed supported at the beginning but retired eventually–, did not stand behind such an idea of ‘Western unity’ against international security threats, and “whilst 9/11 and the war on terror did not result in a cohesive CFSP being formulated by EU
members, US unilateralism has led many in Europe to recognize the potential advantages for European states in ‘pooling’ their diplomatic, economic, and political powers (if not sovereignty) through the EU” (Shearman and Sussex, 2004: 62-63). In that sense, contrary to what is expected, 9/11 or the war on terrorism, did not become a “substitute for the Cold War” (Calleo, 2001) for the Europeans. It became, instead, almost a chance for the EU to employ the long-expected plurality of the world security politics after the Cold War, mainly due to the unilateral tendencies followed by the recent American foreign policy.

In that sense, the major break-up between post Cold War European and American security understandings appear under the debate of ‘unilateralism’ and ‘multilateralism’. When the forty five years of Cold War ended, the world system acquired an opportunity to shift from the unchangeable rules of bipolarity to a ‘freer’ atmosphere where individual states or organizations might follow their own political decisions without being supposed to pursue the line drawn by any polar. According to O’Sullivan, in order to fill the gap of ‘lawless’ world, the ‘quiet revolution of trans-nationalism’ happened through five overlapping developments: “(1) the growing power and authority of international, transnational, and supranational organizations such as the U.N. and its various agencies, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization; (2) the transformation of international law from the arbitration of disputes between sovereign states into laws that have a direct impact on individual citizens and private bodies through treaties and conventions that override domestic legislation; (3) the dramatic increase in the number of non-governmental organizations and their increasing influence on international politics; (4) the spread of economic, environmental, and social regulation from the national to the international level through laws, treaties, and “standards”; (5) and the emergence of common values, a common outlook, and even a class consciousness among the diplomats, lawyers, and bureaucrats in international organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations, and those academic centers that serve them” (O’Sullivan, 2004).

In the picture O’Sullivan draws, within which the economic, ideological, political as well as security-related role of the EU increased dramatically for last fifteen years, the catalyzing role surely belongs to the increasing multilateralism taken place between the USA and the rising powers, such as China (Hutton, 2006), Russia, Japan and no doubt the EU. However, not only the recent Bush administration, but also the post-Cold War (father) Bush and Clinton administrations took several unilateral steps, on the contrary, (ranging from the 1991 invasion of Iraq, interventions on Somalia or Sudan, to the latest invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq) whereas economic, cultural and even political globalization were bringing those ‘great’ powers closer to each other.
In particular for the US-EU relations, the greatest danger, according to Sloan, comes from “the combination of toothless European autonomy and careless American unilateralism”, examples of which are worth paying attention, to him, “Bush administration has managed, through its careless unilateral behavior to throw away all the good will generated by the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, and now to have put in jeopardy the new consensus on NATO’s global role agreed in Prague last November. In response, the government of France, called for a united EU front against the US approach to Iraq indulging in toothless ‘autonomous’ behavior, the European response to American unilateralism – perhaps understandable, but not helpful” (Sloan, 2003).

**Post Cold War Europe: A ‘Kantian Paradise’?**

This ‘understandable but not helpful’ polarization between American and European understandings of security in the post Cold War environment was reviewed and even conceptualized, as Kaganism, by American neo-conservative scholar and politician Robert Kagan, in his 2002 Policy Review article. Accordingly, “it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging” (Kagan, 2002). For Kagan, this divergence is mostly reasoned by Europe’s being the pioneer of a new security strategy with more diplomacy, more persuasion (reminding of the Nye’s ‘soft-power’ concept), more patience in taking action, more tolerance, more international institutions and law, and more cooperation whereas Americans had long been the champions of the classic quick diplomacy, good vs. evil approach, coercion, unilateralism, and search for finality – Yıldızoğlu points out that these characteristics of American security perception were also hailed in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2005, which basically drew a thick line between American hegemony (or even Empire) and the rest of the world (Yıldızoğlu, 2006) -.

The ‘Kaganian’ reasons why the US and European (indeed the EU) foreign policies have shifted from a similar agenda to such differing areas are strikingly similar to those being analyzed so far in this essay. He reduces, however, the historical paradigm shift into two major factors. Firstly, it is simply the concept of ‘power’ by which European and American security interests differ. Accordingly, the EU foreign policy truly represents the ‘psychology of the weak’ with the examples of its ineffectiveness in the Balkan wars in the 1990s, the reduction in military spending of European governments, and the hovering arguments about the CFSP. Further, as a typical sign of the weak, Europeans prefer solving problems within the boundaries of international law, institutions, tolerance and multilateralism,
even denying the real ‘threats’ of the world security (like terrorism, proliferation of the WMD, and militant Islam after 9/11 events) and labeling them as ‘challenges’ instead of ‘threats’. In addition to this ‘typical’ psychological motivation, the Europeans do not have to worry about the real threats because of the concept of ‘disparity of power’, which represents that the Continent of Europe is under NATO, hence the USA, guarantee and the Continent is not a primary but only a secondary target of the real ‘threats’, coming way after the soil of America. For Europeans, enjoying, this ‘free-rider’ problem, therefore, it is more than understandable to speak in ‘friendly’ terms, searching for non-coercive means to solve problems.

Secondly, Kagan proposes an historical/ideological dilemma between the two sides of the Atlantic. According to Kagan, the formation of the EU is the best example of the post-modern historical evolution, ideologies of which represent the priority given to tolerance, negotiation and international law. Spreading these ‘values’ world-wide is almost like a ‘mission’ for the Union whereas the USA’s pose, in this picture, is nothing but a ‘threat’ to this European mission. In a philosophical sense, the Europeans are searching for a Kantian ‘perpetual peace’ against the anarchic Hobbesian world of the US. However, Kagan rejects and adds that if there is even a possibility for the Kantian paradise for Europe, it is solely because of the US security guarantee over the Continent during as well as after the Cold War.

Kagan’s provocative article has, doubtlessly, received many responses from all walks of the academia. Yet, Alan Henrikson’s paper was understood as the ‘predator’ of Kagan’s work. Henrikson is indeed giving credit to Kagan for that he also acknowledges the need for transatlantic cooperation and that Kagan actually reminded of the necessity for it. However, he defends that “the United States and its American neighbors, on the one side, and the countries of Europe, on the other, are two halves of the same historical entity – the same basic, diverse, ever-changing but nonetheless mutually recognizable civilization” (Henrikson, 2003). According to Henrikson, Kagan’s power-oriented America figure and law-oriented Europe figure are caricatures of both sides and do not reflect the reality. The reality is, for him, that European and American sides are interwoven by complex, demanding and successful economic, political and military ties, especially if one is to consider the role of the USA in the establishment of the Union after the WWII and during the Cold War, and ‘polarizing’ the differences between them is nothing but harmful for world-wide peace.

Henrikson also criticizes Kagan in theoretical terms as well, claiming that ‘Kaganism’ is theoretically inconsistent since Kagan uses three distinct approaches in his article and book, namely realism, idealism and constructivism. Kagan’s ‘all-important question of power’, firstly, brings him in the realm of realism, and he particularly refers to power as ‘physical coercion’, neglecting other forms of it (another reference to Nye’s concept of
‘soft-power’). The philosophical interpretation of Kagan, secondly, shows his ‘idealistic’ side, in which Kagan is not sure whether the Europeans do not have enough guns to become ‘powerful’ because of the ideology they follow (‘Kantian’, peaceful, multilateral, negotiation-based approach) or the fact that Europeans do not have enough weaponry necessitates them to follow such an ideology. Thirdly, Kagan claims that since the end of the Cold War, Europe is trying to establish itself apart from America, even from the West, and to form a single European entity. Yet, according to Henrikson, such an approach does not necessarily intend to put a gap/rift in transatlantic relations, since the leading motive of the formation of the United States was to become separated from Europe, then representing the center of coercion, warfare and unilateralism.

Internal Tensions – Corporate Perception?

Before the conclusion, a particular problem about the basis of this essay must be reflected, and ways to solve it should be sought for. Since the beginning of the article, the concept of perception – either it is devoted to the pre-Cold War or post-Cold War environment – has been used to indicate a ‘common’ notion. In detail, for instance, European perception of security in the aftermath of the Cold War has been reflected as such that Europe, as the whole Continent, has agreed to take unanimous decision and had the will to pursue that decision; and the USA is no different. This is, no doubt, misleading. First, as also pointed out earlier, even the EU has been having serious legitimacy troubles although it has established central decision-making organs before individual governments, let alone the boundaries of the European Continent, which countries are included, is highly questionable. Second, more importantly, in this lack of higher decision-making mechanism, domestic politics gain even more significance in terms of international/global security understandings, which are on the other hand, highly susceptible to change.

Do these factors lead to a contextual hazard for this essay? The answer is yes, because when one is dealing with such an issue that is subject to change easily, the future predictions seem to be even more problematic. On the other hand, the answer is no, because there is a certain tendency for both actors, different European and US governments, in years that has been rarely changed regardless of internal governmental shifts. The internal tensions, therefore, do not demonstrate high variances upon the big-picture of Continental security perceptions even though domestic politics are in alteration.

In order to support this argument, the study entitled ‘The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?’ undertaken by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS) would be helpful. In this study, the ISS first deals with the notion of hegemony, associating the concept with
“both material supremacy and the recognition of primacy and authority on the part of other members of the international community”, then the Institute continues with a positive connotation that “the absence of a hegemonic power will have momentous implications for shaping global governance… no individual state power will be up to the task of setting the rules of the game in the global economy, and shaping global institutions, as the US largely did in the aftermath of the Second World War.” (EU ISS Document, 2006: 196) This optimistic view for the absence of global hegemony, however, does not go any further, stating that “after three centuries of Western hegemony, history is taking a somehow more natural course, with new pivotal players emerging and smaller countries forging closer ties at the regional level. Power will inevitably shift from the West to the rest.” (EU ISS Document, 2006: 206) The statement is in fact remarkable to be quoted as not only does it celebrate the end of American hegemony but also it foresees a future with more power given to the non-Western world. This demonstrates that American hegemony is no longer supported - explicitly or implicitly – by the Europeans.

The Center for European Reform (CER), as well, supports the forecast of the ISS in their recent study ‘Divided World: The Struggle for Primacy in 2020’. The editor of the CER’s study, Mark Leonard summarizes the position of the EU in the press release: “An Expanded ‘Europshire’ will share the America’s belief in democracy – but be divided from by its support for international institutions. To Europe’s east, Russia and China will lead an ‘axis of sovereignty’ that seeks to use law and multilateral institutions to protect states from Western interference” (Leonard, 2007). The emphasis, this time, is given to the multilateralism needed for a more secure world, inclusion of ‘the rising powers’, i.e., China, Russia and the EU itself, and significance of international institutions freed from all American influence.

The outcome of these (official European) studies indicates a shift in the European mind about the decline of American hegemony and repositioning of the EU in this new global context. Not only the recent rising relations with Russia (Erşen, 2004), but also the recently opposing French and German positions against American invasion on Iraq and establishment of American ballistic missile shield within Polish and Czech territories (Castle, 2007) are clear instances that indicate the growing distance between former friends of the Atlantic.

**Conclusion – Three Questions to be Answered**

There are three questions remained to be answered to conclude this article and make the change in European security perception in the aftermath of the Cold War more prominent.

The first question is related to the so-called ‘rift’ between traditional allies of the Atlantic, ‘as America reaches out to the conclusion of
Mandelbaum that searches for a harmony under American hegemony, is it good for Europe to drive into a different direction?’ The answer should, though complex, be related whether Europe offers a security that is utterly different than the ideas of ‘democracy’, ‘peace’ and ‘free-markets’, which are associated with the ‘American-way’. These items, indeed, are likewise-inclusive ideas that are written in the Maastricht Treaty’s CFSP section, such as “democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (EU Document, 1992). The Union is probably one of the promising examples of the theory of ‘the end of history’ and the ‘absence of war’ among liberal, democratic states, although it also has obstacles on legitimacy and effectiveness issues (Fukuyama, 2006a: 192). Thus, it must be emphasized that the split between American and European perceptions of security is not particularly determined in the field of ideology but especially in the means of imposing that similar ideology. The debates on multilateralism and unilateralism or on hard power and soft power are worth listing.

The second question, then, is related to these means of new European security and how they are handled through the European institutions. The basic quality of the American guarantee over the Western Europe in the years of the Cold War was its solidity, of which the current world-wide security is largely lack. The new types of security threats, including fundamentalist terrorism, the WMD or the rogue states phenomena, unfortunately make stability in neither the methods nor the means of security any easier, including those of America. Moreover, as American hard grid of security understanding and her pose of hegemon - or even Empire for some authors (Ignatieff, 2003) - increases, the level of threat directed against the US also ascends. In this turbulence of world-wide security, therefore, being an ally to the American hegemony turns into a critical decision to be made by European policy-makers. Although the European institutions of the post-Cold War security have so far failed or stood still in several occasions, from the Yugoslavian conflict to the Iraq War, keeping the ‘negotiating’ position with the sources of problems might, as well, be regarded as a valid option taken by the European parties and it seems to be appropriate with the missions stated in the establishing treaties of those security agencies, such as that of the EDA, as pointed out previously.

The third question, lastly, is whether this new shift of the European security after the Cold War is – at least expected to be – beneficial for the European, or even global security. Or, simply, is this new European security better than the one before? For the answer, Robert Cooper, a former advisor of Tony Blair and External Relations specialist in the Council of the EU, might be referred.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, which Cooper believes the world was about not to be restored but to be constructed entirely newly, he divides the
world into ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’ states. Accordingly, “first there are now states - often former colonies - where in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist a pre-modern zone where the state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all is underway (countries such as Somalia and, until recently, Afghanistan). Second, there are the post imperial, post-modern states who no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest. And thirdly, of course there remain the traditional modern states who behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and *raison d’État* (one thinks of countries such as India, Pakistan and China)” (Cooper, 2002). In this tripartite division, Europe, especially the EU, stands in the post-modern zone. Yet, neither zone is regarded safer than one another. The pre-modern states, for instance, are said to produce terrorist acts whereas modern states are more likely to cause economic instability for the ‘global harmony of world-wide free-trade’ due to their huge populations and their growing demand for limited global resources. Even the post-modern zone is dangerous: “a post-modern world in which security interests are not uppermost in people’s minds is one where the state becomes less important. Within the shelter of NATO and the EU the state itself may weaken or fragment – if devolution turns to disintegration” (Cooper, 2004: 79).

Although Cooper’s division of states is arguable, it is still worth mentioning as he manages to picture how it is more difficult to harmonize the idea of security even between counterparts. His solution to this instable environment of world-wide security constitutes five approaches: first, foreigners must be understood better; second, since foreign policies are shaped through domestic ones, thinking locally is crucial; third, persuasion must be utilized to make long-term commitments with others; fourth, one must perceive thoroughly how national interests are defined; and fifth, constructing international community is the best solution to redefine identities (Cooper, 2004: 86-87). The set of solution proposed by Cooper is designed in the way that the EU has been acting in last fifteen, twenty years. Its diplomatic tone almost excludes the American way of dealing with problems as described in Mandelbaum’s works. The ideas of persuasion, cooperation, diplomacy, patience and utilization of soft security measures are promoted for these post-Cold War security standings, instead of traditional security conception as understood by American foreign policy makers in the recent decade.

As an upshot, considering the admitted failure of ‘the American way’ in the 2003 Iraq War, Cooper’s conclusions and his optimistic views on European understanding of security, unfortunately brings out a dilemma upon the table. After the events of 9/11, American government has been pursuing an aggressive defence strategy with unilateralist roots that may favor up to preemptive strike, contrary to what the current world-wide
security actually seeks for, that is, stability. The shift in the European security perception - though so far proved to be disappointing and dealing with legitimacy problems – is therefore critical in terms not only of following the ‘right’ solution in world-wide security but also of establishing an alternative to be followed by other actors.

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