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İÇSEL BATIK MALİYETLER VE PİYASA YAPISI: SUTTON’IN TEORİK ANALİZİ ÜZERİNE NOTLAR

Endüstrinin ürünlerinin talebinin artmasına karşılık birçok imalat sanayi endüstrisinin neden yüksek oranlarda yoğunlaştığını açıklamak üzere, John Sutton (1991, 1998) oyun-teorik analizlere dayandırılmış içsel batık maliyet teorisini geliştirmiştir. Sutton’un bu soruna yönelik açıklaması, reklam ve Ar-Ge gibi harcamaların firmalar açısından dışsal olarak belirlenmediği, fakat firma kararlarının sonucunda içsel olarak belirlendiği yönündedir. Çünkü reklam ve Ar-Ge harcamaları, firmanın ürününe yönelik tüketicinin satın alma isteğinin artırılması amacıyla katlanılan batık maliyetler olarak düşünülmektedir. Sutton’un piyasa konfigürasyonunda bu batık harcamaların düzeyi ayrıca fiyat dışı rekabetin şiddetini de belirlemektedir. Bu çalışmada Sutton’un içsel batık maliyet teorisi ele alınıp incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Piyasa Yapısı, İçsel Batık Maliyet, Fiyat-Dışı Rekabet

To explain why many manufacturing indusries have remained higly concentrated even as industry demand increases, John Sutton (1991, 1998) has developed the theory of endogenous sunk costs which depends on game-theoretic analyses. Sutton’s explanation to this problem is that the levels of spending such as advertising and R&D are not exogenous to the firms, but are the outcomes of the firms’ choices. Because, advertising and R&D can both be thought of as sunk costs incurred with a view to enhancing consumer’ willingness-to-pay for the firm’s product(s). In the Sutton’s market configuration, the level of these sunk expenditures also determines the toughness of non-price competition mechanism. In this study, Sutton’s endogenous sunk cost theory is discussed and evaluated.

Keywords:

Market Structure, Endogenous Sunk Costs, Nonprice Competition,

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